





Puerto Rico and the Promise of United States Citizenship: Struggles around Status 









A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
(American Culture) 










 Professor Rebecca J. Scott, Co-Chair 
 Associate Professor Jesse H. Garskof, Co-Chair 
 Professor Richard A. Primus 
Associate Professor Martha S. Jones 






























Rebecca Scott deserves foremost credit for whatever merit I have achieved as a 
historian. She has inspired, mentored, encouraged, corrected, and guided me for nearly a 
decade. It has been my honor and privilege to be among her students. 
Jesse Hoffnung-Garskof’s sage and careful hand is evident on every page of this 
project. He has shaped me as a scholar, taught me to find new strands in familiar 
material, pointed me toward new avenues of research, and put wind in my sails.  
I began graduate school in Susanna Blumenthal’s criminal-law course—my most 
challenging academic experience up to that date. Since then, through lessons and 
example, she showed me what a legal historian should aspire to be and helped me try to 
become one. 
I am blessed to count Martha Jones, Richard Primus, and Daniel Ernst among my 
advisers. Martha Jones and Richard Primus have offered advice, reassurance, and 
criticism; brought fresh eyes to my work; and showed me new ways to undertake, 
organize, and direct my research. While Daniel Ernst never officially joined my 
committee, he has been a generous, skilled, and constant teacher, reader, editor, coach, 
and booster. 
I have also been fortunate to work with two wonderful editorial staffs in 
publishing an article and a book review related to this dissertation. I had the opportunity 
 iv 
to thank some of the people who have helped with this project at that time, and I wish to 
incorporate those acknowledgements here.* 
I owe a great debt to the University of Michigan. At the law school, I thank Deans 
Evan Caminker, Jeffrey Lehman, David Baum, Virginia Gordan, Katherine Gottschalk, 
and Sarah Zearfoss; Professors Rebecca Eisenberg, Phoebe Ellsworth, Richard Friedman, 
Bruce Frier, Tom Green, Samuel Gross, Daniel Halberstam, Don Herzog, Doug Kahn, 
Yale Kamisar, Ellen Katz, Joan Larsen, Bill Novak, J.J. Prescott, Nancy Vettorello, and 
Christina Whitman; and Margaret Leary. In the Program in American Culture, I thank 
Marlene Moore and Professors Phil Deloria, Vicente Diaz, Gregory Dowd, Mary Kelley, 
Maria Montoya, Tiya Miles, Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, Penny Von Eschen, and Michael 
Witgen. In the Department of History, I thank Paulina Alberto, Sueann Caulfield, Jean 
Hébrard, Matt Lassiter, Jeremy Mumford, J. Mills Thornton, and Richard Turits. I have 
benefited enormously from my graduate- and law-student peers, including Héctor 
Bladuell, Marisa Bono, Sherri Charleston, Alyssa Chen, Tyler Cornelius, Marie Cruz, 
Peter DiCola, Caroline Fayard, Lorgia García, Lily Geismer, Megan Guilford, Ona Hahs, 
Clay Howard, Monica Kim, Brian Koch, Sharon Lee, Aaron Lewis, Andrew Lin, 
Millington Bergeson-Lockwood, John Low, Will Mackintosh, Bayrex Marti, Graham 
Nessler, Afia Ofori-Mensa, Angela Parker, Isabella Quintana, Marco Rigau Jr., Dean 
Saranillio, Kelly Sisson, Kithika St. John, Daniel Tenny, and Joanne Werdel. While in 
Michigan I have also benefited from participating in the Student Research Roundtable at 
the law school, the Mellon Seminar in the Humanities, the Graduate Student Workshop 
                                                 
* Sam Erman, “An ‘Unintended Consequence’: Dred Scott Reinterpreted,” review of Origins of the Dred 
Scott Case: Jacksonian Jurisprudence and the Supreme Court, 1837-1857, by Austin Allen, Michigan Law 
Review 106 (2008): 1157-1165; Sam Erman, “Meanings of Citizenship in the U.S. Empire: Puerto Rico, 
Isabel Gonzalez, and the Supreme Court, 1895 to 1905,” Journal of American Ethnic History 27 (summer 
2008): 5-33. 
 v 
on U.S. history, and the Graduate Student Roundtable at the conference “Slavery and 
Freedom in the Atlantic World” that the University of Michigan and the University of 
Windsor co-sponsored. As a member of the Michigan Law Review, I was fortunate to 
work with and learn from the editors for volumes 102-104. 
Georgetown Law School, the Institute for Constitutional Studies, the Universidad 
de Puerto Rico, Asociación Pop Wuj, and the Middlebury Spanish Language School all 
provided classroom opportunities during my graduate studies. I owe particular thanks to 
Professors Charles Abernathy, Bryan Pearce-Gonzales, Maeva Marcus, and Mark 
Tushnet; my instructors and host family in Quetzaltenango, Guatemala; and Peter Barrett 
and Charles Zook. 
Historical research is only possible because of the invaluable work of archivists, 
librarians, directors, and staff at repositories and other historically minded institutions. I 
am grateful to all those who have built and maintained those that I have visited and for all 
those there who have applied their knowledge and insight on my behalf. In Puerto Rico, 
these institutions included the Archivo General de Puerto Rico; the Centro de 
Investigaciones Históricas, the Colección Puertorriqueña, and the Biblioteca de Derecho 
of the Universidad de Puerto Rico, Recinto de Río Piedras; the Centro de Documentación 
Obrera Santiago Iglesias Pantín of the Universidad de Puerto Rico, Recinto de Humacao; 
the Archivo de la Fundación Luis Muñoz Marín; the Ateneo Puertorriqueño; and the 
Archivo Histórico Municipal del Municipio Autónomo de Ponce, Puerto Rico. José M. 
Encarnación, Sra. Merche Hicón, Jose H. Morales Cardona, and Evelyn Sola provided 
special assistance as did everyone at the Centro de Investigaciones Históricas. 
 vi 
On the mainland United States, I worked at the Centro de Estudios 
Puertorriqueños of Hunter College; the Maryland, District of Columbia, and New York 
branches of the National Archives; the Library of Congress; the New York City 
Municipal Archives; the Manuscripts and Archives Division and the Schomburg Center 
for Research in Black Culture at the New York Public Library, and the Bentley Historical 
Library of the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor. I owe special thanks to Robert Ellis, 
Pedro Juan Hernandez, Karen Jania, and Gregory Plunges. 
In Cuba, I visited the Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo de la Cultura Cubana 
Juan Marinello, the Centro de Estudios Martianos, the Biblioteca Nacional José Martí, 
and the Archivo Nacional de la República de Cuba. There, elsewhere on the island, and in 
my travel preparations, I benefited from the assistance of Gregorio Delgado García, Mitzi 
Espinosa Luis, Reinaldo Funes Monzote, Ricardo Galbis, Josman García Lauda, Enrique 
López Mesa, Esther Pérez Pérez, Fernando Martínez Heredia, Pedro Pablo Rodríguez, 
Elena Socarrás de la Fuente, Ariadna de la Torre, and Sandra del Valle.  
While conducting my research in Puerto Rico, I found mentorship, community, 
and inspiration within and beyond the Universidad de Puerto Rico, Recinto de Río 
Piedras. I am particularly grateful to Professors Juan Baldrich, Gonzalo Córdova, Astrid 
Cubano, Jorge Duany, Fernando Picó, Efrén Rivera Ramos, Mario Roche Velázquez, and 
Lanny Thompson; the honorable Juan Torruella; and Isabel Córdova, her son Diego, Juan 
Dinzey, Zaire Dinzey-Flores, Esperanza Flores, Tomás Pérez Varela, Marco Rigau Sr., 
and Carmen Suárez. 
 While researching, writing, and presenting on the U.S. mainland, numerous other 
people and organizations have provided me assistance and opportunities. I am thankful 
 vii 
for the mentorship, feedback, and consideration of Professors Christina Burnett, Eileen 
Findlay, Ariela Gross, Tanya Hernandez, Linda Kerber, John Nieto Phillips, and Lucy 
Salyer. The DC Area Legal History Roundtable, Latin American Studies Association, and 
Organization of American Historians have all provided me opportunities to share my 
work and benefit from feedback. Suejean Cho, Dinah Choi, Cassie Dick, Jamie Jones, 
Nancy Kong, Jeff Meiser, Patrick Mueller, Oanh Nguyen, Gautham Rao, Veta 
Schlimgen, David Teller-Goldman, and Joe Wicentowski have been invaluable 
interlocutors, editors, hosts, collaborators, cheerleaders, role models, and sources. 
I owe a special debt to William Jentes, whose named scholarship and warm 
support allowed me to pursue numerous scholarly opportunities that financial 
considerations would otherwise have foreclosed. I am also thankful to the following 
funders, whose generosity has faciliated and made possible myriad aspects of this project: 
the University of Michigan Program in American Culture, the University of Michigan 
Law School, the Rackham Graduate School of the Univeristy of Michigan, the University 
of Michigan Institute for Research on Women and Gender, Clara Belfield and Henry 
Bates, the Immigration and Ethnic History Society, the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, 
the University of Michigan International Institute, and the U.S. Department of Education.  
Family and friends have sustained me throughout this process. I am thankful to 
Rebecca Batiste, David Corcoran, Emma Corcoran, James Corcoran, Lynn Ermann, Kay 
Lee, Jonathan Ragle, and Elaine Tung, as well as the far-too-many people there are to 
name individually. I am thankful to my inlaws, Kevin and Sue Lee, for their support and 
encouragement. In addition to being my oldest and dearest friend, Greg Walton has been 
an incisive, insightful, and indefatigable critic and supporter. Rabia Belt and Ethan Ard 
 viii 
have awed me with their humor, loyalty, warmth, and brilliance for over a decade. Rabia 
has been with me almost every step of the way in graduate school, for which I am more 
thankful than I know how to express. No small part of that gratitude is a result of her 
having brought Ethan to Ann Arbor. 
Though I once prided myself on helping my younger brother Dan Erman find his 
way, our relationship has long since shifted. He is now among my role models and 
confidants, and I valued his support throughout this project. I am proud and grateful to 
have his wife, Katie Toews, as a sister and friend.  
I have dedicated this dissertation to my parents, Mary Corcoran and Howard 
Erman. Nothing in my life, much less this project, would have been possible without 
them. I am forever grateful. 
Listing Julia Lee’s many contributions to this dissertation would be both a fool’s 
errand and beside the point. She is my great and perpetual benediction. Her love, 
companionship, cheer, humor, warmth, loyalty, wisdom, faith, and generosity fill my life 
with meaning, joy, excitement, and passion. As this chapter in my professional career 
draws to a close, I am thrilled to have the opportunity to acknowledge my astounding 
luck at having a lifetime to spend together with her. Thank you. 
Many have had a hand in the improvement and completion of this dissertation. 














LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS x 
CHAPTERS  
1. INTRODUCTION 1 
2. STATUS IN THE SHADOW OF WAR, 1898-1900 24 
3. MAKING ALLIES, MAKING CLAIMS: ISLAND LEADERS ON THE MAINLAND, 
1900-1902 
77 
4. “AMERICAN ALIEN”: ISABEL GONZALEZ AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1902-
1905 
141 
5. “THE FORGOTTEN ISLAND,” 1905-1909 196 
6. A “PECULIARLY GOVERNED” ISLAND: THE TWILIGHT OF U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP IN PUERTO RICO, 1909-1917 
230 








LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
MD NARA, 350/_/_/_  Maryland National Archives and Records Administration, 
Record Group 350, Series, Box, File 
DC NARA District of Columbia National Archives and Records 
Administration 
46/_/_/_ Record Group 46, Box, Label, Folder 
233/_/_ Record Group 233, Box, Folder 
85/_/_~_/_/_ Record Group 85, Entry, Volume number out of total 
number of volumes, page, no. 
AG . . . /_/_  Archivo General de Puerto Rico . . . , Caja, Expediente 
OG Oficina del Gobernador 
DE Fondo del Departamento de Estado 
SPR Sección del Secretario de Puerto Rico 
COS Serie del Correspondencia Oficina del Secretaria 
CG Correspondiente General 
RC Sub-serie del Registro de Correspondencia 
T Tarea 
CIHCAM _/_/_  Centro de Investigaciones Históricas, Colección Angel M. 
Mergal, caja, cartapacio, documento 
L  Libro 
LOC  Library of Congress 
CDOSIP/MC/_  El Centro de Documentación Obrera Santiago Iglesias Pantín, 
 xi
Microfilm Collection, Roll. 
BCSPCEPHC/_/_/_  Blase Camacho Souza Papers, Centro de Estudios 
Puertorriqueños, Hunter College, Series, Box, Folder 
SGL _/_ Library of Congress, Samuel Gompers Letterbooks, 1883-
1924, volume, page 















 When Frederic Coudert opted to tell the legal history of early-20th-century 
relationships between U.S. empire and U.S. law, few were better positioned. Following 
U.S. invasions of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines in the 1898-99 war with Spain, 
and U.S. annexations of Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Guam, Coudert had acted as 
counsel in innumerable claims concerning the status of the newly acquired lands and 
peoples. Appearing alongside and on behalf of Puerto Rican political leaders, a migrant 
from the island seeking work on the mainland, and merchants involved in U.S.-Puerto 
Rican trade, he had presented arguments to U.S. agencies, courts, and legislators. By 
1926, his activities—especially his arguments before the Supreme Court in the disputes 
on the topic that came to be known as the Insular Cases—had won him wealth, 
prominence, and influence. Reflecting on these events in the pages of the Columbia Law 
Review, he described the Insular Cases as presenting the Supreme Court a choice 
between its “reverence for the Constitution” and allowing “the United States properly to 
govern a people so alien.” “These two conflicting desires,” Coudert explained, “were 
reconciled by [an] ingenious and original doctrine” that “failed anywhere to specify what 
particular portions of the Constitution were applicable to the newly acquired 
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possessions.” “The very vagueness of the doctrine,” Coudert concluded, “was valuable.” 
The genesis, persistence, and significance of that doctrine, which he called “Territorial 
Incorporation,” lies at the core of this study.1 
This study proposes a new scholarly perspective on the Insular Cases, especially 
Gonzales v. Williams (1904). Like Coudert, I argue that doctrine emerged from the 
balance and interplay between legal and administrative concerns. But these two strands 
within the U.S. state are not the whole story. This thesis also traces how a group of Puerto 
Ricans articulated legal claims about their citizenship in response to the evolution of this 
legal doctrine, sometimes challenging it, sometimes working within in, and sometimes 
acting to shape it. 
As Coudert indicated, struggles over law and empire in the United States involved 
institutional actors both within and beyond courts. U.S. expansion in 1898 created 
opportunities for federal administrators—especially those in the Department of War—to 
emerge alongside courts and political parties as lead actors in the federal government. As 
they cooperated and competed to secure autonomous control over and policies for Puerto 
Rico and other newly U.S. lands, such officials deployed and deferred to legal claims. 
Members of U.S. political branches also drew upon legal language and norms, responded 
to judicial decisions, and acted in accordance with their declarations that they were bound 
                                                 
1 Frederic R. Coudert, “The Evolution of the Doctrine of Territorial Incorporation,” Columbia Law Review 
26 (1926): 850 (quotes 1, 3-7), 828 (quote 2); see also, e.g., Gallardo v. Noble, 236 U.S. 135 (1915). 
Recent scholars join Coudert in examining post-annexation cases concerning the status of Puerto Rico and 
Puerto Ricans as of a piece. For works defining the Insular Cases to include such cases, see, e.g., 
Bartholomew H. Sparrow, The Insular Cases and the Emergence of American Empire (Lawrence: 
University of Kansas Press, 2006); Christina Duffy Burnett, “A Note on the Insular Cases,” Foreign in a 
Domestic Sense: Puerto Rico, American Expansion, and the Constitution, ed. Christina Duffy Burnett and 
Burke Marshall (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2001), 389; see also Efrén Rivera Ramos, The 
Legal Construction of Identity: The Judicial and Social Legacy of American Colonialism in Puerto Rico 
(Washington D.C., American Psychological Association, 2001). 
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by law.2 
Coudert observed that courts navigated similarly competing pulls between 
governance and law. Judges knew that their decisions variously influenced, empowered, 
and hindered administrative and political officials. They expressed and displayed fidelity 
to law, but sought to avoid creating a conflict between what they perceived to be needs of 
governance and the constraints they saw as essential for avoiding tyranny. Some 
contemporaries described judges’ law as the mere, nearly automatic deduction of results 
from preexisting and apolitical axioms. Others perceived a law predicated upon evolving 
social conditions and morals. And some considered judges to be instrumental and 
idiosyncratic arbiters. But judges belonged to and were influenced by a broader 
community of legal academics and commentators, private lawyers, and government 
attorneys. To varying degrees, these heterogeneous legal actors shared norms about the 
substance, nature, and practices of law that judges felt at least partly bound to honor or 
address.3 
                                                 
2 For work describing and theorizing the slow emergence of powerful, autonomous agencies from a U.S. 
state largely constituted by political parties and courts, see Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American 
State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920 (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982); see also Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of 
Social Policy in the United States (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993); Peter H. 
Argersinger, “The Transformation of American Politics: Political Institutions and Public Policy, 1865-
1910,” in Contesting Democracy: Substance and Structure in American Political History, 1775-2000, eds. 
Byrn E. Shafer and Anthony J. Badger (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001). 
3 On classical legal thought and its detractors, see, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of 
American Law 1870-1960: The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); 
Thomas C. Grey, “Langdell’s Orthodoxy,” University of Pittsburgh Law Review 45 (1983): 1-53; Duncan 
Kennedy, “Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal 
Thought in America, 1850-1940,” Research in Law and Sociology 3 (1980): 3-24; Christopher Tomlins, 
“Framing the Field of Law’s Disciplinary Encounters: A Historical Narrative,” Law & Society Review 34 
(2000): 933; Robert W. Gordon, “The Elusive Transformation,” Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities 6 
(1994): 137-162 (reviewing Horwitz, Transformation of American Law). Stephen A. Siegel has examined 
historical views of law as systematic and yet also predicated on the morals and conditions of particular 
groups in specific times and places. See, e.g., “Francis Wharton’s Orthodoxy: God, Historical 
Jurisprudence, and Classical Legal Thought,” American Journal of Legal History 46 (2004): 422-446. On 
elite lawyers, law schools, legal academics, and the broader legal community, see Robert W. Gordon, “‘The 
Ideal and the Actual in Law’: Fantasies and Practices of New York City Lawyers, 1870-1910,” in The New 
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People not employed by the U.S. state also participated in these negotiations. 
Because U.S. officials throughout the state sought myriad, often-conflicting ends, the 
concrete disputes and problems that they faced influenced the priorities that they 
emphasized and pursued and thus the relationships that they formed, the compromises 
that they reached, and the conflicts that they perpetuated. Those seeking to harness or 
stave off state action found opportunities in the resultant indeterminacy and plasticity of 
official policy and decision making. Many, including the five Puerto Ricans whose 
claims making in 1898-1917 is the focus of this project, sought to exploit this dynamic by 
becoming students of the state. They learned the competing commitments and aims of 
U.S. judges, administrators, and elected officials and used that knowledge to pursue their 
ends by turning some arms of the state against others or positioning one to influence 
another’s decisions.4 
To perceive processes and changes like those Coudert described requires 
identifying and exploring dynamics that encompassed courts, other arms of the state, and 
claimants largely devoid of political, economic, or social power. Hoping to harness 
judicial power, individuals crafted claims, presented them to authorities, and thereby 
framed the arguments and conflicts that courts faced when they rendered decisions. 
Often, moreover, those conflicts were predecessors of and heirs to similar disputes that 
had arisen before courts, agencies, and political officials. 
 This study builds on conceptions of legal history that look beyond judicial 
                                                                                                                                                 
High Priests: Lawyers in Post-Civil War America, ed. Gerard Gawalt (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 
1984), 51; Neil Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); 
Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1870-1960; Robert Stevens, Law School: Legal Education 
in America from the 1850s to the 1980s (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983). 
4 On the complexities of the incentives, circumstances, and senses of self of U.S. officials that shaped their 
actions, see, e.g., Daniel Ernst, “Morgan and the New Dealers,” Journal of Policy History 20 (2008): 447-
481; Daniel P. Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy 
Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1896-1928 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001). 
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proceedings to encompass the various struggles over concepts that unfolded between 
people outside the state and officials from all across it. The core case at the center of this 
project, Gonzales v. Williams (1904), thus only emerges at the midpoint of my seven 
chapters. The balance of the study attends to other aspects of the struggles around, law, 
empire, and status of which Gonzales was but a part. 
 The 1898 U.S. invasion of Puerto Rico interrupted and redirected years of 
struggle by Spanish Antilleans with Spain for greater freedoms. It occasioned a 
realignment of island politics that intertwined with debates in Puerto Rico and among 
U.S. officials over the rights and status of post-annexation Puerto Ricans. U.S. lawmakers 
initially saw Puerto Rico primarily in terms of the Philippines, the annexation of which 
worried most mainlanders more than did that of Puerto Rico. By providing Puerto Ricans 
little self-government and no recognition as U.S. citizens in the 1900 Foraker Act 
establishing civil government in Puerto Rico, Congress hoped to create a model for U.S. 
rule in the Philippines that could be challenged in court without risking an adverse ruling 
directly applicable to the Philippines. But the first round of Insular Cases (1901) did not 
settle the status of Puerto Ricans or Filipinos. Seeking to clarify matters, the elected 
Puerto Rican representative in Washington, Federico Degetau y González, launched 
numerous claims to U.S. citizenship on behalf of Puerto Ricans. His opportunity came in 
1901, after immigration officials excluded the Puerto Rican Isabel Gonzalez as an 
undesirable alien and she and her uncle, Domingo Collazo, launched a lawsuit claiming 
U.S. citizenship.5 
When the Supreme Court issued its opinion in the case, it established that Puerto 
                                                 
5 I follow the usage of Isabel Gonzalez and her brother Luis Gonzalez in signing their names and omit the 
accent marks. Isabel Gonzalez to Federico Degetau, 10 Apr. 1904, CIHCAM 5/I/5; Luis Gonzalez to 
Federico Degetau, 5 Feb. 1903, CIHCAM 3/VII/35. 
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Ricans, and thus likely Filipinos, were not aliens. Many also understood Gonzales to 
signal the Court’s unwillingness to decide whether Puerto Ricans were U.S. citizens. 
 After Gonzales, federal administrators and the U.S. political branches became 
increasingly amenable to a U.S. citizenship for Puerto Ricans that courts seemed unlikely 
to construe as constraining U.S. rule in the Philippines. In Puerto Rico, the decision also 
preceded a political realignment that swept Degetau’s party from power and firmly 
installed a coalition, led by Luis Muñoz Rivera, that took a more confrontational attitude 
toward perceived injustices of U.S. rule in Puerto Rico. Muñoz and his co-partisans 
became more incrementalist, however, after 1909, when Congress reduced Puerto Rican 
self-government in response to protests by elected islanders for greater democracy. 
During the years that followed, organized labor in Puerto Rico became increasingly 
powerful and assertive as one of its leaders, Santiago Iglesias, helped expand its reach 
from the cities into the fields by co-leading large agricultural strikes that began in 1915. 
Drawing on a decade-long alliance with the American Federation of Labor, a powerful 
mainland labor organization, and on years of experience claiming for Puerto Ricans 
rights that mainland workers sought or held, Iglesias also aligned Puerto Rican and U.S. 
organized labor firmly behind U.S. citizenship for Puerto Ricans. Those latter efforts 
culminated with congressional extension of U.S. citizenship to Puerto Ricans in the 1917 
Jones Act, an event that altered but did not resolve struggles around the status of Puerto 
Rico and of Puerto Ricans. 
Through this reframed legal history of the first two decades of U.S. imperial rule 
in Puerto Rico, several revisions to standard accounts of the Insular Cases become 
apparent. The relative importance and coherence of the longest and most-cited of those 
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cases—Downes v. Bidwell (1901)—has tended to overshadow the significance of 
Gonzales to the history of U.S. citizenship and empire. In explicating Insular Cases, 
some scholars have argued that the Court used them to try to reconcile fidelity to 
constitutional norms with exigencies of empire by explicitly altering the constitutional 
order. Other scholars have disagreed, stressing that the Court had long accorded U.S. 
political branches wide discretion in territorial governance and that the Court ultimately 
explicitly denied U.S. colonized peoples few rights. This investigation finds much truth 
in both positions. The Insular Cases, which attempted to reconcile Constitution and 
empire, involved few explicit alterations to constitutional rights. To do so, justices met 
claims seeking clarification of the status of Puerto Rico and Puerto Ricans by announcing 
narrow holdings in opinions that maintained a studied and productive ambiguity.6 
 But evasive decisions were decisions nonetheless. Slowly, a new legal landscape 
emerged. Between 1898 and 1917, a conventional wisdom formed among many U.S. 
officials and Puerto Rican political and organized-labor leaders that judicial actions 
seeking U.S. citizenship for Puerto Ricans were likely to remain unavailing and that 
                                                 
6 In advocating a link between potential U.S. de-annexation of Puerto Rico and the Insular Cases, Christina 
Duffy Burnett stresses longstanding congressional power over U.S. territories and the relatively few 
constitutional rights that the Supreme Court has explicitly denied residents of Puerto Rico. “Untied States: 
American Expansion and Territorial Deannexation,” University of Chicago Law Review 72 (summer 2005): 
797-879. Additionally, she collects and distinguishes herself from scholarship depicting the Insular Cases 
as having distinguished unincorporated territories like Puerto Rico—where residents only received 
fundamental constitutional rights—from incorporated territories where the U.S. Constitution applied in full. 
Ibid. 808-809 & nn.39-41. For more on U.S. discretion in territories, see Sarah H. Cleveland, “Powers 
Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power 
over Foreign Affairs,” Texas Law Review 81 (Nov. 2002): 1-284. On Gonzales v. Williams (1904), see Sam 
Erman, “Meanings of Citizenship in the U.S. Empire: Puerto Rico, Isabel Gonzalez, and the Supreme 
Court, 1895 to 1905,” Journal of American Ethnic History 27 (summer 2008): 5-33; Christina Duffy 
Burnett, “Empire and the Transformation of Citizenship,” in Colonial Crucible: Empire in the Making of 
the Modern American State, eds. Alfred W. McCoy and Francisco A. Scarano (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 2009), 332-341; Christina Duffy Burnett, “‘They say I am not an American . . .’: The 
Noncitizen National and the Law of American Empire,” Virginia Journal of International Law 48 (2008): 
659-718. For an overview of research using social and legal histories to trace potentially legal problems, 
see Rebecca Sandefur, “Access to Civil Justice and Race, Class, and Gender Inequality,” Annual Review of 
Sociology 34 (2008): 16.3-16.5; see also Hendrik Hartog, “Pigs and Positivism,” Wisconsin Law Review 
1985: 899-935.  
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consequently Congress was the only source from which such recognition could 
reasonably be sought. In 1898, many U.S. commentators and officials along with some 
leading Puerto Rican political men insisted that Puerto Ricans would secure U.S. 
citizenship, eventual statehood, and full constitutional protections all in a bundle or not at 
all. By 1917, piecemeal official decision making had convinced most observers of the 
contrary. The growing consensus that securing U.S. citizenship would win Puerto Ricans 
few new rights and provide them little help winning U.S. statehood for their island 
increasingly weakened arguments that depended on more robust visions of U.S. 
citizenship. These same shifts, men elected to office in Puerto Rico discovered, left open 
ever fewer promising or even plausible paths to home rule.7 
 Yet doctrine deferred was not doctrine denied. During the first two decades of 
U.S. rule in Puerto Rico, the Court decided very little about the status of U.S. colonies 
and their peoples. Most notably, the justices held, the colonies were neither part of the 
“United States” for purposes of a single clause in one section of an article of the 
Constitution nor a “foreign country” for purposes of pre-1900 U.S. tariff laws. Similarly, 
the Court later decided that Puerto Ricans were not alien to the United States for purposes 
of federal immigration law, but did not thereby clarify their U.S. citizenship status. Even 
territorial non-incorporation—the doctrine for which the Insular Cases are best known 
and which remains binding constitutional law today—did not receive unambiguous 
support from the Court for more than two decades. And though the Court held that Puerto 
                                                 
7 For work examining the invention of citizenship as a legal category in the French context, see Peter 
Sahlins, Unnaturally French: Foreign Citizens in the Old Regime and After (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
University Press, 2004); cf. Frederick Cooper, Thomas C. Holt, and Rebecca J. Scott, Beyond Slavery: 
Explorations of Race, Labor, and Citizenship in Postemancipation Societies (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2000) (observing that because freedom, like slavery, unfolded differently across 
locales, citizenship is an institution to be described locally). For an example of a concept—in this case 
capacity—that shifted shape as judges applied it in different doctrinal areas, see Susanna L. Blumenthal, 
“The Default Legal Person,” UCLA Law Review 54 (2007): 1135-1265. 
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Ricans and others who shared their status lacked constitutional rights to certain criminal 
procedures—most notably jury trials—what further constitutional rights they lacked 
remained largely undetermined. By 1917, then, the justices had interposed relatively little 
in the way of holdings with which their successors would have to reckon in further 
clarifying the constitutional relationships between law, empire, status, and rights.8 
 Though they often argued and addressed disputes around law, empire, and status 
as matters of legal reasoning, effective administration, and political priorities, petitioners 
and federal officials also frequently referred to the popular and academic ideas about race 
and empire that they understood these disputes to involve. Among the most powerful 
such socio-cultural concepts were those identifying and justifying global racial 
hierarchies. Such theories spoke of eugenics, degeneration, environmental factors, the 
line between civilization and savagery, and relationships of states, nations, and their laws 
to peoples and races. To many in the United States, these theories were grounds for 
treating certain racial groups as inferior. American Indians, Filipinos, and other tropical 
or indigenous peoples, some thus claimed, were savages. Others—and often the same 
people—deprecated the level of civilization of Asian peoples, especially the Chinese. Yet 
another group—again frequently overlapping in membership—portrayed people of 
southern and eastern European descent, including residents of lands formerly within the 
                                                 
8 For an overview of the Insular Cases, see Sparrow, The Insular Cases (emphasizing the extent to which 
the doctrine of territorial non-incorporation gained ground after 1903, delineating and seeking to rationalize 
instances where the Supreme Court did and did not deny constitutional protections to residents of 
unincorporated territories, and reviewing much prior research analyzing the Insular Cases); José Trías 
Monge, Historia constitucional de Puerto Rico, vol. 1 (San Juan: Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto 
Rico, 1980), 244-267, passim; see also José Trías Monge, Historia constitucional de Puerto Rico, vol. 2 
(Río Piedras, P.R.: Editorial Universitaria, 1981); Note, “Status of Filipinos for Purposes of Immigration 
and Naturalization,” Harvard Law Review 42 (1928-1929): 810 & nn.10-11 (failing to identify a Supreme 
Court holding to support the claim that peoples annexed to the United States in 1898 were not all then U.S. 
citizens);. As Gary Lawson and Robert D. Sloane have recently explained, the “category of fundamental 
rights is as arbitrary and ill-defined as the concept of incorporation,” from which it derives. “The 
Constitutionality of Decolonization by Associated Statehood: Puerto Rico’s Legal Status Reconsidered,” 
Boston College Law Review 50 (2009): 24.  
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Spanish Empire, as incompetent at and inexperienced with law, liberty, and self-
government. At the same time, some in Puerto Rico and the mainland deployed these 
theories to distinguish different levels of degradation among non-Anglo-Saxon peoples 
and thus establish their own relative superiority vis-à-vis others.9 
Annexation also brought Puerto Ricans into a U.S. empire-state still grappling 
with the aftermath of its Civil War. That conflict had long stood, especially in the 
memories of many northerners and of many southerners of color, for union and for 
emancipation, racial justice, and national inclusiveness. In the 1890s, however, 
mainstream white U.S. opinion had increasingly come to vilify a key legacy of that 
conflict: Reconstruction. This renunciation drew inspiration from the academic writings 
of William Dunning, a professional historian at Columbia University who portrayed 
Reconstruction as a northern imposition on the U.S. South. It had resulted, he claimed, in 
misrule by a combination of southern blacks unprepared for office or the franchise, 
“carpet-bagging” northern whites, and southern white “scalawags” who sought to 
                                                 
9 On the concept of the “Anglo-Saxon” and its relationship to scientific racism and U.S. white mainstream 
thought on American Indians and Filipinos, see, e.g., Mark S. Weiner, “Teutonic Constitutionalism: The 
Role of Ethno-Juridical Discourse in the Spanish-American War,” in Burnett and Marshall, Foreign in a 
Domestic Sense. Alexandra Stern presents a helpful overview of recent work on U.S. eugenics in her 
introduction to: Eugenic Nation: Faults and Frontiers of Better Breeding in Modern America (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2005), 1-26. On perceived racial differences among those of European 
descent, see Matthew Frye Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the 
Alchemy of Race (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998). On notions of savagery and 
civilization, see Matthew Frye Jacobson, Barbarian Virtues: The United States Encounters Foreign 
Peoples at Home and Abroad, 1876-1917 (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000). A popular mode of thought 
that Stephen A. Siegel terms “historicism” sorted nations and races in part based upon their laws. 
“Historism in Late Nineteenth-Century Constitutional Thought,” Wisconsin Law Review (1990): 1431-
1547. On U.S. perceptions of Filipinos, see Paul A. Kramer, The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the 
United States, & the Philippines (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006). The classic 
overview of U.S.-American Indian relations remains Francis Paul Prucha, The Great Father: The United 
States Government and the American Indians, vols. 1-2 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995 
[1984]). In “‘Chinese Demons’: The Violent Articulation of Chinese Otherness and Interracial Sexuality in 
The U.S. Midwest, 1885-1889,” Victor Jew recounts anti-Chinese violence in Milwaukee and reviews 
scholarship on the Chinese-American experience in the United States. Journal of Social History 37 (winter 
2003): 389-410. For an early work discussing one manner in which Gilded Age intellectuals synthesized 
many of these ideas, see David N. Livingstone, “Science and Society: Nathaniel S. Shaler and Racial 
Ideology,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers [n.s.] 9 (1984): 181-210. 
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advance themselves at the expense of the “mass of” southern whites over whom they 
exercised authority. In its uglier forms—which included and drew upon longstanding 
portrayals of blacks as potential rapists of white women—this theory contributed to the 
epidemic of lynchings in the United States. As intended, such attacks on Reconstruction 
also figured prominently in its rollback, including black disfranchisement and imposition 
of Jim Crow. These ideas became U.S. cultural touchstones as well, winning expression 
in popular media such as Thomas Dixon’s novel The Clansman (1907) and D. W. 
Griffith’s adaptation of it to film, Birth of a Nation (1915).10 
Ideas like those Dunning espoused also became commonplaces of U.S. politics, 
administration, and law. White-supremacist U.S. Democrats’ embrace of them was 
unsurprising. But following U.S. Republicans’ failure in 1890-91 to pass the Lodge Bill 
with its federal-elections protections for U.S. blacks and the perceived wartime need for 
national unity in 1898, substantial numbers of members of Abraham Lincoln’s party also 
came to accept and espouse such ideas. U.S. administrators and judges also operated 
within this ideological frame. Grasping the power of these concepts, men heading what 
came to be the dominant Puerto Rican political coalition took them up, asserting that the 
injustices they perceived in U.S. governance of Puerto Rico reenacted Reconstruction-era 
                                                 
10 William Archibald Dunning, Essays on the Civil War and Reconstruction and Related Topics (New 
York: The Macmillan Co., 1904 [1898]); Charles E. Merriam, “William Archibald Dunning,” American 
Political Science Review 16 (Nov. 1922): 692-694; Thomas Dixon Jr., The Clansman: An Historical 
Romance of the Ku Klux Klan (New York: A. Wessels Co., 1907); The Birth of a Nation, Dir. D. W. 
Griffith (Epoch Producing Corp., 1915); David W. Blight, Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American 
Memory (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001), 108-122, 335-366; Mark Elliott, Color-Blind 
Justice: Albion Tourgée and the Quest for Racial Equality from the Civil War to Plessy v. Ferguson 
(Oxford, Eng.: Oxford University Press, 2006), 237-243; C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim 
Crow, commemorative ed. (Oxford, Eng.: Oxford University Press, 2002 [1955]), 85-96; Rebecca J. Scott, 




U.S. jurisprudence reflected both the emancipatory legacy of the Civil War and 
the narrowing of that legacy in subsequent decades. Postbellum Supreme Court treatment 
of U.S. citizenship illustrates the dynamic. In the Dred Scott case, Scott v. Sandford 
(1857), Chief Justice Taney had held free U.S. blacks not to be U.S. citizens. Claiming 
that states had traditionally denied civil and political rights associated with citizenship to 
free blacks, he had reasoned that the Founders could not have intended the Constitution 
to cloak free blacks with U.S. citizenship. The 14th Amendment repudiated that holding, 
guaranteeing that “All persons born or naturalized in the Untied States, and subject to its 
jurisdiction, are citizens of the United States.” Prior to 1898, U.S. postbellum 
jurisprudence construed this language to classify peoples subject to U.S. jurisdiction and 
born in lands under U.S. sovereignty as U.S. citizens. Afterward, and in light of U.S. 
annexations of territories in which millions of non-whites resided, federal judges 
indicated a willingness to revisit the matter. The Fourteenth Amendment also prohibited 
state abridgement of “the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.” In 
their opinions, Supreme Court justices addressed this clause ambivalently too, variously 
celebrating the significance and substance of U.S. citizenship and construing the status to 
provide few judiciable rights.12 
 While Reconstruction and the Civil War figured prominently in the U.S. past, it 
was Spanish rule that dominated pre-annexation events on the island. Afterward, many in 
Puerto Rico and on the mainland analyzed U.S.-island relations through this lens. U.S. 
                                                 
11 On the relationship between the 1898 war between Spain and the United States and renunciation of the 
heritage of Reconstruction by many Republicans, see Blight, Race and Reunion, 335-366. See also Elliott, 
Color-Blind Justice, 243-249; Woodward, Strange Career of Jim Crow, 85-96; Scott, Degrees of Freedom, 
159-166. 
12 Am. 14, sec. 1, U.S. Const. (quotes); see also note 337 below and accompanying text; . 
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officials and commentators often cast Spain as a tyrant who had denied Puerto Ricans 
self-government, individual rights, and rule of law. For advocates and opponents of U.S. 
imperial policies, such portrayals proved double-edged: In light of them, U.S. rule 
appeared to be an improvement. But they also potentially undermined the legitimacy of 
U.S. policies in cases where those policies could be portrayed as less liberal than Spanish 
ones.13 
Puerto Rican men at the forefront of island politics generally held a more complex 
view of the legacy of Spanish rule. For decades, most prominent island-born politicians 
had been what came to be known as Autonomistas, or autonomists. Federico Degetau y 
González and Luis Muñoz Rivera, both Puerto Ricans at the center of this study, emerged 
as leaders of this movement in the late nineteenth century. Unlike participants in the 
Cuban Revolutionary Party such as Santiago Iglesias and Domingo Collazo—urban 
artisans whose activities also animate this project—Autonomistas did not seek to end 
Spanish rule in Puerto Rico or in neighboring Cuba. Instead, they worked within the 
Spanish system and disavowed Puerto Rican independence, seeking to end preferences 
for those born in continental Spain, to secure full Spanish citizenship and political 
participation for island-born Puerto Ricans, and to win islanders control over island 
affairs. They had made progress on all fronts by mid-1898. In the years following the 
                                                 
13 On the relationship between U.S. perceptions of Spanish tyranny and U.S. understandings of the 
consequences of U.S. military actions in 1898, see Louis A. Pérez, Jr., “Incurring a Debt of Gratitude: 1898 
and the Moral Sources of United States Hegemony in Cuba,” American Historical Review 104 (Apr. 1999): 
356-398. For interrelationships between U.S. domestic issues and U.S. imperialism, see, e.g., Shelley 
Fisher Fishkin, “Crossroads of Cultures: The Transnational Turn in American Studies,” American 
Quarterly 57 (Mar. 2005): 17-57; Lanny Thompson, “The Imperial Republic: A Comparison of the Insular 
Territories under U.S. Dominion after 1898,” Pacific Historical Review 71 (Nov. 2002): 535-574. On gains 
by Autonomistas, see, e.g., Astrid Cubano-Iguina, “Political Culture and Male Mass-Party Formation in 
Late-Nineteenth-Century Puerto Rico,” Hispanic American Historical Review 78 (Nov. 1998): 631-662; 
notes 17-25 below and accompanying text; see also Astrid Cubano Iguina, El hilo en el laberinto: claves de 
la lucha política en Puerto Rico (siglo XIX) (Río Piedras, P.R.: Ediciones Huracán, 1990) 77-144. 
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U.S. invasion, they drew on those experiences to evaluate U.S. policies, chart strategy, 
justify their actions, and craft arguments to present U.S. officials. In particular, they 
deployed this history in service of self-portrayals contesting U.S. images of them as 
passive, politically inexperienced, and unsuited for full citizenship. 
 While the focus of this history is U.S. law, empire, and status as they involved 
Puerto Rico in 1898-1917, the questions it raises about the relationship of modestly 
situated claimants to legal and political change over time have relevance to broader 
concerns in history and throughout the humanities. Recent work on race, class, gender, 
discourse, and culture has made less plausible an earlier ambition of some humanities 
scholars: grand, accurate narratives describing the human condition and its change over 
time. Observing that centers of power like the state were never the whole story, 
humanistic scholars increasingly ask how variously situated people experienced and 
contested everyday power. This scholarship avoids overly neat causal stories but risks 
sacrificing causal explanations altogether. One way to escape this Hobson’s choice—and 
it is the path chosen in this study—is to explore citizenship as a venue both for large-
forces narratives and the complexities of individual agency. Because claims of citizenship 
rested at the nexus of individuals and the state, they provided a tool that individuals used 
to harness state power and that the state deployed to justify coercive actions against them. 
This is not a story in which causation worked neatly—people struggled over meanings of 
citizenship with unpredictable results—but it is one that illustrates mechanisms by which 
the complex processes that formed our past evolved into those that form our present.14 
                                                 
14 On concern over a loss of unifying narratives following the cultural turn in legal history, see, e.g., Ariela 
Gross, “Beyond Black and White: Cultural Approaches to Race and Slavery,” Columbia Law Review 101 
(2001): 640-689. On the loss of traditional grand narratives in legal history, see Robert W. Gordon, 
“Critical Legal Histories,” Stanford Law Review 36 (1984): 57-126. For works focusing on citizenship as a 
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This study attends especially to the ways that the circulation of people and ideas 
could offer resources to those whose positions were otherwise weak. What Rebecca Scott 
terms “concepts” of citizenship provide one example. As people articulated concepts of 
citizenship in one part of the Atlantic World, those concepts could accompany travelers 
and writings along paths of trade, governance, and conquest. This circulation created an 
Atlantic intellectual space in which numerous concepts of citizenship co-existed. When 
residents drew upon this suite of ideas to make claims, they engaged the concepts 
creatively, recombining, inventing, inflecting, and creating alternatives to them. These 
new concepts also entered circulation, becoming bases for new claims.15 
  To explore more specifically how powerful institutions affected and were affected 
by those of more modest means, I draw on scholarship examining what is broadly 
characterized as “claims making.” Such work does not aim to answer classic 
dichotomous framings of questions of rights and repression, an end its methods could not 
achieve. Instead, it looks for mechanisms of negotiation between powerful institutions 
and individuals. Such claims and counter-claims are not mere snapshots of the past; they 
                                                                                                                                                 
legal category, see, e.g., James H. Kettner, The Development of American Citizenship: 1608-1870 (Chapel 
Hill: Published for the Institute of Early American History and Culture by The University of North 
Carolina Press, 1978). Hilda Sabato insists on the importance of citizenship as a word in “On Political 
Citizenship in Nineteenth-Century Latin America,” American History Review 106 (2001): 1290-1315. 
Different characterizations of citizenship can produce seemingly inconsistent results. In Revolution, 
Romanticism, and the Afro-Creole Protest Tradition in Louisiana 1718-1868 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1997) Caryn Cossé Bell finds free, antebellum New Orleanians of color placing 
U.S. citizenship at the core of their claims and senses of self. William J. Novak, by contrast, argues that 
U.S. citizenship was merely one status among many in the United States during these years. “The Legal 
Transformation of Citizenship in Nineteenth-Century America,” in The Democratic Experiment: New 
Directions in American Political History, eds. Meg Jacobs, William J. Novak, and Julian E. Zelizer 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003). 
15 Rebecca J. Scott, “Public Rights and Private Commerce: A Nineteenth-Century Atlantic Creole 
Itinerary,” 48 Current Anthropology (Apr. 2007): 238 (quote). On reconstructing circulation and 
development of ideas in the Atlantic World by those in modest positions, see Laurent Dubois, “An 
Enslaved Enlightenment: Rethinking the Intellectual History of the French Atlantic,” Social History 31 
(Feb. 2006): 1-14; Lara Putnam, “To Study the Fragments/Whole: Microhistory and the Atlantic World,” 
Journal of Social History 39 (spring 2006): 615-630. 
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offer opportunities to study the dynamics through which negotiations between unequal 
agents produced historical change.16 
 This study examines such dynamics of historical change by focusing on five 
Puerto Ricans’ struggles with each other and the state over citizenship and other status 
relationships. They are Federico Degetau y González, Luis Muñoz Rivera, Domingo 
Collazo, Isabel Gonzalez, and Santiago Iglesias. 
Twenty-five-year-old Federico Degetau was a rising member of the liberal, 
cosmopolitan, Puerto Rican elite in 1887. His grandparents hailed from Puerto Rico, 
Britain, and Germany, and his extended family included abolitionists. Though Degetau’s 
parents hosted meetings of leading liberals in their home, his father owned property in 
people until the end of his life in 1863, at which point the twenty-eight-year-old enslaved 
man Chalí appeared among the effects in his will. In the 1870s, Degetau began an 
education in Europe that culminated in an 1888 law degree in Spain. While there, he 
cultivated liberal causes and associations. He joined the freemasons, discussed abolition 
of the death penalty with Victor Hugo, published commentary on pedagogy and fiction, 
participated in the Société Française pour L’Arbitrage entre Nations, met the Puerto 
Rican nationalist leader Ramón Betances, and became both a protégé of a leading Puerto 
Rican pro-autonomy politician. In 1887, that politician, Ramón Baldorioty, founded and 
Degetau then joined the Partido Autonomista, which became the primary party for Puerto 
Rican-born politicians. Baldorioty soon faced repression and imprisonment. Still in 
                                                 
16 A list of claims-making scholarship is necessarily illustrative rather than comprehensive: Rebecca J. 
Scott, “Reclaiming Gregoria’s Mule: The Meanings of Freedom in the Arimao and Caunao Valleys, 
Cienfuegos, Cuba, 1880-1899,” Past & Present 170 (2001): 181-216; Laurent Dubois, A Colony of 
Citizens: Revolution & Slave Emancipation in the French Caribbean, 1787-1804 (Chapel Hill: Published 
for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture by The University of North Carolina 
Press, 2004). On making claims as a learned skill and its relationship to power inequalities, see Sally Engle 
Merry, Getting Justice and Getting Even: Legal Consciousness among Working-Class Americans 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990): 1-10. 
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Spain, Degetau launched a newspaper to protest. Some months later, Baldorioty was 
freed.17 
 Like Degetau, Luis Muñoz Rivera joined the Autonomist movement of the aging 
Baldorioty. When Baldorioty died in 1889, the thirty-year-old autodidact Muñoz founded 
La Democracia, an Autonomista newspaper. There Muñoz, the son of a slave-owning 
merchant, continued to advocate on behalf of the party, which sought local power in local 
matters, greater civil and political rights, and enjoyment of constitutional rights for those 
born in Puerto Rico on equal terms with continental Spaniards.18 
The years 1894-95 found thirteen-year-old Isabel Gonzalez growing up in a 
Puerto Rican home alongside her brother Luis and her four-year-old sister Eloisa. Her 
mother, Antonia Dávila González, was again pregnant. Though the family lacked 
financial security, they had the resources to secure an education for Isabel Gonzalez. But 
between the looming need for Luis Gonzalez to produce income for the family and the 
concomitant lack of secure resources, the family’s ability to provide educational 
                                                 
17 Ángel M. Mergal, Federico Degetau: un orientador de su pueblo (New York: Hispanic Institute, 1944), 
30-34, 39-46; Untitled document, 27 May 1864, CIHCAM 6/VII/14; Copy, Certificate of Federico Degetau 
upon receiving his law license, 29 Oct. 1888, in A. M. Melgar, Documentación relacionada con la vida y la 
obra de D. Federico Degetau, 1941, 29, CIHCAM 20/L2; Copy, Inventario, in Melgar, Documentación, 20; 
Certification of membership in El Porvenir, 20 Jan. 1882, CIHCAM 6/VII/16; “Delegate from Porto Rico,” 
The Times, Worthington, Ind., [Dec. 1900?], available at CIHCAM 22/L1; José Trías Monge, Puerto Rico: 
The Trials of the Oldest Colony in the World (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997), 11-12; 
Gonzalo F. Córdova, Resident Commissioner, Santiago Iglesias and His Times (Río Piedras: Editorial de la 
Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1993), 25; Fernando Bayron Toro, Elecciones y partidos políticos de Puerto 
Rico (1809-1976) (Mayagüez, P.R.: Editorial Isla, Inc., 1977), 92; see also David Ortiz Jr., Paper Liberals: 
Press and Politics in Restoration Spain (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2000), 4-6, 9, 105, 108, 
passim; Dominique Soucy, Masonería y nación: redes masónicas y políticas en la construcción identitaria 
cubana (1811-1902) (Spain: Ediciones Idea, 2006); Sandi E. Cooper, “Pacifism in France, 1889-1914: 
International Peace as a Human Right,” French Historical Studies 17 (autumn 1991): 359-386; Felíx Ojeda 
Reyes and Paul Estrade eds., Ramón Emetrio Betances: obras completas, 16 vols. (San Juan, P.R.: 
Ediciones Puerto, vols. 1-3 published in 2008-2009, vols, 4-16 are forthcoming); Pilar Barbosa de Rosario, 
De Baldorioty a Barbosa: historia del autonomismo puertorriqueño, 1887-1896 (San Juan, P.R.: Imprenta 
Venezuela, 1957). 
18 Córdova, Resident Commissioner, 24, 26-28, 31; Ortiz, Paper Liberals, 21-22; Trías Monge, Trials, 11. 
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opportunities for the other children was not assured.19  
 Though the date of Domingo Collazo’s marriage to Isabel Gonzalez’s aunt is 
unclear, Isabel Gonzalez eventually came to call that Puerto Rican typographer uncle. 
Collazo had arrived in New York from the island in the late 1880s or early 1890s. Once 
there, he rejected Autonomistas’ attempts to merely alter the terms of Spanish rule in 
Puerto Rico and instead became an advocate of Antillean independence. Though he 
would be counted as white in later censuses, for the moment he closely followed the 
trajectory of Sotero Figueroa, perhaps the most prominent Puerto Rican activist of color 
to promote an Antillean revolution against Spanish colonial rule. Around 1895, Collazo 
became Secretary of a political club that Figueroa had founded and led three years earlier. 
The club aimed to unite Puerto Ricans in New York behind revolution. Collazo also 
joined Figueroa in a second revolutionary club, this one comprised largely of Puerto 
Ricans of color. There, Collazo attended meetings alongside revolutionary activists like 
Arturo Schomburg and Rosendo Rodríguez.20 
 A native of continental Spain, Santiago Iglesias had trained as a carpenter, 
participated in republican protests, gained exposure to labor and political thought, and 
                                                 
19 Gonzalez to Degetau, 5 Feb. 1903; Gonzalez to Degetau, 10 Apr. 1904; Manifest for the S.S. Ponce, 12 
May 1903, 78, EIA; Transcript of Record, No. 225, Gonzales v. Williams, 192 U.S. 1 (1904). 
20 U.S. Manuscript Census of 1910 for Ward 12, Manhattan, New York, Supervisor’s District No. 1, 
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 19 
written for the labor press before relocating to Cuba in 1887. There, he was a lector in a 
tobacco factory, charged with reading aloud from novels and newspapers to workers as 
they performed their work. He also organized workers, published a labor newspaper, and 
assisted strikes. Like Collazo, though at greater personal risk, Iglesias eschewed 
Autonomism for revolutionary politics, winning a commission from the head of the 
Cuban revolutionary movement to write a manifesto on behalf of pro-independence 
Cuban workers and securing the rank of Lieutenant from insurgent leader General 
Máximo Gómez.21 
In 1895, partisans of Cuban independence took up arms against the Spanish 
colonial state. Within months, José Martí—an advocate of separation from Spain who 
would soon be remembered as a major intellectual and political leader of the Cuban 
revolutionary movement—joined the troops already in the field in Cuba. Martí depicted 
Cuban independence as one goal in a larger social revolution that would create an 
egalitarian Cuba free from race and class divisions. When he died in battle later that year, 
partisans of such an Antillean revolution lost their most articulate and influential 
advocate. Some responded by seeking to shore up support for Martí’s vision. Thus, in 
1896 Collazo helped found and briefly became the administrator of a new revolutionary 
newspaper, La Doctrina de Martí. Headed by Rafael Serra, a leading Cuban 
revolutionary thinker and journalist of color, and frequently featuring Sotero Figueroa’s 
writings, La Doctrina located itself on “the extreme left of the Separatist Party.” It 
rejected calls for U.S. annexation of the Spanish Antilles and advocated a “free and 
                                                 
21 Santiago Iglesias Pantín, Luchas emancipadoras (crónicas de Puerto Rico) vol. 1, 2d ed. (San Juan, P.R.: 
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47, 50-52; see also, e.g., Jean Stubbs, Tobacco on the Periphery: A Case Study in Cuban Labour History, 
1860-1958 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Louis A. Pérez, Jr., Cuba Between Empires 
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sovereign” Cuba and Puerto Rico where its envisioned revolution would improve the 
status of workers, women, and people of color. In his two articles, Collazo stressed 
Puerto Rican independence, asserting that the revolution “is not only a Cuban question, 
but an Antillean question, in which Puerto Rico and Cuba share equally.”22 
Santiago Iglesias initially remained at his desk as a lector in a Cuban cigar factory 
as battles raged elsewhere on the island. Then, in 1896 Cuban authorities searched his 
home, seized his papers, and issued a warrant for his arrest on charges of sedition and 
collaboration with the revolution. Iglesias fled to Puerto Rico. While workers’ guilds 
(gremios), mutual-benefit societies, and strikes were visible there, organized labor in 
Puerto Rico remained weak and overall working conditions were poor. The young, rural, 
and island-born Puerto Ricans who made up the bulk of the work force generally lived in 
the countryside, faced rising mortality rates, and were poor and illiterate. Few owned real 
estate. Many worked in the coffee, sugar, and tobacco industries that dominated the 
island. Iglesias treated the dearth of unions as an opportunity. Focusing on urban artisans 
like himself, he began organizing workers and in May 1897 launched a labor newspaper. 
He benefited from his status as a continental-born Spaniard, he later recalled. “I was 
frank and spoke in the colony without any kind of reservation,” for “the fact of having 
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been born in [continental] Spain was, in a way, a form of security for me then.”23 
 As fighting in Cuba continued, Puerto Ricans observed and maneuvered. Some 
were optimistic. Spain, they knew, was on the defensive, caught between a resilient 
insurgency and U.S. pressure to engineer a prompt peace. During prior anti-Spanish 
foment and uprisings within and beyond the Antilles, Puerto Rico had secured at least 
temporary gains. In 1812, a short-lived Constitution had treated colonies such as Puerto 
Rico as Spanish provinces with full representation in the Spanish Cortes, or legislature, 
and had extended full Spanish citizenship to white islanders. Under attack during a prior 
Cuban insurgency in the 1870s, Spain had restored some Puerto Rican representation in 
the Cortes, abolished slavery in Puerto Rico, and promulgated an 1876 Constitution that 
it had partly extended to Puerto Rico. Luis Muñoz Rivera now sought to repeat this 
history by remaining loyal to Spain and treating the crisis that the Cuban insurgency had 
produced as an opportunity to seek autonomy. He traveled to Madrid to form a 
commission of Puerto Rican Autonomistas that also included Federico Degetau. Once 
there, and notwithstanding Degetau’s dissent, Muñoz negotiated a deal on behalf of a 
majority of the commission with the liberal-monarchical party of Práxedes Mateo 
Sagasta. That party—along with the Conservative Party currently in power under Antonio 
Cánovas del Castillo’s leadership—dominated Spanish politics. Under the agreement, 
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Autonomistas were to fuse with Sagasta’s party, instrumentally retreating from their 
republicanism to make island autonomy more likely. Though Autonomistas as a whole 
approved the measure, a substantial minority that included Degetau dissented and 
withdrew from the party. The schism produced two new parties: Muñoz’s Liberales, and 
the Ortodoxos to which Degetau belonged. In 1897 Sagasta’s party came to power. Still 
facing U.S. pressure to end the fighting in Cuba, it extended relatively liberal charters of 
autonomy to both Cuba and Puerto Rico, albeit ones that also left metropolitan authorities 
substantial power over the islands. Island-wide elections were scheduled for early 1898.24 
 U.S. leaders monitored events in Cuba with growing concern. As 1897 drew to a 
close, they increasingly realized that Spain would not be able to halt the revolution in 
Cuba. They thus faced a choice: wait for Cuban rebels to win independence for their 
island or intervene. Here, competing U.S. aspirations for Cuba muddied matters. For 
decades U.S. officials had coveted the island, vaguely imagining that Spanish rule would 
some day end and that Cuba would migrate to U.S. sovereignty. Cuban independence 
threatened this vision. At the same time, however, much of the U.S. public had come to 
sympathize with the Cuban independence movement. While this sentiment would prove 
fleeting, it now led to an unusual situation. U.S. President William McKinley tried to 
negotiate for purchase of Cuba and then declared the United States on the path to war 
shortly before the U.S. Congress passed a resolution disclaiming any “intention to 
exercise sovereignty” over Cuba “except for the pacification thereof.” As active fighting 
between Spain and the United States loomed, U.S. goals seemed to be defined in 
contradictory ways. But however unclear the goals of intervention, Congress authorized 
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war on April 20, 1898. The decisive step toward overseas empire had been taken, despite 
an apparent renunciation of the intent to rule.25 
 The events that followed sparked a constitutional crisis over the relationships of 
U.S. imperial governance to U.S. law and democratic norms. That crisis unfolded across 
the U.S. state. During it, judges, lawmakers, and administrators struggled to variously 
channel, implement, and contest legal underpinnings of U.S. colonial rule. Those outside 
the employ of the state, including the Puerto Rican leaders and litigants upon whom this 
study focuses, also participated. Wielding concepts of citizenship, they made claims that 
drew official responses and thereby altered mainland-Puerto Rican status relationships. 
During these debates, actors on all sides drew on, responded to, and transformed 
powerful, competing metaphors and terminologies involving race and empire. The 
Insular Cases, as well as the extension of U.S. citizenship to Puerto Ricans in 1917 via 
the congressional Jones Act, followed. Those legal landmarks largely reflected—even as 
they shaped—the broader and surrounding set of conversations about race, citizenship, 
empire, and the Constitution, which, crucially, included a handful of remarkable Puerto 
Ricans.
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STATUS IN THE SHADOW OF WAR, 1898-1900 
 
 U.S. invasion hit Puerto Rico like a hurricane, destroying or transforming many 
aspects of life while leaving others intact. People residing on the island found that the war 
left their allegiances in question and in flux. Drawing on their backgrounds as native-born 
Puerto Ricans, as islanders born in continental Spain, or as foreigners, residents navigated 
their competing potential obligations and sought to define their status vis-à-vis Spain, the 
United States, and other nations. With U.S. occupation also auguring a potential 
transformation of Puerto Rican tariff policy, businesses and their lawyers contemplated 
means with which to shape and profit from the upcoming settlement. Partisan differences 
between island political leaders Federico Degetau and Luis Muñoz Rivera survived the 
U.S. takeover relatively unscathed. As they considered which political advantages to try 
to retain from the times of Spanish rule and to seek from the United States, they also 
considered their differing roles in the Puerto Rican state. In promoting themselves and 
their policies to potential island voters and to U.S. officials in control of island 
governance, the men deployed both the language and the ideal of the United States as a 
guardian of democracy and individual rights. For Santiago Iglesias, a labor leader on the 
island, U.S. rule altered the conditions but the nature of his struggle for prominence and 
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worker welfare. A new metropole did not alter workers’ poverty or powerlessness. It did 
reshape opportunities for and threats to labor organizing and activism by bringing new 
investors and employers, a new history of metropolitan labor activism and governmental 
responses, and new potential allies. The U.S. invasion of Puerto Rico also struck many 
mainlanders as likely to transform the United States. Some opponents of annexation 
worried either that it would extend U.S. citizenship, full constitutional protections, and 
eventual statehood to racial inferiors and thus erode the U.S. nation from within. Others 
feared that the United States would violate its constitution to exclude such people from 
the polity. The challenge for those promoting annexation, then, was to reconcile U.S. 
empire with fidelity to constitutional norms. 
 
The War Department Shapes the Debate 
 The U.S. War Department lay at the center of debates around the legal 
implications of U.S. expansion. As the agency responsible for governing territories that 
the United States occupied, it was among the first parts of the U.S. state to confront 
potential constitutional and other legal limits that arose through implementing U.S. 
imperial policies. In Puerto Rico, debates centered on two events: the U.S. invasion and 
then annexation of the island.  
 Puerto Rican revolutionary Domingo Collazo was implicated in the invasion that 
came as part of the broader military conflict between Spain and the United States. That 
military conflict began with the U.S. routing of a Spanish squadron in the Philippines on 
May 1, 1898. As U.S. military officials prepared to invade both Cuba and Puerto Rico as 
well, they met with numerous Puerto Rican members of the Cuban Revolutionary Party, 
 26 
including Dr. Julio Henna, R. H. Todd, and Antonio Lluveras. Though all three men were 
members of the same club within that Party, Lluveras proceeded independently from 
Henna and Todd. He helped the commander of the U.S. invasion of Puerto Rico, General 
Nelson Miles, plan an invasion that was predicated on Lluveras’s promise that 2,000 
Puerto Ricans in the town of Yauco stood ready to receive U.S. arms and rise up in 
support of U.S. troops. Having already transported Cubans to Cuba to join those already 
fighting against Spanish forces, U.S. officials selected what came to be known as the 
Puerto Rican Commission. The seven commissioners, who included Collazo and 
Lluveras, were to act as guides, aides, and interpreters for the invading army. On July 25, 
General Miles landed troops and arms near Yauco. Soon Collazo and the other 
commissioners were ashore.26 
 Speaking in Ponce shortly after his arrival, Miles requested Puerto Ricans’ 
“cheerful acceptance of the Government of the United States” and promised Puerto 
Ricans “the liberal institutions of our Government” and “the largest measure of liberty 
consistent with this military occupation.” Hopeful that U.S. rule would in fact bring 
liberal rule and liberty, many local island leaders welcomed U.S. troops by displaying 
U.S. flags. At least some commissioners and their allies led campaigns by Puerto Ricans 
on behalf of U.S. forces, including attacks by armed squads seeking quick, orderly 
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capitulations of lightly defended island towns. By mid-August, fighting had ended and 
Spain had promised to transfer sovereignty over Puerto Rico to the United States at a 
future date.27 
 Formal U.S. annexation of Puerto Rico did not come until April 11, 1899, when 
Spain and the United States exchanged the ratifications of the Treaty of Paris ending the 
war. They had finalized the text four months earlier. The delay in ratification resulted 
partly from internal opposition. In the United States, a powerful anti-imperialist 
movement arose to fight annexation of the Philippines. Characterizing Filipinos as a 
barbaric threat, Anti-Imperialists in the Senate spoke against the treaty. They and allies 
argued that U.S. colonialism would rend the U.S. constitutional system or, conversely, 
that the U.S. Constitution would require a disastrous incorporation of Filipinos into the 
U.S. polity. When the Senate advised ratification on February 6, 1899, it declared that it 
did “not intend[] to incorporate the inhabitants of the Philippines into citizenship of the 
United States.” Humiliated by its recent military defeat and reluctant to dismantle the 
bulk of its remaining empire, Spain delayed ratification somewhat longer, until March 
19.28 
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 Once in place, Article IX of the treaty shaped struggles over allegiance, status, 
and governance. The article settled one set of lingering questions: whether and which 
Puerto Ricans owed allegiance to the United States. It demanded U.S. allegiance from all 
Spaniards born outside the Spanish peninsula then resident in Puerto Rico and gave 
Spanish “natives of the [Iberian] peninsula” who resided in Puerto Rico a choice: remain 
Spanish or renounce that citizenship and adopt “the nationality of the territory in which 
they may reside.” Additionally, Article IX extended congressional discretion over Puerto 
Rico and Puerto Ricans close to its outer constitutional limits, asserting that the “civil 
rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the 
United States shall be determined by Congress.” The impact of the provision was less 
broad than its language, for treaties did not nullify constitutional restraints on Congress. 
A debate among legal academics soon began over what courts should and would do in the 
face of such a political assertion of power. Initial commentators split into two broad 
camps. One set claimed that U.S. annexation would automatically extend peoples in the 
acquired territories U.S. citizenship, full constitutional protections, and eventual 
statehood for their lands. The other asserted that the United States could deny the peoples 
it acquired this entire bundle of status and rights.29 
At the War Department, occupation of Cuba and formal annexation of Puerto 
Rico and the Philippines lent growing urgency to questions around the legal ramifications 
of empire. Recognizing the shift in emphasis from conquest to law, President McKinley 
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on August 1, 1899, appointed as Secretary of War Elihu Root, one of the most respected, 
capable corporate lawyers of his day. Now an adviser to the U.S. political branches, a 
peer of other secretaries, and the head of the agency chiefly responsible for governing 
new possessions, Root became a central architect of U.S imperial policy. Joining his 
subordinates in deprecating Filipinos, Cubans, and Puerto Ricans as racial inferiors, he 
sought ways to ensure ongoing U.S. influence in governance of all three communities.30 
Root variously described Puerto Ricans, Cubans, and Filipinos as being “as 
incapable of self-government as children” and thus as sharing the attitude “which causes 
the continual revolutions in . . . other West Indian islands and the Central American 
states.” Attributing this degraded state to accrued, persistent, and intergenerational—
though not biologically determined—racial differences, he did not “doubt their capacity 
to learn to govern themselves,” but argued that self-government would “be slowly 
learned, because it is a matter . . . of character and of acquired habits of thoughts and 
feeling.” His immediate subordinates agreed. According to the public report of Puerto 
Rican military governor George Davis, Puerto Ricans resembled “negro illiterates” in the 
U.S. South, “reservation Indians,” and “Chinese”; lacked “true manhood”; were but “a 
few steps removed from a primitive state of nature”; and threatened to become another 
“Santo Domingo, Martinique, or Guadeloupe.” Cuban governor-general Leonard Wood 
told the New York Times that Cuban self-government could mean “establishment of 
another Haitian Republic.” Root’s men in the Philippines saw their charges as “large 
children” and “Indian[s]” who would need one or two generations of U.S. tutelage to 
avoid reprising “all the oppression and all the evils which were known in Spanish 
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times.”31 
Though Root’s Republican Party formally opposed southern disfranchisement of 
former slaves and their descendants, Root personally and publicly deemed 
Reconstruction a failed experiment in extending men of color citizenship, suffrage, and 
equal rights. Joining southern white-supremacist disfranchisers to portray voting as a 
privilege that could undermine good government if dispensed too liberally, Root and his 
agents advocated suffrage restrictions. In the Philippines and Puerto Rico, U.S. officials 
limited voting to combinations of property holding, tax paying, office holding, and 
literate men. Root sought a similar result in Cuba, later describing to Governor Wood the 
importance of “exclud[ing a] great a proportion of the elements which have brought ruin 
to Haiti and San Domingo.” But having failed to disarm fully the thousands who held no 
property but enjoyed prestige and had proven their willingness to fight for their vision of 
Cuban independence, Root and Wood had little choice but to let veterans vote. Though 
that expansion of the franchise may have helped preserve an uneasy peace in Cuba, it 
likely contributed to the election of constitutional-convention delegates who disappointed 
U.S. officials by constitutionally guaranteeing nearly universal male suffrage. Following 
the reestablishment of civil government in Puerto Rico, lawmakers there too moved to 
liberalize suffrage laws until in 1904 nearly universal male suffrage had been restored.32 
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 Root and his subordinates also sought to write U.S. control into the civil 
governments of the territories that they administered. With the U.S. Congress having 
rejected annexation of Cuba, Root moved to circumscribe eventual Cuban sovereignty in 
ways that would nonetheless guarantee a continuing U.S. role in Cuban governance. 
Synthesizing the ideas of many high U.S. officials with select British imperial practices, 
Root suggested to Secretary of State John Hay that future U.S.-Cuban relations include a 
U.S. right to intervene to protect independence, stability, and rights in Cuba; a limited 
U.S. veto over Cuban treaties; and a U.S. naval station in Cuba. Aware that Cubans 
would not accept such infringements on their sovereignty once granted independence, 
Root and the U.S. Congress made these concessions, in a slightly modified form known 
as the Platt Amendment, the price of sovereignty. They represented, Root told Cuban 
representatives, the “[e]xtreme limit of this country’s indulgence in the matter of the 
independence of Cuba.” Given little other choice, Cubans enshrined the Platt Amendment 
in their constitution and then in a treaty with the United States.33 
With no congressional promise of independence impeding U.S. rule in Puerto 
Rico or the Philippines, Root promoted explicit U.S. controls. Contending that 
Jeffersonian government “does not depend upon consent,” Root characterized 
independence as “the most fatal possible gift” to peoples in need of political 
guardianship. “[J]ustice and humanity require,” he added, “that . . . the weak shall be 
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protected, that cruelty and lust shall be restrained, whether there be consent or not.” Root 
initially looked to British colonial models for inspiration, but soon concluded that non-
democratic versions of U.S. state governments were a better fit. He and his subordinates 
thus argued that both archipelagos should enjoy U.S. governmental institutions—e.g., a 
governor, executive agencies, and a legislative chamber—but little electoral influence. At 
most, they wrote, elected islanders should form a lower legislative chamber that lacked 
the power to “chok[e] the government” by preventing passage of the annual budget.34 
Anticipating that his policies and proposals would occasion status-based 
challenges and congressional questions, Root produced legal arguments denying that the 
Constitution imposed substantial restraints on U.S. rule in Puerto Rico, and arguing that 
Puerto Ricans were not U.S. citizens. In an internal Department memo and his annual 
report, he argued that the dominant understanding of the source of U.S. power to acquire 
territory was not a constitutional provision but the powers of sovereignty of all nations 
under international law. That authority, he went on, included a plenary federal power to 
govern acquisitions limited only by express constitutional provisions and natural law. 
Because the Constitution primarily limited federal reach by reserving powers to 
individual, interested states, he added, it had little effect where Congress administered 
territory for all states. Root cast U.S. rule there as “an inheritance case” where the 
“[e]xecutor may yield to individuals where their particular shares are at stake, but will 
guard the general fund for all.” Similarly, Root wrote, the Constitution primarily 
protected individual rights from federal but not state interference and so ensured a 
                                                 
34 Jessup, Elihu Root, 332 (quotes 1, 3-4); 370 (quote 2) (quoting Elihu Root to Mrs. Lowell, 11 Feb. 1904), 
288-379; Report of the United States Philippines Commission . . . 1901, 22 (quote 5); Sparrow, The Insular 
Cases, 34-35, 40-55; José A. Cabranes, “Citizenship and American Empire: Notes on the Legislative 
History of the United States Citizenship of Puerto Ricans,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 127 
(Dec. 1978): 412-435. 
 33 
federal-state balance, but did not confer individual rights to those residing beyond state 
borders. This all made sense, he wrote, because the U.S. Constitution was designed solely 
for U.S. benefit, which Root defined as encompassing the pre-existing U.S. populations 
and not annexed peoples. Only a “very few” “general limitations” “protected equally by 
the Constitution[,] Magna Charta,” and natural law, he concluded, restrained 
congressional action in the territory. Even this limit on U.S. rule, he elaborated, was 
enacted for U.S. and not Puerto Rican benefit. It thus only encompasses strictures that 
were “a part of the nature of our Government.” The Uniformity Clause—with its 
prescription that “all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United 
States”—would not qualify. Due Process and Contracts clauses would 35 
Root found support in precedents inscribing U.S. expansion and ascription into 
law. Assessing judicial review of U.S. actions during the periods of non-state status of 
Louisiana, Florida, Alaska, the Guano Islands, and Montana, Root found consistent 
recognition of congressional discretion. Cases involving Mormons, slaves, antebellum 
free people of color, and American Indians had reached similar conclusions. Thus, Root 
found, the legal legacy of U.S. expansion and subordination provided doctrinal 
underpinnings for U.S. colonialism.36 
For the proposition that Puerto Ricans were not U.S. citizens, Root and a law 
officer in his Department, Charles Magoon, drew on U.S. political practice, international 
law, and the Constitution. In his Department memorandum, Root discussed the judicially 
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validated U.S. practice of extending U.S. citizenship to non-tribal residents of annexed 
areas. Here he stressed that these settlements of questions involving citizenship, 
governance, status, and rights in acquired land came through treaties and similar 
documents. They thus reflected, he argued, not fidelity to constitutional mandates but the 
necessity of political action to accomplish ends that the Constitution did not require. Such 
discretion over the citizenship status of acquired peoples, he indicated, paralleled 
international precedents. Britain did not extend its Magna Charta to all people over whom 
it was sovereign, he wrote. Similarly, international law recognized conquered peoples as 
nationals of the conquering nation but had no effect on what status the conquering nation 
accorded such peoples for its domestic purposes.37 
In a February 12, 1900 memorandum later published by Congress, Magoon turned 
to constitutional issues. The “correlative of allegiance is protection,” not citizenship, he 
argued, because citizenship was more substantive. It encompassed “great powers, rights, 
privileges, and immunities,” he continued, noting that were Puerto Ricans to be U.S. 
citizens, ethnic-Malaysian and -Chinese islanders would have a right to enter the 
mainland under U.S. immigration laws. Not only were foreign-national soldiers, aliens, 
Indians, Chinese, and convicts “persons within the jurisdiction of the United States from 
whom allegiance in some form is due who are not citizens of the United States,” he 
expanded, but “in another and limited sense,” so were U.S. “minors and women,” who 
held only limited political rights. As a result, that Puerto Ricans owed allegiance to the 
United States under the Treaty of Paris did not make them U.S. citizens despite the 14th 
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Amendment injunction that “All persons born . . . in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States.” Summarizing the amendment as 
making U.S. citizens of those who could establish “[b]irth within the territory and 
allegiance of the United States,” he turned to Elk v. Wilkins, an 1884 Supreme Court case 
holding that an American Indian who had been born into a tribe and had thus been 
outside “allegiance of the United States” at that time did not come within the amendment 
upon abandoning his tribe and joining non-tribal U.S. society. The decision drew on 
several arguments, the most prominent of which compared Indians to immigrants to 
argue that the quasi-national nature of tribal governments made individual Indians’ 
decisions to join non-tribal U.S. society akin to expatriations, hence matters of 
naturalization and not birthright citizenship. In his memorandum, Magoon focused on a 
less prominent part of the opinion: “Persons not . . . subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States at the time of birth cannot become so afterwards” for purposes of claiming 
U.S. citizenship under the 14th Amendment. As a result, he concluded, individual 
naturalizations were Puerto Ricans’ sole path to U.S. citizenship. 38 
In early 1900, U.S. political branches turned their attention to an organic act 
addressing the status and governance of Puerto Rico and Puerto Ricans. Drawing on 
Root’s proposals and legal analyses, among other sources, politicians and commentators 
mixed legal and political questions involving tariffs, the status of people and places, and 
constitutional injunctions. Frequently they did not detail what links joined their themes. 
They also cited prior U.S. activities in former territorial acquisitions, though frequently 
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without specifying whether the analogies were political or legal authorities. Authors and 
speakers tied governance to race, characterizing Puerto Ricans as superior to ostensibly 
“savage” Filipinos. But because the Philippines were larger than Puerto Rico and, 
racially, seen to pose a greater threat, U.S. Congressmen were quick to sacrifice Puerto 
Rican interests for what they perceived to be a favorable settlement of the Philippines 
question. Aware that the Supreme Court would likely use its review of any organic act for 
Puerto Rico as an opportunity to clarify the constitutional status of Puerto Rico and other 
new U.S. acquisitions, Congressmen treated the act as a chance to test of the legality of a 
possible legislative scheme for the Philippines without risking an adverse ruling directly 
applicable to that archipelago. Imposing a modest tariff on U.S.-Puerto Rican trade, 
Congressmen observed, would facilitate the envisioned test, because such non-uniform 
tariffs were constitutionally barred for trade within the “United States.” On April 12 
Congress did just that, setting customs and monetary policy for Puerto Rico and 
delineating a new government to replace War Department rule. By not specifying 
whether and what constitutional protections, U.S. citizenship status, and eventual 
statehood status Puerto Ricans would receive, the bill, known as the Foraker Act, 
indicated that the myriad legal issues raised by annexation could and perhaps should be 
addressed separately.39 
The bill created a civil government for Puerto Rico with some but not much 
democracy, thereby closely tracking the proposals that Root had made in his 1899 annual 
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report. Under it, the President would appoint the Governor, top judges, and Executive 
Council for the island, with the last forming both a gubernatorial cabinet and an upper 
legislative chamber. Puerto Ricans would elect the House of Delegates, a lower 
legislative chamber unable to legislate without Executive Council consent, and the 
Resident Commissioner, a nonvoting representative in Washington. As Root had earlier 
observed, this thin democracy had precedents in prior U.S. territorial laws, though, 
importantly, inexact ones. Previously, Congress had reserved such strong federal controls 
for territories with relatively few non-tribal residents, anticipating that greater democracy 
would follow migrations by U.S. citizens into those lands. Puerto Rico, by contrast, was 
already densely populated. Additionally, in prior organic acts, Congress had tended to 
create nonvoting “Delegates” to Congress to represent territorial residents’ interests in 
Washington. The new nomenclature of Resident Commissioner suggested uncertainty 
over the status of the island. So too did both the instruction that the commissioner file his 
certificate of election with the Secretary of State, like a foreign dignitary, and the lack of 
mention of the commissioner enjoying a voice in the House of Representatives as 
delegates generally did.40 
 Responding to financial and constitutional concerns, the Foraker Act also 
reshaped Puerto Rican commerce and labor. It set the official exchange rate at $0.60 for 
each peso and imposed a temporary tariff on goods transported between Puerto Rico and 
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other U.S. ports that was 15% of the rate charged on foreign goods imported into the 
United States. While powerful corporate and state sugar interests weighed in on the tariff, 
their impact was blunted by the conflicting interests of sugar growers and processors, the 
opportunities mainlanders with capital saw in Puerto Rican sugar, and the emergence of 
antitrust sentiment and tariff policies as partisan U.S. political issues. Consistent with 
what Degetau had read during the debates, congressmen also saw a tariff as a way to 
secure Supreme Court clarification of the status of Puerto Rico. Because it would 
potentially violate the constitutional injunction that “Duties . . . be uniform throughout 
the United States,” a tariff was likely to give the Court an occasion to decide whether 
Puerto Rico was part of the United States, at least for those purposes. U.S. political 
branches embraced this opportunity to create a doctrinal hook for judicial review while 
declining to impose a tariff sufficiently high to slow growth substantially in the Puerto 
Rican sugar industry.41 
 Concerning the citizenship status of Puerto Ricans, the Foraker Act obscured as 
much as it clarified. Republican Senator Joseph Foraker of Ohio, who had authored the 
law in close collaboration with the White House, had originally included a provision 
recognizing Puerto Ricans as U.S. citizens. In response to colleagues’ objections, he had 
on March 2 explained that the provision was not “giving to those people any rights that 
the American people do not want them to have.” This had not satisfied colleagues who 
worried that the provision might prejudice the issue that they anticipated the Supreme 
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Court would soon decide—whether Puerto Rico was part of the United States—in ways 
that would tie their hands when legislating for the Philippines. To quell dissent, Foraker 
backed down, substituting a vague provision describing Puerto Ricans as “citizens of 
Porto Rico.” It would be for later actors to determine whether this was a national status 
like French citizenship, a regional status like state citizenship, or something new.42 
 Taken together, the provisions of the Foraker Act reflected only a modest 
clarification of the constitutional and status issues surrounding U.S. annexation of Puerto 
Rico. The law made no mention of whether Puerto Rico would one day become a U.S. 
state, instead extending the island a measure of democracy that was small for such a 
densely populated territory, but similar to that which had existed in other territories that 
were now U.S. states. Similarly, Congress was reticent about the application of the U.S. 
Constitution to Puerto Rico; it used a modest tariff to create grounds for a test case that 
would determine whether the Uniformity Clause applied to the island, but otherwise 
remained silent. As to citizenship, Congress elected ambiguity. Even as these issues 
remained unresolved, however, legal analyses like those that the War Department 
produced shaped the terms of debate, providing argumentative tools to allies and 
constituting targets for opponents’ rebuttals. By treating each of these issues separately, 
the Foraker Act made it easier to see constitutional protections, eventual statehood, and 
U.S. citizenship for Puerto Ricans as independent issues that could be addressed 
separately through subsequent claims and future legislation.43 
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Crafting Claims against the U.S. State 
 While the War Department sought to establish what they could do in Puerto Rico, 
individuals resident there and businesses with interest in island trade struggled to 
discover and influence what was done to them. Differently situated people in Puerto Rico 
pursued a variety of strategies vis-à-vis the U.S. state, dependent in part upon the status 
that they had held under Spanish rule, the relationships to Spain that they now desired, 
and the shifting relationship of Puerto Rico to Spain and to the United States. Mainland 
businesses that feared competition from Puerto Rican products lobbied Congress to tax 
them. Those that traded in those goods sought to defeat such duties, at times in court. 
Both groups directed their claims to U.S. officials who generally responded to such 
concerns by altering policies in ways that avoided rather than answered questions of 
status.  
As the war persisted into August 1898, inhabitants owing Spain their permanent 
allegiance found themselves caught between regimes. As citizens of a Spanish empire-
state at war with the United States, they faced charges of treason for cooperating with 
U.S. troops. Thus, after retaking towns that Puerto Ricans had helped capture, Spanish 
troops arrested or killed more than a dozen of the Puerto Ricans they found there. Yet, as 
U.S. troops overran broad swathes of the island and appeared certain to win the war, 
Puerto Ricans’ incentives to cooperate with and pledge allegiance to U.S. forces grew.44 
 Cognizant of these competing pressures, Commanding General Miles issued an 
order three days after landing in Puerto Rico that clarified the U.S. position on mutual 
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obligations of allegiance and protection. U.S. forces, he wrote, primarily sought “to 
destroy or capture all who are in armed resistance.” While Spain might not agree that 
refraining from “armed resistance” was sufficient to prove allegiance to Spain, Miles’s 
order created a safe haven of sorts for Puerto Ricans, letting them meet their obligations 
to the U.S. state through inaction. If they could reconcile passivity with their obligations 
to Spain, they could avoid a choice between treasonous betrayal of a former or future 
master.45 
 Yet within days, Miles’s subordinates raised the price of liberty and access to 
governmental institutions. For U.S. forces administering conquered territory, military and 
political prisoners were a distraction, while the expertise, experience, and effort of Puerto 
Ricans were key resources. Consequently, U.S. forces paroled prisoners and hired Puerto 
Ricans willing to give their “word of honor” that they did not “sympathize with Spain” 
“in the current war” and “will not give aid nor assistance . . . to the enemies of the United 
States.”46 
The oaths ostensibly only solicited Puerto Rican passivity—an absence of aid and 
assistance—but many oath-takers saw little middle ground as to national sympathies 
during wartime. Before taking the oath, islanders provided their birthplace—generally 
Puerto Rico or Spain. For those who desired to remain Spaniards after the war, the 
dilemma could be particular acute. So it appeared to be for Pedro San Clemente who, 
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after indicating that he was a Spaniard, sought to satisfy the oath while affirming his 
allegiance to Spain by focusing on his opposition to war: “I say as a Spaniard, that my 
natural sentiments and sympathies are with my nation; saying at the same time, that I 
don’t sympathize with any type of war.” For others, oaths confirmed a prior decision to 
oppose Spain. Island-born Manuel E. Vidal y Vidal, who had already decided to work for 
the United States, “salute[d] the great power, initiator of the liberty of the American 
world, and [was] at its service.” Some Puerto Ricans used the oaths to align publicly with 
the U.S. cause. Native-Puerto Rican Pedro M. Fort y Ramírez declared, “To be a slave or 
to be a citizen of a free and powerful nation is a great difference, and all my soul and 
sympathies are with the United States.”47 
 After U.S. and Spanish representatives signed a protocol suspending active 
hostilities on August 12, 1898, U.S. officials again tightened the oaths that they regularly 
administered as prerequisites to official employment. For the next eight months U.S. 
military officials would build and administer a Puerto Rican state to govern a population 
that technically continued to owe Spain its permanent allegiance. While doing so, they 
used promises of U.S. citizenship and the related issue of allegiance to promote U.S. rule 
and encourage Puerto Ricans into more robust relationships with the U.S. state. On 
October 18, 1898, General Guy Henry, a future military governor of Puerto Rico, 
announced, “The forty five States . . . unite in vouchsafing to you prosperity and 
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protection as citizens of the American union.” In the months following, subordinates had 
islanders swear to undertake such traditional duties of citizenship as allegiance, service, 
and defense. Under one oath, islanders gave their word to “bear true faith and allegiance 
to the United States of America, . . . serve them . . . against all their enemies,” and act “in 
accordance with the orders of the President.” The other went farther, requiring that they 
“swear that it is my loyal and true intention to become a United States citizen” while 
making them “renounce forever every . . . state or sovereignty[,] . . particularly the King 
of Spain.”48  
 Some Puerto Ricans found these oaths coercive. With no treaty specifying their 
future relationship to Spain, taking the oath raised troubling questions about their Spanish 
pensions, their Spanish status, and their prior services to the crown. One native Puerto 
Rican who had served in the Spanish militia told U.S. officials that losing his Spanish 
citizenship would contradict his military oath and make him a perjurer. For those born in 
continental Spain who desired to retain their prior allegiance, the oaths constituted a 
reversal of sorts, for it was the overwhelmingly island-born Puerto Ricans who embraced 
U.S rule who were best positioned to comply with oaths of office. Thus, one man wrote 
the government as “a Spaniard and Notary Public” to see if he could decline the oath, 
while Antonio Álvarez Nava later sacrificed his notarial post to preserve his claim to 
“Spanish nationality.”49 
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 On April 11, 1898, Spain and the United States promulgated the Treaty of Paris. 
In it, the nations addressed ambiguity around Puerto Ricans’ allegiance by transferring 
the allegiance of the island born to the United States and by giving those born in 
continental Spain one year to choose between that outcome and continuing their loyalty 
to Spain. But by failing to clarify the citizenship status of Puerto Ricans now under U.S. 
sovereignty, Spain and the United States gave Puerto Ricans incentives to claim that 
status. For instance, the continental-born Dr. Valeriano Asenjo did not merely accept 
transference of his allegiance from Spain to the United States, but instead took 
affirmative steps to be recognized as a U.S. citizen. His doing so raised the possibility 
that continental Spaniards would not only have greater opportunities under the Treaty of 
Paris to determine their new allegiance, but also might have greater access to U.S. 
citizenship. Those Puerto Ricans born in continental Spain who remained alien to the 
United States under the Treaty of Paris could potentially have access to U.S 
naturalization procedures on the same terms as other foreigners, an opportunity it was not 
yet clear that Puerto Ricans who owed their allegiance to the United States would have. 
Thus in June 1899, Asenjo submitted what he called an “application for naturalization 
papers” to military-governor George Davis. With no established naturalization procedure 
in place, Asenjo supplemented his request with biographical details relevant to a variety 
of conceptions of U.S. citizenship: desire to become a citizen, residence, capacity, 
achievement, loyalty, language, military service, community, and character. He thus 
stressed his seventeen-year residence in Puerto Rico, his four years of medical education 
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in New York, his professional status as a doctor, his “desire to become an American 
citizen,” that his “sympathies are entirely American,” and his fluency and literacy in 
English. Additionally, he attached a reference from a member of the U.S. armed forces 
attesting that Asenjo was “well known and respected in this community—[] intelligent, 
conscientious and of high moral character.” An aide-de-camp to Davis deflected this 
claim by explaining that no court in Puerto Rico was yet authorized to naturalize.50 
 Asenjo gained a second opportunity to claim U.S. citizenship on October 12 when 
Governor Davis promulgated new election laws. In crafting his order Davis faced a 
populace that included island-born Puerto Ricans who now owed the United States their 
permanent allegiance; frequently long-term-resident foreigners who under international 
law owed the United States only the temporary allegiance of sojourners; and Puerto 
Ricans born in continental Spain who had eight more months to choose which status to 
occupy. Davis decided to give “foreigners of long residence in Puerto Rico [including 
Puerto Ricans born in continental Spain] an opportunity to vote in the election.” He thus 
ordered that qualified “[c]itizens or subjects of foreign countries . . . be permitted to vote . 
. . provided . . . that they shall have made renunciation under oath of their foreign 
nationality.” More than 1,000 men, including Asenjo, responded by “solemnly 
declar[ing] and swear[ing] that it is my bona fide intention to become a citizen of the 
United States of America. I renounce forever all allegiance and fidelity to the [state to 
which allegiance was currently owed].” Though Davis later insisted that his order “in no 
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way related to naturalization,” the French Chargé d’Affaires, on December 26, 1898, 
asked the U.S. Secretary of State if the order extended U.S. naturalization laws to the 
island. If so, both men knew, it could mean U.S. citizenship for and French expatriation 
of oath-takers. Though of little concern to French officials, Davis’s order also again 
raised the possibility that the United States would reenact Spanish favoritism toward 
Puerto Ricans born in continental Spain by giving them and not native-born Puerto 
Ricans access to naturalization.51 
 An official in the State Department then wrote the War Department for 
clarification, launching correspondence that revealed agreement that the order had been a 
mistake but disagreements—rooted in officials’ differing roles—over responses. The 
State Department argued that the second part of the oaths raised troubling questions. 
While the declaration of intention to become a U.S. citizen merely tracked “the first act 
necessary to naturalization” under U.S. law, the renunciation of foreign nationality 
“superadd[ed] thereto the performance of an act which under the naturalization laws of 
the United States is an essential feature of the final act of admission to citizenship.” For 
the State Department, which had to explain U.S. policy to foreign officials, Davis’s order 
could “create for a foreigner accepting its provision an anomalous situation, inasmuch as 
by renouncing his foreign allegiance he would cease to be a citizen of the country of 
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origin without thereby acquiring any new allegiance.” Agreeing that a foreigner in Puerto 
Rico might, under Davis’s orders, renounce one allegiance while “having acquired no 
right to any other citizenship,” Root wrote not of fear of foreign states but of individual 
claimants. A “French subject” in such a position, he predicted, “would very naturally 
complain of having been misled.” Thus, he concluded, the provision should be stricken. 
Describing his “embarrassment” that his policy had placed hundreds “in the anomalous 
condition of ‘a man without a country,’” Davis asked to retire rather than rescind his 
order. Less concerned with international reaction or future claims, he worried that 
revocation would invalidate recent local elections, creating local “turmoil and 
excitement.” Instead, he proposed, only address the issue if forced. Root and his staff 
concurred, at least temporarily leaving open the issues raised by the French Chargé 
d’Affaires. If Dr. Asenjo pushed the matter further, I have yet to find evidence of the 
effort.52 
As other Puerto Ricans continued to claim U.S. citizenship, U.S. officials 
established a regular response: avoidance. In one example a former Puerto Rican resident 
who had sworn an oath of allegiance to the United States and served under U.S. forces in 
the Insular Police, Rafael Molinari, wrote the Puerto Rican government from Mexico. He 
sought certification of his prior service, which, he presumed, would prove his U.S. 
nationality. U.S. officials demurred. Avoiding the substantive issues of whether residence 
in lands under U.S. sovereignty made him a U.S. national and whether his oath and quasi-
martial service entitled him to U.S. protection, the Secretary of Puerto Rico wrote that the 
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oath and service had not naturalized Molinari and that Molinari was not listed as a U.S. 
citizen in existing documents. In November 1900, Carlos Rampola launched a claim with 
similar results. He told U.S. officials that he and his siblings, children of U.S. citizens 
who had resided in Puerto Rico for eighteen years, sought recognition as U.S. citizens. 
The Acting Attorney General of Puerto Rico, in a letter to the Governor, advised 
otherwise. Despite agreeing that the siblings were U.S. citizens, he saw no need for 
official confirmation. Rather, “[i]f the persons . . . are citizens of the United States, and 
any right belonging to them based thereon shall be hereafter denied them, ample remedies 
for enforcement of such rights exist in Porto Rico.” In other words, Rampola needed a 
better test case.53 
While Puerto Ricans were failing to clarify their status, a second and related line 
of claims involving challenges to federal customs policy made headway. By October 
1899 the Coudert Brothers international-law firm had begun to lay groundwork for such 
challenges. Writing former colleague Secretary of War Elihu Root, they expressed 
professional interest in the “many questions arising in Cuba,” which the United States 
also still occupied, and requested legal opinions and circulars from Root’s Department. 
Such documents would help them dispense advice to and mount legal challenges to U.S. 
policies adversely affecting their clients. By late 1899, the New York Times reported, 
“[n]umerous protests” were “pending before the board [of general appraisers] regarding 
duties levied on merchandise from Puerto Rico and the Philippines.” Initially some failed 
for a variety of technical reasons: shipment predated annexation; U.S. sovereignty did not 
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cover Cuba; and filing in customs court created a presumption that goods were imported. 
But beginning in July 1900 federal circuit courts began issuing rulings on whether Puerto 
Rico was part of the United States for purposes of tariff laws and constitutional 
provisions. The Coudert Brothers law firm brought two particularly well-framed 
challenges. On March 12, 1900, it sued George Bidwell, the collector of customs at the 
port of New York, in state court on behalf of D. A. de Lima and Company. In the suit, 
quickly removed to a U.S. circuit court, De Lima protested tariffs that Bidwell had levied 
in late 1899, before enactment of the Foraker Act. In a perfunctory October 17, 1900, 
opinion, the court rejected De Lima’s complaint. De Lima appealed. Then, on November 
23, 1900, Coudert Brothers brought a new suit against Bidwell on behalf of Samuel 
Downes and in the circuit court. Downes contested tariffs that Bidwell had levied in late 
1900 after enactment of and pursuant to the Foraker Act. The court rejected this 
complaint perfunctorily on November 30, 1900. Downes too appealed. By year end, 
appeals of both cases pended before the U.S. Supreme Court.54 
 
Autonomists Reconstituted: Luis Muñoz Rivera and Federico Degetau Face U.S. 
Rule 
Proceeding under the Charter of Autonomy that Spain had extended Puerto Rico 
the year before, Luis Muñoz Rivera moved in early 1898 to establish himself as the head 
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of a new, autonomous Puerto Rican civil government. On March 27, 1898, in what the 
Charter had decreed would be the first island-wide election with near-universal male 
suffrage, 121,573 Puerto Rican men cast ballots. Securing more than two-thirds of the 
vote, Muñoz’s Liberales looked forward to controlling the upcoming island legislature. 
Degetau’s party, the Ortodoxos, received less than 20% of that total, though Degetau 
himself won and quickly occupied a post as a deputy in the lower chamber of the Spanish 
Cortes in Madrid. Within weeks, Spain and the United States were at war and then on 
July 17, eight days before U.S. troops came ashore in Puerto Rico, the island legislature 
opened with Muñoz at the head of the cabinet-like Council of Secretaries.55 
Across the Atlantic, Federico Degetau faced the war as a deputy in the Cortes. 
Like most elected Puerto Rican officials, he did not support a Cuban-style revolution in 
Puerto Rico and instead advocated Puerto Rican autonomy from, allegiance to, and 
participation in the metropolitan state. But such loyalty, he and his compatriots in Spain 
discovered, did not insulate their policies, posts, or constituents from danger. After word 
of the U.S. landing in Puerto Rico reached Spain, Juan Ramos y Velex, a fellow attorney, 
wrote Degetau that he expected a Spanish colonial policy of “the offering of Isaac 
sacrificed by his father Abraham.” A recent copy of the Madrid El Heraldo, he then 
related with disgust, asserted that national interests meant that Spain “‘cannot arm the 
inhabitants because it would be to expose itself to what occurred in the Philippines.’” 
Now, he feared, Spain might send under-armed islanders into the “slaughterhouse.” “Is it 
that the national honor commands it?” he wrote. “My God: no more of national honor; it 
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has already been satisfied.”56 
Several days later, with U.S. annexation of Puerto Rico likely, Rafael María de 
Labra, a Puerto Rican politician and advocate of autonomy, described to Degetau another 
betrayal of the mutual obligations of allegiance and protection that allegedly bound the 
Spanish citizenry of Puerto Rico to their metropole. Spain, he wrote, accused Puerto Rico 
of “disloyalty” while itself preparing to concede rather than meet its duty to protect the 
island. Spanish cession of Puerto Rico, he noted, meant Spain “forgetting about the 
agreements that were contracted with us, respecting the government”; hard-won Puerto 
Rican autonomy might not survive annexation. Then, on August 7-8, liberal Madrid 
newspapers El Heraldo and El Globo addressed the anomalous position of Puerto Rican 
deputies, who represented soon-to-be annexed constituencies. Though the papers agreed 
that deputies could finish their terms, they encouraged them to and assured readers that 
they would resign their posts once their districts disappeared.57 
Federico Degetau thus occupied an uncomfortable position by the time Spain and 
the United States declared an end to active fighting in an August 12 protocol promising 
Spanish cession of Puerto Rico to the United States. An official state of war existed 
between the government of which he remained a deputy and the troops currently 
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governing the homeland that he represented. He responded by temporarily relocating to 
his property in France and seeking to convince Spain and the United States to mitigate 
the conflicting loyalties that the looming U.S. annexation would impose on Puerto 
Ricans. There, in mid-October, he wrote both to Praxedes Sagasta, the Spanish Prime 
Minister, and to U.S. President McKinley. Drawing on his commitments to international 
law and mandatory arbitration as an alternative to war, he advocated making mandatory, 
permanent arbitration part of the final treaty of peace. Otherwise, he argued, Puerto 
Ricans’ “regional history, culture, and . . . language,” which constituted a “moral” and 
“indestructible link of origin,” would coexist with the “narrow, juridical link” they would 
soon owe the United States; renewed U.S.-Spanish hostilities would be for them “in part 
a civil war.”58  
When U.S. and Spanish treaty negotiators arrived in Paris soon thereafter, 
Degetau secured meetings with them. Having drawn on his existing relationships in Spain 
and begun building enduring relationships with high U.S. officials, he shared his views 
with both. Although the parties rejected his arbitration suggestion, they accepted his 
proposal to promote Puerto Rican culture and education by allowing Spanish-language 
“scientific, literary and artistic works” to be admitted duty-free to the island for ten years 
following ratification of the treaty. Degetau then left for Puerto Rico, arriving in late 
November to restart his political life.59 
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Muñoz spent the early months of U.S. rule trying to prolong his pre-war political 
power. As head of the first autonomous, democratically elected, insular parliament on the 
island at the time of U.S. invasion, he had nowhere to go but down. If the United States 
reduced Puerto Rican autonomy, the portion of the state that Muñoz controlled would 
shrink. Any position in Puerto Rican civil government except the top one would also be a 
demotion. As a result, progress for Muñoz lay in opposing and impeding U.S. 
innovations. 
Indeed, Muñoz’s position had promptly come to seem less powerful and less 
permanent under U.S. rule. Despite reconstituting Puerto Rico’s elected Council of 
Secretaries as a U.S. institution and confirming Muñoz as both its interim President and 
its interim Secretary of State, U.S. military authorities made themselves the locus of state 
power. In December, newly appointed military governor Guy Henry foreshadowed 
imposition of a literacy requirement for suffrage by voicing his support for the measure. 
He then told a critical prominent island politician that “he [the governor] was the supreme 
authority of the Island.” Both the decision and the response to criticism boded poorly for 
Muñoz, whose power depended upon robust civilian rule and winning elections. His 
Liberales had just won a commanding majority in elections featuring nearly universal 
manhood suffrage, but had not been tested before an electorate from which, as Henry 
intimated, the more than three quarters of islanders who were illiterate had been 
expunged.60 
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On February 5, island military governor Henry reorganized the elected Council of 
Secretaries into four departments whose heads reported directly to him. Muñoz and his 
colleagues resigned in protest and appealed to Washington. Military governor Guy Henry 
met the resignations with an attack on Muñoz, telling Puerto Ricans that the Council 
“was of Spanish origin[,] gave to one man the opportunity to dominate all the 
departments and to enhance his political power[, and was] contrary to that which should 
exist under the present form of government.” Under the new system, he wrote, Liberales 
and Ortodoxos were both represented, “so that all the people may feel they have 
representation.” Explaining that Muñoz wanted more—suffrage and a legislature—he 
wrote that “[t]hese come with Congressional legislation and are not possible now.”61 
In attempting to divide U.S. officials in Puerto Rico from those in Washington, 
Muñoz misjudged the federal state and isolated himself from it. On February 15, the 
military governor wrote Washington that Muñoz was “a disgruntled politician [who] lost 
his power through his own fault” and that Puerto Ricans were “incapable of governing 
themselves and will be for some time to come. Like children, they have to be governed 
by fear.” Washington officials, who worked through and tended to trust their subordinates 
in Puerto Rico, appeared to concur, letting the change in island governance and the 
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resignations stand.62 
Muñoz’s setbacks facilitated Degetau’s gains. In February, Degetau secured the 
vacancy that Muñoz’s orchestrated resignations had left at the head of the island’s 
Department of the Interior, becoming one of four top civilian officers on the island and 
responsible for education, public works, and charities. Shortly after Spain and the United 
States formalized U.S. annexation of Puerto Rico via the Treaty of Paris, island political 
leaders reconstituted themselves into new political parties. On July 4, 1899, 
revolutionaries who had assisted the U.S. invasion joined former Ortodoxos like Degetau 
to launch a new party they called Republicano. Soon thereafter Muñoz and his allies, in a 
substantially weaker position than they had been a year earlier, reconstituted themselves 
into the Partido Federal.63 
Both coalitions retained the Autonomist ideals of liberal republicanism and Puerto 
Rican self-government that had dominated Puerto Rican politics since late in Spanish 
rule. Portraying themselves as the best men to lead Puerto Rico as it forged a relationship 
to a new sovereign, leaders in each party trumpeted their Puerto Rican patriotism and cast 
their political aspirations for Puerto Rico in terms of U.S. practices and constitutional 
traditions. Their rivals, they argued, failed on one or the other criteria.  
To position themselves as vigorous and pragmatic advocates of Puerto Rican self-
government, Muñoz and other Federales described the United States as a nation that 
valued regional autonomy and people willing to struggle for it. Celebrating U.S. 
annexation as a step toward autonomy, their platform contended that no other nation had 
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“a system of autonomy so broad and indestructible.” It was thus, they claimed, that the 
United States was not “called a nation[;] they . . . do not say: <Oh Lord, bless our 
nation,> but they say: <Oh Lord, bless these United States.>” Yet in joining the Union, 
Muñoz’s paper El Liberal argued, “the race that inhabits Puerto Rico” also faced a threat 
of domination by and absorption into the United States. Acknowledging that Puerto 
Ricans could only hold their own by achieving an unlikely national greatness like that of 
French Revolutionary troops and Frederick the Great’s armies, the paper told readers that 
the thirteen original U.S. colonies had once spoken “loudly because they didn’t know 
how to speak like slaves”; they did not seek “liberty as a privilege, but as a right.” Puerto 
Ricans, too, it wrote had won “liberty” and “autonomy” from Spain, and now should 
again “claim with . . . energy the respect that ought to come to our personality as a 
pueblo.” Previously, another Federal paper claimed in an English-language article, Puerto 
Ricans who had less than full freedoms under Spain had abstained from May 2 festivities 
that celebrated how “Spain combated with heroic impetus for its independence.” Now, it 
related, some Puerto Ricans who supported “the liberal principles upheld by Washington” 
would avoid Washington Day celebrations because they were “subjected to a degrading, 
depreciating inferiority, . . . are denied citizenship, [and] are not protected by a 
constitution.”64 
By depicting a United States that would extend ample autonomy to those who 
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fought for it, Muñoz could position his clashes with U.S. officials as evidence of his 
fitness for Puerto Rican leadership rather than as examples of bootless anti-U.S. 
intransigence. Explaining his earlier resignation from the body that had been the Council 
of Secretaries in an open letter, Muñoz portrayed himself as a martyr to honor and 
country whose actions would hurry U.S. extension of autonomy to Puerto Rico. In 
reducing the responsibilities of Muñoz and the other highest-ranking elected officials on 
the island, Muñoz wrote, Governor-General Henry had “completely annulled” “the 
personality of our country,” “snatch[ed]” away “the autonomy we were enjoying when 
the occupation began,” and made it impossible for Muñoz to “continue with dignity” in 
his post. Drawing on a metaphor of polity as family, Muñoz advocated a Puerto Rican 
“emancipation,” that “Porto Rico be a brother in the [U.S.] family and not a slave.” With 
Henry’s contrary change in place, he did not think that new “[m]en of honor and 
character” should decline official posts. Change, he argued, would now come not from 
local protests but through appeals to federal authorities who, he predicted, “will not 
consent to the enslavement of the whites after spilling so much blood to prevent the 
enslavement of the blacks.”65 
Muñoz’s claim that struggle represented the surest path to Puerto Rican autonomy 
also facilitated his critique of Degetau and other Republicanos who had benefited from 
his and his colleagues’ travails. Republicanos, Muñoz and his allies claimed, resembled 
the Puerto Rican Unconditional Party from Spanish rule. Incondicionales—who had 
tended to be Iberian-born and used patronage networks to accrue electoral power—had 
supported centralized Spanish rule in Puerto Rico rather than autonomy. In opposition, 
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Autonomistas had aligned emerging Puerto Rican patriotism with advocacy of autonomy, 
making Incondicionales national enemies in popular island memory. Although 
Republicanos joined Federales as successors to political movements that had long 
opposed Incondicionales, Federales now argued that Republicanos mirrored their prior 
common enemy in extending unpatriotic, disproportionate loyalty to the new metropole. 
They were, Federales argued, “unconditionally American.”66 
By the time the United States formally annexed Puerto Rico, Republicanos like 
Degetau had, unlike Muñoz and his Federales, aligned themselves with a new metropole 
that many islanders perceived to be a modern, affluent model of democracy. Degetau 
built on this prestigious association with U.S. rule by developing and displaying expertise 
in U.S. law and politics and by taking positions of leadership that publicly highlighted his 
commitments to promoting Puerto Ricans’ welfare through a mix of paternalistic and 
modern-liberal reforms. He thus entered the Puerto Rican Supreme Court bar, chaired the 
island Board of Charities, served on the Board of Trustees for the free library of San 
Juan, became President of the San Juan school board, and joined the Executive 
Committee of the Partido Republicano. Twining charitable service with paternalism 
toward purported social inferiors, Degetau offered lectures in San Juan for the betterment 
of unmarried women and working-class men. He also presented himself as a man of 
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principle, risking controversy to reject a suggestion by a Muñoz newspaper that in Puerto 
Rican girls “the general instinct awakes very early” making “immediate vigilance, not of 
a teacher but of a mother,” necessary. Rather, he argued, the paper needlessly cast doubt 
on the virtue of Puerto Rican daughters and on the morality of Puerto Rican wives and 
mothers, for science, experience, and modern pedagogy all supported co-education. Then 
as Chair of the Board of Charities, Degetau investigated and confirmed charges that the 
superintendent of an orphan asylum had physically abused children in his care. The 
Board closed the matter after accepting the resignation of that superintendent but not 
punishing him further. Writing Governor-General George Davis that “neither you nor any 
other officer . . . could so punish soldiers—already robust men—with such impunity,” 
Degetau resigned.67 
At the same time he devoted himself to mastering English while supplementing 
his firsthand knowledge of U.S. practices and norms by consuming scholarly and political 
writings and commentary. These, he would later indicate to readers of island newspapers, 
included books like James Bryce’s 1888 treatment of U.S. people and institutions, The 
American Commonwealth and articles by professors and politicians in leading mainland 
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periodicals.68 
As a result of these efforts and his preexisting reputation, Degetau quickly 
emerged as a leading Republicano spokesman. In promoting his party and later his own 
candidacy to represent Puerto Rico as its first nonvoting Resident Commissioner in 
Washington, Degetau portrayed Federales as patriotic fools. Their sound and fury on 
behalf of the island, he claimed, signified nothing in comparison to Degetau’s informed 
and effective, albeit more subtle, efforts to secure Puerto Rico a favorable status within 
the United States. Degetau attacked Federales’ constitutionally doubtful demand that the 
United States immediately extend Puerto Rico a territorial government “with all the rights 
of a State, except the right of sending Senators and [voting] Representatives to 
Congress.” Doing so would, for instance, contravene the Article Two reservation in the 
U.S. Constitution of electoral votes for President to the states. In making such a demand, 
Degetau charged, Federales displayed “total ignorance concerning the roles of States and 
Territories in the Union.” Stressing the role of the U.S. Congress in shaping Puerto Rican 
status, Republicanos used their platform to counsel and even celebrate patient attention to 
meeting the expectations of an admittedly superior United States. It is, they wrote, “our 
duty to await” congressional action. In the meantime, they proposed, Puerto Ricans 
should “advance civilization” on the island, “lend every effort to . . . teach [islanders] 
loyalty” to the United States, and “strive to become worthy” of a United States that could 
help them achieve “the highest culture in human destinies.”69 
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This full-throated embrace of U.S. rule, Degetau added in a speech at a 
Republicano convention, was no impugnment of Republicanos’ Puerto Rican patriotism. 
Only under “monarchical and centralized pueblos” like Spain, he claimed, does 
“patriotism . . . involve[] a tension between love of region and submission to the family 
or city that personifies or stands in for the entirety of national life.” Because the U.S. 
federal government did not dominate its regions, he continued, there “patriotism has a 
double concept with profound love of native region acting as a basis and foundation for 
profound love and respect for the general state.” In fact, Degetau asserted, his purported 
sophistication about the nature of U.S. politics and law would only enhance his vigorous 
advocacy on Puerto Ricans’ behalf. Thus, shortly after the Foraker Act laid out 
procedures for electing a nonvoting representative of Puerto Rico in Washington and an 
island House of Delegates, Degetau asked his “Fellow-citizens” to select a Republicano 
legislature and to give him the “honor of representing our people [and] going to claim in 
Washington for us the right to the fullness of the American citizenship” as resident 
commissioner. He promised islanders that “basic principles of the Constitution of the 
United States” guaranteed Puerto Ricans “enjoyment of the American citizenship” and 
Puerto Rico status as an “organized Territory now, in preparation to become an 
autonomous state of the union.” Honor and manhood, he intoned, demanded that they 
vindicate these rights. Just as the U.S. Revolution told “the world that mankind has 
reached its majority,” islanders had reached “the hour . . . of assuming the duties and 
responsibilities of American citizenship.” Failing to win “immunities and privileges of 
the citizenship,” would doom U.S. rule in Puerto Rico and ruin “our honor . . . as Porto 
Ricans, as Americans, and as men.” Unlike Muñoz and his allies, he insisted, only he had 
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done the “studies of constitutional materials and decisions involving the American 
constitutional questions that underlay issues of status” to succeed. He was ready, he 
elaborated, to “brandish” the “juridical meaning” of the Treaty of Paris “in defense of the 
rights of our country.”70 
Debate in Washington concerning U.S. rule in Puerto Rico, Degetau claimed, 
raised two fundamental, interrelated issues: the status of Puerto Rico and of Puerto 
Ricans. The dilemma, he wrote, was whether “Puerto Rico will be a Republican Territory 
today and tomorrow a State of the Union, or [if] Puerto Rico will be what the Anglo 
Saxons call ‘a crown colony.’” That question in turn raised another: if “there are in the 
United States . . . or can be two classes of citizens, two conditions of rights,” “citizens of 
a higher category called to govern other citizens of an inferior condition.” He argued that 
the answer lay in the highest U.S. authority, a constitution with two facets: the principles, 
organizations, and functions that it established, which then developed over time; and the 
legal document with its fixed, interpretable text.71 
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With him and his audiences presumably aware that the United States treated non-
whites as “citizens of an inferior condition” in the popular sense of citizenship as full 
membership in a civic community, Degetau found reassurance in the history of the U.S. 
Constitution. He added that under it innumerable groups—all, he implied, inferior to 
Anglo-Saxons—held extensive, formal rights. Overlooking the failure of such legal forms 
to protect ostensible beneficiaries from such subordinating state polices as Jim Crow, 
Degetau instead focused on a whiggish recounting of the history of U.S. rights. After 
abolishing slavery, and despite worries that southern U.S. society, including its many 
former slaves, “‘was not prepared’ for the life of law,” he claimed, the United States had 
“not dared to deprive slaveholders or freedmen of the privileges and immunities of the 
Constitution.” Today, he wrote, the United States extended “equality before the law and 
liberty,” albeit a technical one, to a “pueblo composed of representatives of all the 
European families, and of the families of Cherokee, Chootawaw, Chickawa, Creek, 
Seminole, among other varieties of red skins, and of Chinese in California and of Blacks 
in the South.”72 
For those unimpressed by the chance to resemble U.S. blacks, Degetau also 
portrayed members of the Latin race like Puerto Ricans as coauthors with Anglo-Saxons 
of democracy, hence equal members in a shared civic tradition. Equating political 
                                                 
72 F. Degetau y Gonzalez, “Por honor y por deber,” El País, 22 Mar. 1900, available at CIHCAM 18/L2 
(quotes 1-2 (“‘no estaba preparado’ para el derecho”; “no se atrevió á despojar a esclavizadores y 
esclavizados de las [] garantías y de las inmunidades de la Constitución”); Degetau, “Puerto-Rico ante el 
Congreso” (quotes 3-4 (“la igualdad ante al derecho y la libertad”; “pueblo compuesto de representantes de 
todas las familias europeas y de indios Cherokees y Chootaws y Chickasaws y Creeks y Seminoles entre las 
variedades de pieles rojas, y de chinos en California y de negros en el Sud”)); “La constitución Americana” 
(quote 5 (“las distintas razas humanas en ella representadas”)); “La constitución de los Estados Unidos,” El 
País, 23-24 Apr. 1900, available at CIHCAM 12/L2; cf. Neil Foley, The White Scourge: Mexicans, Blacks, 
and Poor Whites in Texas Cotton Culture (Berkely: University of California Press, 1997). For an overview 
of ascriptive strands in the history of U.S. citizenship, see Rogers M. Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting 
Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997). 
 64 
organizations and political innovations of nations with the “distinct human races 
represented in” them, he depicted “Latins” as affirming “the existences of the individual 
as the center of juridical relations” and unifying diverse peoples within a single state 
through common laws. Montesquieu, he added, developed the Aristotelian notion of 
separation of powers that the United States had put into practice.73 
Yet despite his assurances that the U.S. government would see Puerto Rican 
Latins as Anglo-Saxons’ equals, Degetau also worried about the matter. The challenge, 
he wrote, was that because many in Congress both saw the Foraker Act as a precedent for 
Filipino legislation and did not believe that Filipino history had prepared those islands for 
U.S. institutions, they might equate Puerto Ricans and Filipinos. In response, he did not 
explicitly make Cuba his object lesson, though it shared a history of slavery and a 
populace with African ancestry with Puerto Rico; many mainlanders were racializing 
Cubans as dark, barbaric, dishonorable, and incapable of self-government; and some 
Cuban leaders were responding by stressing Cuban civility, culture, peacefulness, and 
whiteness. He did, however, tell readers, “our duty now is to demonstrate with 
information the reality that we are a civilized and Christian society and that it cannot be 
said that ‘we are not prepared’ to live with the principles of the Constitution.”74 
Though Degetau also asserted that the legal or textual Constitution as well as U.S. 
ideals, international standing, and honor would all ensure U.S. citizenship and 
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constitutional rights for Puerto Ricans. But by framing his claim as an argument that he 
could later deploy if necessary, he also he betrayed concern that U.S. officials might 
disagree. Degetau depicted a U.S. Constitution that constrained U.S action in Puerto 
Rico. Unlike Root, for whom sovereignty over Puerto Rico brought the United States 
inherent, unimpeded governing discretion, Degetau claimed both that all federal power 
over Puerto Rico sprang from the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution and 
that this power was limited by the numerous constitutional provisions that protected 
individual rights from federal, though not necessarily state, infringement. As for U.S. 
citizenship, he wrote that subjecting Puerto Ricans would be both to say “Goodbye 
Washington, Goodbye Founding Fathers” and indicate, “with the entry of Puerto Rico 
into the Union as a ‘Dependency,’ that American citizenship had been reduced to the 
monopoly of 74 million oligarchs.” If the United States “shamefully” reneged on General 
Nelson Miles’s presidentially sanctioned promise to Puerto Ricans on behalf of the 
“honor and . . . dignity of the American pueblo” to bring them the blessings of the U.S. 
Constitution, it would be a “disrespect of [U.S. people’s] own honor and good name,” 
recognized as such “even in the eyes of a tribe relegated to the solitude of Indian 
Territory.”75 
As voters considered Federales’ and Republicanos’ competing arguments, the 
Executive Council of Puerto Rico proceeded under the Foraker Act to divide the island 
into seven electoral districts. Aware that the district lines would shape electoral fortunes 
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for the major Puerto Rican political parties, the Executive Council proposed a procedural 
solution. After new Governor of Puerto Rico Charles Allen appointed five Puerto 
Ricans—two Federales, two Republicanos, and one independent—to the Executive 
Council, the Council instructed those members to propose electoral districts. At a 
subsequent meeting, the Republicano members accepted a plan proposed by the 
independent. Despite protests by the Federales, the Council ratified the choice. Hoping to 
improve their prospects, Federales charged gerrymandering; the two Federales on the 
Council resigned; and Muñoz cabled Washington in protest. As in 1899, Muñoz’s attempt 
to divide Washington and island officials failed. On September 7, the State Department 
cabled the Governor for details, and the Governor “[r]ecommend[ed] resignations be 
accepted at once” from the “declared obstructionists, openly and actively hostile to 
America and Americans.” The State Department told the Governor that President 
McKinley directed acceptance of the resignations.76 
With elections looming, Federales next faced extralegal violence unchecked by 
island officials. In successive September incidents, a group of mostly working-class 
residents of San Juan who supported Republicanos gathered outside of Muñoz’s home 
and fired shots, then destroyed the press with which he published the newspaper El 
Diario. These public performances of violence against a man of Muñoz’s standing by 
men he would have perceived to be his social inferiors overturned honor-based norms of 
deference and provided at least some who had long faced disfranchisement with 
opportunities to assert their equality or even their superiority. Though both attacks were 
                                                 
76 In AG/OG/CG/179/justicia, ciudadanía octubre 1898, L. M. Rivera, see Governor Allen to Assistant 
Secretary Hill, 8 Sep. 1900 (quotes); Hill to Governor Allen, 7 Sep. 1900; John Hay to [Governor Allen], 3 
Oct. 1900. See also Foraker Act, 31 1900: 82-83 (secs. 27-30); Cabán, Constructing a Colonial People, 
167; “Se consumó la injusticia: nueve contra dos,” La Democracia, 6 Sep. 1900, 2.  
 67 
brazen and lengthy, city officials did not prevent them. As November elections for the 
House of Delegates and Resident Commissioner neared, the extra-legal violence 
intensified, until Federales faced nearly daily attacks in and around San Juan. Finally, in 
early November, Muñoz and the Federales decided to withdraw from the elections, citing 
“lack of protection for our right to vote and the manifest partiality of the council in favor 
of the Republican[o] Party.” Two days later, Republicanos ran unopposed in November 6 
elections, sweeping the House of Delegates and electing Degetau Resident 
Commissioner. Within days, Degetau had left for Washington to fulfill his campaign 
promise to win U.S. citizenship for all islanders. Soon thereafter, Muñoz joined him on 
the mainland in self-imposed exile.77 
 
New Labor: Santiago Iglesias Seeks Mainland Allies and U.S. Protection  
Santiago Iglesias embraced U.S. rule from the outset. He perceived its potential to 
alter political and economic relations between island workers, local elites, metropolitan 
officials, and U.S. capital. He could observe that under U.S. rule island political leader 
Luis Muñoz and his partisans lost much of the political power they had been on the verge 
of locking up in mid-1898. Similarly, U.S. capital followed U.S. troops into the island. 
Admittedly unfamiliar with many facets of U.S. politics, government, and organized 
labor, Iglesias took an experimental approach to his new circumstances. He explored 
mainland alliances, formulated and revised arguments around U.S. rule, and sought 
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opportunities to take advantage of U.S. protection and promises of freedoms of 
citizenship.78 
Iglesias’s first opportunities came early. Shortly before the U.S. invasion Iglesias 
had learned of orders to arrest him that he presumed were Muñoz’s doing. Captured 
while seeking to flee to the United States, he had been jailed by Spanish colonial officials 
who viewed him as a danger to a state on the brink of war. His release came five months 
later, on October 5, 1898, as part of a U.S.-initiated policy toward political prisoners. 
When a police inspector close to Muñoz immediately sought to re-arrest Iglesias, Iglesias 
sought protection from U.S. troops. Those troops, he remembered years later, told him, 
“Now you don’t have anything to fear; the American flag protects you[;] . . . consider 
yourself a free citizen.” Two weeks later, on October 20, Iglesias founded the Federación 
Regional de los Trabajadores de Puerto Rico to organize, represent, and advocate for 
island workers. Three days after that he launched the newspaper Porvenir Social, an 
organ of the Federación Regional that published American and European writings on 
labor organizing, economic battles, and socialism. By October 25, he had organized 
artisans and workingmen to petition for his appointment as a San Juan councilman. And 
at the end of the month, a large assembly of labor representatives supplemented their 
economic demands by declaring, “we are annexationists”; “the institutions of the 
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American Republic should be planted in our Island for the good of the pueblo.”79  
Having regained a measure of space in which to maneuver, Iglesias turned to 
forging alliances. One opportunity came from Federico Degetau’s Republicanos, newly 
ascendant over Iglesias’s former adversary, Muñoz. When Degetau and his co-partisans 
met with Iglesias and the Federación Regional in mid-1899 to propose an alliance, 
however, a combination of self-interest and his expressed desire to keep labor 
independent of partisanship led Iglesias to demur. Other members embraced the chance 
to acquire electorally powerful allies. As the white Spaniard Iglesias later acknowledged, 
“[t]hat Dr. Barbosa [the leader of the Republicanos] was a prominent member of the race 
of color, and that many workers of all kinds were of the same race that society was 
prejudiced against, complicated my situation greatly.” When a fractious, chaotic labor 
meeting followed, Iglesias and his allies abandoned the Federación Regional to Degetau 
and his allies, forming the Federación de Trabajadores Libres in its stead.80  
Seeing mainland labor organizations as other potential allies, Iglesias and his 
colleagues resolved to reach out to the U.S. Socialist Labor Party and the American 
Federation of Labor. Socialist Party leaders saw U.S. annexation of hundreds of 
thousands of workingmen as an opportunity to grow. Within days of promulgation of the 
Treaty of Paris, they wrote Iglesias with information, sought links with socialists in 
Puerto Rico, and solicited an article from Iglesias for their organ, The People. Later that 
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year, Iglesias provided the requested article, and the political wing of the Federación 
Libre formally aligned with mainland socialists. By contrast, the American Federation of 
Labor vilified U.S. expansion as a threat. In late 1899, protesting “against the forcible 
annexation to this country of . . . Porto Rico” rather than for better U.S. rule there, the 
Federation described Puerto Ricans being “deprived of the right of self-government” as 
putting “our [mainlanders’] political rights . . . in jeopardy.” Earlier, Federation President 
Samuel Gompers, had linked Puerto Rico to what he perceived to be the racial threat of 
the Philippines when, in opposing annexation of both, he had asked, “If the Philippines 
are annexed what is to prevent” “hordes of Chinese and the semi-savage races” of “the 
negritos and Malays from coming to our country [and] . . . engulfing our people and our 
civilization?”81 
 During a trip to New York hosted by mainland socialists in the first quarter of 
1900, Iglesias saw benefits from associating with their party. At numerous socialist 
events he discovered an inclusive organization of male and female workers of Russian, 
German, Italian, Polish, French, Austrian, and Spanish descent; he heard speeches in 
German, Spanish, and English; and he saw an embrace of Puerto Rican unions. He also 
observed that U.S. socialists held banquets, used large meeting halls, and counted 
lawyers, doctors, writers, and journalists as members, indicating resources that 
outstripped those of the Federación Libre.82 
While there, he also gained access to mainland audiences. On March 8, for 
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example, Iglesias tested his arguments before 6,000 workers and reporters at a socialist 
meeting at the Cooper Union hall that had previously been a forum for Cuban 
revolutionary activities. Stressing Puerto Rican workers’ need for U.S. protection, he 
characterized U.S. rule in Puerto Rico as an interrupted journey from slavery to freedom. 
“[F]or four centuries, the privileged were the owners of lives and haciendas,” he told 
listeners, and workers were “treated like servants.” Even before “President McKinley . . . 
told Congress and the world: ‘THAT IN THE NAME OF HUMANITY AND LIBERTY, 
I INTERVENED IN THE SPANISH COLONIES,’” “they [Puerto Ricans] accept[ed] 
with jubilation the DEMOCRATIC AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS.” Problems, he 
related, arose due to “a privileged class of the republic” and “capitalist designs” aiming to 
create a “new slavery.” The U.S. people, he contended, should not let the “ignorance,” 
“humility and submission” of island laborers lead those laborers to “work nearly for free 
and be political slaves.” Rather they should “loan their cooperation and protection” to 
Puerto Rico “until it has been elevated to a level of economic and political life like that in 
modest U.S. states.” When Iglesias finished, the audience adopted a protest resolution 
that they telegraphed to President McKinley. Afterward, the socialist paper The Worker 
quoted Iglesias at length and the New York Tribune described Puerto Rican workers’ 
claims of mistreatment, over-taxation, and disfranchisement to its broader audience.83 
 The first major test of whether Iglesias could find space for labor activism under 
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U.S. rule and through recourse to mainland socialist allies came shortly after 
implementation of the exchange rate in the Foraker Act lowered workers’ real wages. 
Employers implemented the exchange rate set by the Act by paying workers $0.60 for 
each peso previously earned. Merchants did not, charging $1.00 for goods that had 
previously cost one peso. Iglesias had few resources with which to respond. Though 
island labor leaders claimed to be translating documents from the mainland socialists for 
publication in the local labor press and anticipating organization of a socialist party 
throughout the island, Puerto Rican organized labor remained institutionally weak. As the 
San Juan News wrote, “Labor in Puerto Rico is not well enough organized to 
accomplish[] anything by strikes” because “a strikers’ reserve fund is unknown among 
the local labor unions, and as the men live practically from hand to mouth, they cannot 
stay out over a day or so.” Nonetheless, in early July Iglesias and fellow labor leaders 
planned a general strike centered in San Juan to target initially construction and 
municipal and insular works. On August 1, after employers denied workers’ written 
demands, the strike began. As Iglesias recalled, their efforts paralyzed private and 
government works and municipal and military workshops.84 
 For several weeks the strike occasioned official repression and party competition. 
For Degetau’s Republicanos, it was a threat. A successful strike would raise Iglesias’s 
standing; laborers would join the Federación Libre and might leave the Republicano-
aligned Federación Regional; and Republicano vote totals could fall. San Juan officials, 
led by their Republicano mayor, thus repressed the strike. On August 2, the San Juan 
News sided with city officials, reporting that “notorious Socialist” Iglesias and some 
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colleagues had been arrested, but that it was “not probable that any of the strikes will 
assume any seriousness” “on account of the number of troops” available. Iglesias 
protested to the mayor that police had provoked strikers in order to arrest them, then 
arrested him for not rising to the bait. Those charged to protect public order and safety, he 
declared, had committed “acts [that] were truly cowardly and beneath the dignity of 
civilized men.” Repression continued. Within days, twenty-seven strikers and strike 
leaders had been arrested. Though eventually released pending a trial scheduled for early 
September, Iglesias was charged with criminal conspiracy.85  
During this period, Muñoz’s Federales and mainland socialists lent Iglesias some 
support. Federales shared Iglesias’s antipathy for Republicanos and criticized what they 
described as repression of strikers by Republicano officials. On August 5, for example, 
Muñoz’s paper El Diario reported that Degetau had overstepped the bounds of what even 
his U.S. allies would permit: “At 9:45 a municipal hygiene attendant passed through la 
Cruz street, exchanged words with a building worker, and in the presence of the mayor 
and Federico Degetau, set out to arrest him. Some Americans stepped in because they 
observed that this was unjust.” On August 22, Iglesias wrote to workers and socialist 
journals in New York about difficulties on the island. He subsequently reported that the 
association between Puerto Rican workers and such extra-island organizations helped 
Puerto Rican organized labor survive the oppression of the period. Some San Juan 
strikers, Iglesias also later reported, won gains.86  
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During and after these months the Federación Libre faced extralegal violence 
from the largely poor San Juan residents who supported Republicanos and the Federación 
Regional and who engaged in anti-Federal violence too. These assailants fought members 
of the Federación Libre during the strikes, and, Iglesias reported, attacked him thrice 
following his release from prison pending trial. Lacking civil rights necessary for labor 
activism, blacklisted from many workshops, and vulnerable to vigilante violence, Iglesias 
left San Juan for New York in late September. Finding work and lodging with socialist 
friends there and uncertain if he would return to Puerto Rico, he joined a local union and 
began publishing articles in the mainland labor press. His first attempt to use U.S. rule 
and a mainland ally to advance his standing and the cause of organized labor in Puerto 
Rico had failed.87 
 
 The range of potential consequences of the U.S. invasion of Puerto Rico for U.S. 
law, Puerto Rican status and self-government, and island leaders narrowed sharply 
between 1898 and 1900. In 1898, many Puerto Rican leaders, military officials, and 
mainland commentators predicted wholesale extension of the U.S. constitutional order to 
Puerto Rico, including self-government, liberal U.S. institutions, U.S. citizenship, full 
constitutional protections, and eventual statehood. Others on the mainland envisaged a 
U.S. empire unencumbered by a constitutional requirement to provide Puerto Ricans any 
of these advantages. By late 1900 War Department policies, unsuccessful claims by 
Puerto Ricans, actions by U.S. officials in Puerto Rico, and the Foraker Act had dashed 
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Puerto Rican hopes for immediate self-government. They had also revealed U.S. officials 
and lawmakers who repeatedly faced and failed to definitively resolve narrower and 
narrower questions concerning Puerto Rican status. It thus appeared that the United 
States would not make a single choice between Constitution and empire but instead try to 
navigate their competing demands case by case. Labor leader Santiago Iglesias and 
political leader Luis Muñoz Rivera were victims of this shift. After enthusiastically 
claiming rights as “a free citizen” and building an alliance with mainland associates, 
Iglesias found neither sufficient to win him adequate state protection during strikes. 
Muñoz, who consistently demanded that the United States immediately fulfill in Puerto 
Rico its ideals of self-government, found himself progressively driven from power. 
 For others, the fracturing of broad questions of Constitution and empire created 
opportunities. Degetau won the highest elected office available in Puerto Rio by joining 
the War Department and Congress in seeing the U.S. citizenship status of Puerto Ricans 
as a bellwether for their rights under the Constitution and for the status of their island 
under that document and in U.S. policy. Muñoz’s vocal failures to win gains from U.S. 
officials and ongoing transformation of broad status questions into multiple, increasingly 
technical and legalistic ones played to Degetau’s strengths as a prominent lawyer, 
intellectual, and student of the United States. Similarly, the Coudert Brothers law firm 
identified remunerative litigation opportunities in challenging the statutory and 
constitutional validity of tariffs on island-mainland shipments. Thus, as Puerto Ricans 
and U.S. officials broke overarching concerns about the meaning of U.S. expansion into 
specific questions about policy and status and then selected some for special attention, 
they reshaped and narrowed debate around discrete matters that claimants could press the 
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MAKING ALLIES, MAKING CLAIMS: ISLAND LEADERS ON THE MAINLAND, 1900-1902 
 
In 1901, Republicanos, the Federación Libre, and Federales each had a top leader 
newly settled on the mainland. Given the differing circumstances under which Federico 
Degetau, Santiago Iglesias, and Luis Muñoz Rivera had left Puerto Rico, these men 
approached mainland interlocutors in different ways and for different ends. Degetau 
sought U.S. citizenship for Puerto Ricans, traditional U.S. territorial status for Puerto 
Rico, and full inclusion of both in the U.S. constitutional order as a proof and 
consequence of Puerto Ricans’ meriting equal treatment as whites with full membership 
in the U.S. nation. Having become Resident Commissioner on promises of securing these 
ends and enjoying good relations with presidential appointees on the island, he aimed to 
use his position within the U.S. government to win immediate progress on his favored 
causes from federal agencies, political branches, and courts. By contrast, with 
presidential appointees in Puerto Rico, local courts, the Republicano majority, a rival 
labor organization, the leading island newspaper, and large employers all aligned against 
him, Santiago Iglesias sought a non-governmental ally on the mainland to offer him and 
his Federación the protection that U.S. Socialists had failed to provide. The most 
promising candidate was the large, powerful, and growing American Federation of Labor, 
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which had learned the benefits of federal lobbying and drawing on strands of U.S. law 
helpful to the labor cause. Luis Muñoz Rivera used oppositional tactics to highlight 
injustices and seek eventually to change the orientation of the U.S. political branches and 
courts toward Puerto Rico. As leader of a minority party that presidential appointees in 
Puerto Rico disfavored, Muñoz both lacked legitimacy when speaking to mainlanders on 
behalf of his island and had comparatively little access to island patronage networks. 
With consequently fewer responsibilities than Degetau or Iglesias to govern Puerto Rico 
or its leading labor movement, he and his co-partisans focused on courting potential 
constituents. 
These men’s struggles occurred amidst shifting U.S.-Puerto Rican relations 
involving dynamics in which they sometimes played only a small role. In the 1900 U.S. 
presidential election, for instance, the question of the U.S. relationship to its new 
acquisition had been a central issue. Embracing anti-imperialism, William Jennings 
Bryan had stated in accepting the Democratic nomination for President that the “forcible 
annexation of territory to be governed by arbitrary power differs as much from the 
acquisition of territory to be built up into states as a monarchy differs from a democracy.” 
After McKinley had decisively won reelection, Anti-Imperialists turned their eyes from 
the polls to the courts, especially the series of tariff and fee disputes that came to be 
known as the Insular Cases. So too did Puerto Ricans.88 
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“The very vagueness . . . was valuable” 
In early 1901, facing seven Insular Cases concerning the relationship of Puerto 
Rico to the United States, the Supreme Court appeared poised to reshape the juridical 
landscape of U.S. empire. Two of these cases, DeLima v. Bidwell (1901) and Downes v. 
Bidwell (1901), presented the issues of whether Puerto Rico was “foreign,” hence subject 
to existing tariff laws, or a part of the “United States” within which the Constitution 
demanded tariff uniformity.89 
The driving force behind DeLima and Downes was the Coudert Brothers law firm. 
The firm had been founded in the 1850s by the three sons of Charles Coudert, a 
Frenchman who had fled to the United States in the 1820s to escape capital charges for 
participation in a conspiracy against the French state involving the revolutionary hero the 
Marquis de Lafayette and Napoleon Bonaparte’s son. As the law firm became a leader in 
international law in the latter 19th century, one founding brother, Frederic Coudert Sr., 
was twice offered Supreme Court posts. By 1900 his twenty-nine-year-old son Frederic 
Coudert, a veteran of the U.S. invasion of Puerto Rico, was the lead oral litigator at the 
firm. On January 8-9 the junior Coudert made front-page news with his arguments before 
the Supreme Court in Downes and Bidwell.90  
In proposing judicial responses to U.S. empire, Coudert and his adversaries, U.S. 
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Attorney General John Griggs and U.S. Solicitor General John Richards, agreed that 
meanings of terms like “foreign” and “United States” varied by context. Coudert focused 
on the Uniformity Clause, arguing that “United States” should there be read to make the 
clause “apply throughout all [U.S.] territory regardless of whether it was a State or 
whether it was Territory of the United States.” In reply, Griggs contended that Puerto 
Rico was U.S. territory under international law but remained foreign under the U.S. 
Constitution. Richards further deconstructed the term “United States”—giving it different 
meanings for purposes of sovereignty, the Constitution, legislation, and international 
matters—and concluding that its constitutional sense did not encompass Puerto Rico. In 
support of these positions, the government attorneys drew precedents from throughout 
U.S. history, including many involving prior U.S. expansions and U.S. treatments of 
slaves and their descendants, Chinese, American Indians, annexed populations, women, 
and children. Though many of these peoples were U.S. citizens who held limited rights, 
Griggs rejected equating allegiance with naturalization by depicting U.S. citizenship in 
robust terms. “Suppose a cession of a small island with a half dozen inhabitants [to be 
used] solely as a fort,” he stated; “must the United States . . . accept them as citizens?” 
Doing so, he implied, would handicap the U.S. right to acquire territory.91 
Griggs’s anti-citizenship stand reflected the potential importance of the issue to 
the cases at hand. “[I]f the inhabitants of these islands are citizens of the United States,” 
Coudert argued, “it would be admitted that the islands themselves were part of the United 
States.” To make the implications of his position more palatable, Coudert portrayed U.S. 
                                                 
91 Transcript of Record, no. 456, DeLima, 182 U.S. 1 (1901), 5 (quote 1); Brief for Plaintiff in Error, 
Downes, 2 (quote 2); Opening Argument of Mr. Coudert for Plaintiff in Error, Downes, 18 (quote 3); 
Sparrow, The Insular Cases, 46-51, 80-85; Argument of the Attorney General, no. 340, Goetze v. United 
States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901), 73. 
 81 
citizenship as broadly distributed and of little consequence. Broad distribution did not 
threaten the U.S. polity, he argued, for though popular opinion equated citizenship with 
political rights, U.S. law did not. Ignoring the fact that as elite a lawyer as the Attorney 
General had just implied otherwise, Coudert asserted that legal U.S. citizenship was 
“passive” or “naked,” synonymous simply with nationality. It encompassed such people 
lacking political rights as “women, children[,] and all persons in the Territories,” and 
those who did not meet state literacy requirements for voting. “[E]very person within a 
given territory,” he asserted, was generally either a “national[ i.e., a citizen,]” or an 
“alien[].” So too Puerto Ricans. Those born after annexation enjoyed what he described 
as the 14th Amendment extension of U.S. citizenship to all people “born . . . in the United 
States and subject to their allegiance.” The international law of cessions made U.S. 
citizens of Puerto Ricans already on the island in 1898.92 
On Coudert’s view, non-U.S.-citizen American Indians and antebellum people of 
color in the United States proved the rule. Though they occupied intermediate U.S. 
statuses that made them neither alien to nor citizens of the United States, he contended 
that the peculiar reasons for their status bolstered his case. Indians, he claimed, were not 
U.S. citizens because they owed allegiance to tribal political communities rather than to 
the United States; place of birth was irrelevant, because those born on Indian lands but 
not into tribal allegiance were U.S. citizens under the 14th Amendment. Here, in fact, was 
a potential way to placate those like Democratic Senator Donelson Caffery of Louisiana, 
who worried that Filipinos “incapable of reaching our standard of government or 
civilization . . . might inoculate our citizenship with the poison of theirs.” As Coudert 
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explained, the United States could class “uncivilized” Filipinos with American Indians 
for constitutional purposes. By treating them as owing an allegiance to their local leaders 
that would remove them from full U.S. sovereignty, the United States could also remove 
them from the 14th Amendment stricture that “All persons born or naturalized in the 
United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States.” 
The choice then, Degetau argued, was not between U.S. citizenship and alienage for 
Filipinos but between two forms of Filipino non-citizenship: quasi-tribal status or 
something else.93 
In advocating the former, Coudert reminded the Court of the antebellum people of 
color who had become noncitizens of the United States via the Dred Scott case. There 
Chief Justice Roger Taney had stressed their being “capable of being made property.” 
Even free people of color, Coudert related, had been “under the Constitution, . . . 
something different and apart from the rest of humanity,” “something . . . in the domain 
of natural history or zoology, . . . like a horse or a dog,” “half man, half beast.” Like 
conquered peoples of yore, he explained, they could in some instances be reduced to 
property under state law and thus subjected without being naturalized. But, he argued, 
Puerto Ricans should not “occupy that debased position.” In any case, such “views have 
been repudiated by the American people in the Civil War, by three amendments to the 
Constitution of the United States, by this court, and by forty years of advancing 
civilization.”94 
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Shortly after disembarking in New York on December 1, 1900, Puerto Rico’s first 
elected representative in the United States, Federico Degetau, had hurried to Washington 
to hear arguments in the Insular Cases. Once there, he observed that U.S. political 
branches were loath to act pending that judicial resolution, and so focused on other levers 
of power: the administrative state and mainland media. Aware that agencies had great 
authority in domains like federal employment, international relations, immigration, and 
colonial governance and that courts, political branches, and agencies often gave 
administrative decisions precedential value, Degetau launched claims involving 
citizenship before them. In Washington, Degetau also got a closer look at a U.S. empire-
state rooted in the construction and enforcement of distinctions based on “racial” 
difference. In Puerto Rico he had portrayed lines between purportedly inferior peoples—
Chinese, Filipinos, blacks, and American Indians—and Puerto Ricans as sharp and 
natural. But race was more socially constructed than he acknowledged. He now saw how 
public opinion cast islanders as a racially inferior, dependent people by stressing their 
African, native, and southern-European heritages. In a media campaign like the one he 
had conducted in Puerto Rico, he made arguments drawing on languages of race, 
masculinity, citizenship, honor, and domesticity in newspapers and before academic 
audiences. The challenge was to highlight the paternal respectability of Puerto Ricans 
like himself without drawing undue attention to potential “racial” characterizations of the 
social dependents who were to be the objects of elites’ benevolence.95 
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While the Supreme Court deliberated on Coudert’s argument, Degetau portrayed 
Puerto Ricans to mainlanders as a patriotic U.S. people seeking traditional U.S. status. 
Despite former Spanish ties, he told reporters, islanders were “naturally Americans” for 
whom “no more fortunate thing could have happened” than annexation. They sought 
eventual U.S. statehood and, in the interim, like U.S. citizens in other territories, “a 
territorial form of government” like that “of Arizona, Indian Territory, Oklahoma.” 
Puerto Ricans did not want a unique status “that can be designated as a difference 
between the United States and Porto Rico”; they advocated application of the U.S. 
Constitution to them and, like residents of other territories, planned to finance their 
governments through self-taxation.96 
 Degetau sought to exemplify the admiration for and integration into U.S. life that 
he attributed to Puerto Ricans, a task made easier by his relocation to Washington. At a 
distance from island arguments over patria and regional-cultural Latin pride he could tell 
a reporter that he “object[ed] to the Spanish appellation, ‘Senor [sic]’” without derailing 
his political career. He also told newspapers, one of which found him “quite at ease in the 
use of the English language,” that he planned to study English further and believed the 
U.S. constitutional system to be ideal. Blurring his earlier advocacy of a Spanish 
republic, his subsequent leadership of island Republicanos, and his current support for the 
U.S. national Republican Party, he asserted that “I have always been a Republican in 
politics.” The self-portrayal worked. Newspapers, federal officials, businessmen, and 
academics treated him as important, capable, and worthy of attention. He addressed an 
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academic society, secured favorable coverage from and the opportunity to write in 
newspapers, and won a warm reception among Wall Street officials. Federal officials 
who welcomed Degetau included the President, Congressmen, and agency heads.97 
 Despite these warm personal receptions, many and often the same mainlanders 
held opinions of Puerto Ricans that Degetau termed “much more negative than the worst 
ideas we had heard or imagined.” He learned that in correspondence and publications, 
mainlanders used racial, imperial, and gender analogies to deprecate Puerto Ricans and 
Spanish Antilleans as uncivilized, uncultured, or politically inept. For one author, the 
U.S. Reconstruction-era “experience with the colored man” illustrated “the danger of 
conferring too many privileges on” “Porto Rico.” Another labeled Degetau’s constituents 
“only 85 percent Americans,” albeit preferable to the “fifty percent citizens” in the 
Philippines. Editorial cartoonists cast islanders as children and defenseless women, travel 
writers depicted them in ways that deprecated their “culture and state of civilization,” and 
the New York Times announced that “Porto Ricans have a great deal to learn about the 
drafting of laws.” Because support from framers of the Foraker Act would be the surest 
way to reform it, Degetau added, congressmen’s “ignorance” and concomitant belief that 
the law treated islanders justly “ma[de] our political labor here hard.”98 
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 “[R]ectifying . . . erroneous evaluations” of islanders by mainlanders, Degetau 
told Rossy and a co-partisan, was his “foremost duty.” Though mainlanders knew little 
about Puerto Rico, he wrote, they displayed “sympathy for and interest in our country.” 
To defend Puerto Rican honor and capacity for and compatibility with U.S. practices, he 
drew on travel accounts, U.S. constitutional histories, newspapers, and government 
documents, and he spoke out in public gatherings, the press, and official contexts. Rather 
than argue that the United States and Puerto shared shortcomings, he described common 
advances. When Princeton Professor John Finley told the American Academy of Political 
Sciences that “Porto Rico under native rule will never be developed,” Degetau objected. 
Depicting Puerto Ricans as the driving force behind the Spanish legislative action, he 
argued that islanders had abolished slavery voluntarily and peacefully. Under U.S. rule, 
he added, Puerto Ricans had made “improvement in our judiciary, in our system of 
education and politics.” Describing islanders and mainlanders as “the blood and flesh of a 
single body,” he proposed that Puerto Ricans be “[t]reat[ed] as brethren” and, “in return,” 
be “loving peaceful citizens.”99 
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Similarly, in a letter to Puerto Rican Governor Charles Allen about a hearing of 
the House Committee on Insular Affairs, Degetau described a witness’s criticism of the 
morality of Puerto Rican judges as an attack on both the “honor of the judge” and “my 
own honor.” Fulfilling his “duty,” he continued, he “strongly protested to the 
Chairman.”100 
When Degetau observed newspapers make the island legislature “the object of 
censure and jokes of middling taste,” he defended it in a Chicago Daily Tribune interview 
and later relayed that Governor Charles Allen judged island “legislators honest, careful” 
contributors to a new “[s]tatute book [that] will start without a bad law upon it.” “We of 
Porto Rico,” Degetau also told reporters “are not a savage people,” having demonstrated 
no “small degree of civilization” in securing duty-free admission of Spanish-language 
“scientific, literary and artistic works”; having adapted to the secret ballot better than 
mainlanders; and often speaking multiple languages. As a Latin people, he added, Puerto 
Ricans were coauthors of U.S. democracy, for the “Constitution is not exclusively an 
American product”; it “would not exist had it not been for the principles formulated by 
Aristotle.”101 
Degetau also tried to circumvent congressional unwillingness to act on Puerto 
Rican matters by bringing selected claims involving Puerto Rican status and citizenship 
before federal agencies. Each time he succeeded in convincing a federal actor to treat 
Puerto Ricans as U.S. citizens or Puerto Rico as a traditional U.S. territory, he neutralized 
arguments that the status he sought would hinder federal administration of the newest 
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U.S. territories and peoples. Such victories were also precedents that subsequent decision 
makers might find persuasive. Degetau quickly learned that agencies were most likely to 
respond to claims involving status if individuals brought them and they did not require 
definitive resolutions of status questions, as when the Department of Agriculture made 
available a ration of seeds to Commissioner Degetau comparable to the one that it gave 
U.S. representatives without deciding whether Puerto Rico had the same status as other 
territories. A claim involving application of federal civil-service laws to Puerto Ricans 
illustrated the dynamic. How those laws applied to islanders, Degetau wrote, depended 
on a view of “the status of a native Porto Rican.” When a U.S. official refused to let a 
Puerto Rican applicant take the civil-service exam, that applicant brought an individual 
appeal to the civil-service commission. Eschewing the issue of U.S. citizenship for Puerto 
Ricans, the commission vindicated the applicant by finding that all who “prove 
citizenship in Porto Rico” “had such right” to apply.102 
In January 1901, Degetau sought to combine official responses to individual 
Puerto Ricans migrating throughout the United States into claims involving the status of 
all islanders. The migrations at issue dated to 1900 when Hawai‘ian sugar planters who 
faced tightening labor supply due to Chinese Exclusion had recruited financially 
distressed Puerto Rican laborers who they had anticipated would not be subject to U.S. 
immigration laws. Over the next two years they brought more than 5,000 islanders, most 
signed to labor contracts, through New Orleans to Hawai‘i. U.S. immigration officials did 
not inspect them. Federal officials at Ellis Island had followed a different policy. On 
November 24, 1900, Degetau wrote, “Mr. Alfonso Gómez y Stanley, a professor who had 
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acted as U. S. Interpreter at the Paris Exposition . . . was [temporarily] detained at Ellis 
Island, N. Y., when it was known that he was a Porto Rican, and that he had no money.” 
Complicating matters further, the New York Tribune on December 7, 1900, had reported 
that a contingent of Puerto Ricans bound for Hawai‘i “claim they were taken . . . under 
false promises.” Subsequent articles claimed men in Texas with rifles had held those 
migrants captive, that the migrants had attempted to mutiny on a steamship in Honolulu 
Harbor after being denied food, and that police had accompanied the migrants from one 
Hawai‘ian island to another.103 
 In response, Degetau drew on his recent acquaintance with Acting Secretary of 
State David Hill to put two claims involving the status of Puerto Ricans before the 
Department of State in late January 1901. After Hill told Degetau that the “private . . . 
relations between the emigrants and the planters” were beyond his reach, Degetau 
charged a potential “violation of the fundamental constitutional rights of the Porto 
Ricans.” Newspapers, he reminded Hill, had reported that migrants in Texas had been 
“arrested as violators, not of a contract, but of the criminal law” and that police had 
restored and maintained order on the steamship in Honolulu Harbor. As he later told the 
Puerto Rican newspaper La Correspondencia, these charges suggested that “Puerto 
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Ricans lacked all political protections, and did not know what type of citizens they were.” 
Hoping to clarify the citizenship status of Puerto Ricans, Degetau reminded Hill that 
immigration authorities had subjected Gómez but not the migrants to immigration 
examinations. Hill could prevent “trouble for the agents of the Government, and for Porto 
Ricans,” Degetau suggested, by stating when “Puerto Ricans are to be considered as 
aliens, according to the immigration law, and when they are to be allowed to land as 
citizens of the United States.”104 
Degetau’s claims produced immediate, limited benefits. Concerning treatment of 
Puerto Ricans for immigration purposes, Hill noted that there was “no judicial decision in 
the question.” Immigration officials, he explained, had not informed the State Department 
before detaining Gómez. The detention, he added, “arose from the lack of knowledge of 
some [immigration] officer as to the status of Porto Ricans.” The letter strengthened 
Degetau’s case. It implied that Puerto Ricans were U.S. citizens, conceded that U.S. 
immigration authorities made an “error” when they applied immigration laws to Puerto 
Ricans, and implied that it was not an error to let Puerto Ricans under labor contracts 
pass through the ports of New Orleans and Hawai‘i despite bars on alien-immigrant 
contract laborers entering the United States. But, as Degetau observed, “[c]oncerning the 
Administration’s opinion of the status of Porto Ricans nothing was said.” When he 
invited State to clarify its position, the Department, with no pending claim hinging on the 
answer, refrained.105 
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As to violations of islanders’ constitutional rights, Hill ordered and reviewed 
investigations of events in Texas and Hawai‘i. When critics in Puerto Rico charged 
Degetau with inactivity or ineffectiveness in the face of the alleged mistreatment of the 
migrants, he could respond that he had addressed the matter and would soon make a 
public report. Hoping to continue recruiting Puerto Rican laborers, Hawai‘ian officials 
and planters used the investigation to trumpet the benefits of migration. The final report 
included a statement by the alleged Puerto Rican mutineer affirming his “good choice of 
having come to this land of Hawaii,” reports by ship and police officials justifying their 
actions and downplaying the alleged mutiny, and a letter from the president of the 
Planters’ Association claiming that the migrants were “all satisfied with the treatment 
they received in transit.” Had Degetau wanted to question the report, he could have noted 
that all statements in it were made by or before planters and their allies. But Degetau was 
no radical on labor questions. With a response to potential critics in hand and no further 
progress on status issues immediately possible on the front, Degetau told the Secretary of 
State on April 15 that he was glad the charges “were not true.”106 
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As Degetau’s inquiries concerning Puerto Rican migrants ran dry in April 1901, 
he sought to win recognition of his and by extension all Puerto Ricans’ U.S. citizenship 
by gaining admission to the U.S. Supreme Court Bar. Well aware that “the court permits 
only citizens of the United States before it,” he applied on April 29, 1901. The Court, 
acting summarily, admitted him. Interpreting this victory as judicial rather than 
administrative, he telegrammed and wrote fellow Republicanos, Puerto Rican 
newspapers, and the Puerto Rican governor that “[m]y admission . . . fixed my personal 
Status and that of my constituents as American citizens.” Some Puerto Rican newspapers 
agreed. On April 30, El País declared: “Degetau Declared a U.S. citizen.” Another article 
entitled “Puerto Ricans are American Citizens: The Great National Constitution Covers 
Puerto Rico” declared that because Puerto Ricans had won “before the Supreme Court 
and the entire world the guarantees and privileges of the American citizen,” Puerto Rico 
held the same status as “other territories like Arizona [and] New Mexico.” Many 
mainland newspapers and lawyers also saw significance in Degetau’s admission. The 
New York Sun, Washington Post, New York Evening Post, and Washington Star judged 
that the Court’s decision had “given rise to considerable discussion” “among the lawyers 
in attendance,” while the Minneapolis Tribune declared that Degetau’s admission had 
been “taken to mean that the court will hold that the constitution follows the flag.” 
Charles Needham, the Dean of Columbian Law School (today the George Washington 
University School of Law), told Degetau, “Now I believe that the Constitution is in 
Puerto Rico.” The tariff that the Foraker Act imposed on Puerto Rico, these authorities 
implied, might soon be struck as violative of the Uniformity Clause.107 
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 Degetau also used his admission to the Supreme Court Bar to undermine 
adversaries in Puerto Rico. Although opposition leader Luis Muñoz was a strong 
advocate of autonomy, his political allies had decided to sacrifice that principle 
temporarily to ask the U.S. Congress and President to overturn a January 1901 tax law 
that Republicanos had helped enact in Puerto Rico. Casting himself as a defender of 
Puerto Rican self-government, Degetau had opposed these efforts in Washington and 
written in the Puerto Rican newspapers that the federal political branches had not and 
legally should not have been receptive to Muñoz’s allies’ entreaties. Despite these and 
other Republicano arguments, Barbosa told Degetau on May 13, “efforts to respond and 
shut [the Commission] up were inutile” initially. Only when Degetau entered the 
Supreme Court bar, he added, did island “opinion completely change[] to our 
satisfaction.”108 
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Ten days later, Degetau aimed at mainland opinion, promoting the capacity of 
Puerto Ricans for citizenship and self-government with a May 23 contribution to the 
Philadelphia Inquirer series “Public Men on Public Questions.” There and in other public 
writings, Degetau asserted that “Puerto-Rican citizens are prepared by their love of 
liberty and their worship of justice to face with other American citizens, the 
responsibilities of solving the problems that we are called upon by Providential decrees to 
share together.” He also depicted islanders as praiseworthy voters and legislators, then 
aligned them with rights, ideals, and obligations frequently associated with the 
citizenship of white men. To do so, Degetau read the current struggles of Puerto Ricans 
through prior battles around creole political status and Puerto Rican territorial status 
within the Spanish empire. Drawing on the history that liberal island reformers had 
memorialized and retold, Degetau depicted Puerto Ricans somewhat contradictorily as 
both committed, effective advocates for liberties they had not held and as having 
extensive experience in self-government. Ignoring longstanding indigenous populations, 
Degetau described Puerto Ricans as “not the youngest Americans, . . . but the oldest 
Americans,” a people who had had the “despotic and arbitrary” Ponce de León relieved 
of duty as governor in 1510 and who had gained commercial and political liberties and 
privileges like those available to Spaniards in Spain by 1512. But it was not until after the 
U.S. and French revolutions released ideas of liberty that swept beyond their borders, 
Degetau wrote, that Spain had joined the circum-Atlantic struggle for liberty with what 
he termed the “noble and glorious” 1812 Constitution that he asserted Puerto Ricans had 
played a key role in creating. In one context he described a 19th-century Puerto Rico that 
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had been “a province of Spain equal to the other provinces,” that had enjoyed more 
autonomy than U.S. states, that had sent representatives and senators to the Spanish 
Cortes, that had long had “practically . . . universal” male suffrage, and in which islanders 
had held an identical juridical status to that of other Spaniards. Elsewhere he celebrated 
Baldorioty de Castro, a Puerto Rican liberal leader whom both Republicanos and 
Federales could claim as a forefather, as having held “‘Yankee ideas’ and ‘democratic 
tendencies to which the youth, fascinated by the new American school, . . . are irresistibly 
drawn.” Degetau recalled that U.S. southerners had fought a bloody war to preserve 
slavery and that Lincoln had “recommended a gradual abolition with indemnification” 
into 1863. By contrast, Degetau claimed, Puerto Rican commissioners to Spain in 1866-
67 had been inspired by Abraham Lincoln’s claim that “the Declaration of Independence 
. . . gave liberty . . . to the world for all future time” and had sought “immediate abolition 
of slavery with indemnification . . . or without it.” In this vein, he emphasized the rights 
Puerto Ricans had won more recently: representation in the Cortes in 1869; inclusion in 
the Spanish Constitution in 1876; autonomy in 1897.109 
Degetau sought to use the U.S. invasion to reconcile his stories of Puerto Ricans 
both enjoying and struggling for liberties. Islanders, he wrote, embraced U.S. rule 
optimistically, not desperately. Praising the autonomy Puerto Ricans had won the year 
before, Degetau argued that the Puerto Rican embrace of U.S. troops that left the “few 
thousand Spaniards . . . practically disarmed,” reflected islanders’ “ardent love of liberty” 
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and not fear of Spanish tyranny. Conversely, he implied, neither Spanish despotism nor 
U.S. might had ensured U.S. victory in Puerto Rico or vindicated U.S. rule there.110 
Aware that mainstream, white, mainland opinion in 1901 condemned 
Reconstruction-era black voting and office holding, Degetau deemphasized how Puerto 
Rican home rule would mean voting and office holding by former slaves and their 
descendants. Though free Puerto Ricans read Uncle Tom’s Cabin and prayed for slaves, 
he argued, they ought “to have invoked the mercy of the Lord” “[i]n behalf of the poor 
unfortunate whites” “[b]ecause the whites were more enslaved by our mo[]nstrous crime 
than our legal victims.” By contrasting “our” to slaves, Degetau associated Puerto Ricans 
with whiteness, not blackness or slavery. Then judging mastery worse than slavery erased 
slaves’ voices and experiences, emphasizing the point.111 
When Degetau sent copies of his article to U.S. congressmen and Vice President 
Theodore Roosevelt, the replies he received illustrated the success of his arguments with 
makers of federal colonial policy. Chairman Henry Cooper, for example, wrote: “I was 
very glad indeed to hear from you . . . . The article is a very forceful presentation, and I 
congratulate the Porto Ricans that they have so eloquent and effective a representative as 
your self.” These connections and arguments, Degetau anticipated, would facilitate 
congressional lobbying after the Supreme Court decided the Insular Cases.112 
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While Degetau pursued claims to U.S. citizenship in early 1901, the Supreme 
Court deliberated on the opposing arguments that plaintiff’s counsel Frederic Coudert 
and the U.S. government had presented it in January in the Insular Cases of Downes v. 
Bidwell (1901) and DeLima v. Bidwell (1901). When the Supreme Court issued rulings 
on May 27, it gave Coudert and the government a split decision, revealing that Degetau’s 
admission to the Supreme Court bar had not augured a robust embrace of Puerto Rico 
into the U.S. constitutional fold. In DeLima, the Court struck down the tariffs that 
officials in Republican President William McKinley’s administration had levied on U.S.-
Puerto Rican shipments prior to passage of the Foraker Act. Writing on behalf of the 
Court, Justice Henry Brown explained that no statutory authority existed for the 
administrators’ actions because Puerto Rico “was not a foreign country within the 
meaning of the tariff laws” in existence at that time. In Downes, however, the Court 
upheld the imposition by the 1900 Foraker Act of an explicit tariff on mainland-island 
commerce. In announcing that judgment, Justice Brown argued that because Puerto Rico 
was “not a part of the United States within the revenue clauses of the Constitution,” that 
legislation by the Republican-dominated U.S. political branches did not violate the U.S. 
constitutional prescription of tariff uniformity “throughout the United States.”113 
In holding that the United States included Puerto Rico for one statutory purpose 
but not for a different constitutional one, the Court caused as much uncertainty as it 
settled. As Degetau observed, “[t]he decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court . . . have 
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produced a perplexity.” After DeLima, “democrats shouted Victory . . . , although they 
did not proclaim it with the same intensity” following Downes. DeLima disappointed 
Republicans, but after Downes one functionary announced “that the Administration has 
obtained a victory on all material points.” “The confusion in the press . . . was great” as 
well, Degetau noted, with adversarial newspapers respectively proclaiming “victory” and 
“triumph.” 114 
This confusion resulted because the opinions were indeed fractured and 
ambiguous. In Downes, held by contemporary observers and their successors to be the 
most important of the Insular Cases, no opinion garnered five votes. In both cases four 
justices dissented. Republican Representative Charles E. Littlefield of Maine told the 
American Bar Association, “Until some reasonable consistency and unanimity of opinion 
is reached by the court upon these questions, we can hardly expect their conclusions to be 
final.”115  
 The most notable of the opinions was Justice Edward White’s Downes plurality 
concurrence. There, writing for three justices, White introduced a new doctrine, that of 
territorial non-incorporation. He reasoned that unlike prior territories Puerto Rico had not 
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been incorporated by Congress or by treaty into the U.S. Union. It was thus “foreign to 
the United States in a domestic sense”—that is, foreign for domestic-law purposes—but 
also part of the United States under international law. White here purported that the 
exigencies of empire could be reconciled with constitutional and democratic norms since 
the constitution did not need to apply uniformly throughout the territories. Yet he offered 
few details as to how specific constitutional provisions applied to unincorporated 
territories. Of that decision, which would become (and remains) binding constitutional 
law, Coudert later wrote, “The very vagueness of the [non-incorporation] doctrine was 
valuable.”116 
What White did make clear was his willingness to deny U.S. citizenship to 
inhabitants of U.S. territories in some cases. Echoing Attorney General John Griggs’s 
argument, White wrote: 
Take a case of discovery. Citizens of the United States discover an 
unknown island, peopled with an uncivilized race, yet rich in soil…. Can 
it be denied that such right [to acquire] could not be practically exercised 
if the result would be to endow the inhabitants with citizenship of the 
United States…, even although the consequence would be to…inflict 
grave detriment on the United States to arise [from] the immediate 
bestowal of citizenship on those absolutely unfit to receive it?117 
By presuming that U.S. citizenship constituted too substantive a status for some 
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colonized peoples, he concluded that the United States either enjoyed the power to annex 
territories without extending inhabitants U.S. citizenship or it was “helpless in the family 
of nations.” Coudert perceived how White’s argument could make decisions concerning 
the distribution of U.S. citizenship depend upon characterizations of its content. In the 
months ahead he searched for a test case in which to argue, as we will see, that U.S. 
citizenship had a fairly minimal content that could be adapted to the exigencies of empire 
and thus safely extended to all conquered peoples, including, he would come to imply, 
Filipinos.118 
 In the days and weeks that followed, Degetau developed an interpretation of the 
cases that served his legal-political ends. Republicanos advocated Puerto Rican 
integration into the U.S. polity. If the Supreme Court had held the island to be outside the 
United States, integration would be infeasible; if the Court renewed U.S. commitment to 
the territorial system integration remained a possibility. For Degetau, publicly 
characterizing mainland legal events so that they appeared to be consistent with his aims 
reinforced his political reputation based on legal acumen and promises to win U.S. 
citizenship and territorial status for Puerto Ricans. Such arguments would also be crucial 
in later urging courts to find claims to U.S. citizenship consistent with existing case law. 
To that end, Degetau had used an opportunity to meet Supreme Court Justice Henry 
Brown the day after the decisions came down to test his ideas.119 
 Satisfied by his conversation with Brown, Degetau portrayed himself and all 
Puerto Ricans to readers of the Puerto Rican newspaper La Correspondencia as 
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sufficiently removed from national U.S. politics to judge the decisions objectively. 
Unlike mainland politicians still “dazzled . . . by the cloud of dust of the battle” in 
Congress, he wrote, islanders could join the Supreme Court in analyzing the cases 
“independent of all influence of governments.” The legal issue in the case, he argued, 
was not the political hot-button issue of “whether ‘the Constitution follows the flag.’” It 
was whether and why the United States could impose a tariff on mainland-island 
shipments. He had earlier joined with those who hoped that the Court would integrate 
Puerto Rico into the existing constitutional order by striking all tariffs on island-mainland 
shipments as violative of the Article I requirement of uniform U.S. tariffs. Now that it 
had not, he reported himself nonetheless “very much pleased with the” decisions. 
Arguing that the “Supreme Court has decided with practical unanimity that Porto Rico is 
‘a territory of the United States’ . . . and ‘a territory appurtenant and belonging to the 
United States,’” he contended that one could not sensibly “speak of Puerto Rico like a 
‘possession’ or ‘colony’ with better title than he would be able to apply such terms to 
New Mexico or to Arizona.” The decisions, he argued, affirmed what he understood to be 
the anti-colonial underpinnings of the Monroe doctrine, facilitating “an expansion 
essentially ‘American’” and “forever ratif[ying] liberty in the hemisphere.” 120 
While the Insular decisions removed one impediment to congressional legislation 
concerning Puerto Rico, they revealed others. Degetau responded with a flurry of 
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activity. On July 10 the Washington Times reported Degetau’s complaint that progress on 
status issues remained difficult because many U.S. officials “classed” Puerto Ricans 
“with the Philippines and Hawaiians while as a matter of fact we have almost nothing in 
common with them.” Chairman of the House Committee on Insular Affairs Henry 
Cooper confirmed that Republicans “don’t want to bother with” Puerto Rican matters 
now because “Puerto Rico can’t be considered in itself, but . . . the Philippines also has to 
be taken into account.” The Times recorded, Degetau’s complaints that “people do not 
seem to appreciate either our capacities, abilities, or political and civil status” and that 
“considerations affecting the Philippines, Hawaii, and other Territories and possessions 
of the United States . . . are entirely foreign and irrelevant to Porto Rico.” The objections 
failed. The representative of a small, weak, distant island with no congressional vote, 
Degetau had little power. As his friend Ramón Lopez wryly observed of U.S.-island 
relations, “That country is so big, and this one so small, that it is smart to always be 
pushing something, just so they’ll remember us.”121 
 With Congress still largely closed to matters of Puerto Rican status, Degetau 
continued to place such matters before federal agencies, asking the State Department to 
give Puerto Ricans U.S. passports as U.S. citizens and the civil-service commission to let 
Puerto Ricans participate in civil service without traveling to the mainland. These two 
actions illustrated the interrelated natures of the status of people and places. When 
abroad, Puerto Ricans were “temporarily subject” to alien sovereignties that often 
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accorded those carrying U.S. passports a degree of protection. The civil service provided 
opportunities to individual job seekers via quotas and exams tied to the status of U.S. 
places as territories and states. Decisions by one agency were also likely to affect 
deliberations at the other.122 
 On July 15, 1901, Degetau told Chairman Cooper that he sought to force the State 
Department to clarify the citizenship status of Puerto Ricans. “I have presented the 
question,” he wrote, “as involved in the issu[]ing of a passport to me, in which my 
American citizenship has been omitted.” In a reprisal of State Department indifference to 
Degetau’s prior request for clarification of Puerto Ricans’ status for immigration 
purposes, the Secretary made no decision on Degetau’s application. Previously the 
Department had not faced an aggrieved client for whom redress required settlement of a 
citizenship issue. But now, because federal law prescribed that “[n]o passport shall be 
granted or issued to or verified for any other persons than citizens of the United States,” it 
appeared that the State Department could only resolve Degetau’s action by clarifying 
Puerto Ricans’ citizenship status. Hoping to compel a decision through a test case, 
Degetau secured Henry Webb, a lawyer with connections to attorneys from the Insular 
Cases. Instead, Webb informed Degetau that federal courts were unlikely to intervene in 
a case that involved “ordinary official duties,[ ]even when those duties require an 
interpretation of the law.” Without proposing alternative ways forward, Webb wrote 
some weeks later “that Coudert Bros, who were the lawyers who argued the De [Lima] 
and Downes cases in the U. S. Supreme Court are anxious to take up your case with me 
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and make a test case of it.” 123 
 On September 14, 1901, the governmental landscape changed abruptly as 
Theodore Roosevelt became president following the assassination of William McKinley. 
For Degetau, the tragedy was a potential boon. Three months earlier, Roosevelt had 
replied to Degetau’s enclosure of his Philadelphia Inquirer article by concurring as to 
“the admirable appearance of the Porto Rican troops” during McKinley’s inauguration 
and announcing, “I am proud to call them, and you, my fellow Americans.” It was a 
victory on which Degetau would now seek to build.124 
 In the interim, a civil-service claim was taking shape. On November 18, a San 
Juan resident named Hernandez forwarded Degetau a letter of protest that he had mailed 
to the civil service and asked Degetau for help. In the protest, Hernandez described being 
rejected for a job as an inspector of vessels in San Juan on the ground that he was not on 
the qualified civil-service list. Yet, he pointed out, qualification meant passing an 
examination not offered in Puerto Rico. In addition to offering no exams in Puerto Rico, 
the civil service had quotas requiring it to hire minimum numbers of residents from most 
states and territories but not from Puerto Rico. For Republicanos, the resultant near-total 
exclusion of Puerto Ricans from the civil service was bad politics. It potentially 
dishonored Puerto Ricans, as one letter writer indicated in a plea on behalf of his 
“honorable, educated, and intelligent” job-seeking brother-in-law. It also reenacted a 
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Spanish practice against which Puerto Rican liberals had long fought: preference for 
continental Spaniards over island ones in the distribution of positions administering the 
Puerto Rican state. As Republicanos told Degetau, “a clique of continental adventurers 
[in] official posts who are a discredit to the American government [and] who in their 
country would be nobody” “are preferred, and a consequent disgust here results.” Finally 
and relatedly, the Puerto Rican political system, like that in the United States, depended 
heavily on patronage. So long as government hiring and Puerto Rican status remained 
entwined, both issues were likely to remain Republicano priorities.125 
 In November 1901, Degetau joined his continuing efforts to win Puerto Ricans 
recognition as U.S. citizens to a lobbying effort designed to win Puerto Rico full access 
to the civil-service system. He again met with Supreme Court Justice Henry Brown, now 
for a “conversation concerning the citizenship of Puerto Rico.” When Brown asked “if 
Puerto Ricans would like to return to Spain,” Degetau told him that “the Puerto Ricans 
are and desire to be American, although they believe that they have not been done justice, 
but they trust.” A meeting with President Roosevelt “to speak of the Civil Service Law 
and citizenship” culminated in Roosevelt requesting a written statement. After a 
discussion with the “Com[missione]r of the Civil Service,” Degetau reported that “Puerto 
Ricans get a quota.” A week later, Degetau had a “Conference with the Sec of State 
concerning the citizenship” of Puerto Ricans.126  
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 In the December 7 letter that Roosevelt requested, Degetau asked him to clarify 
ambiguous policy, remedy harms to Puerto Ricans, and settle a legal controversy by 
recognizing Puerto Ricans as U.S. citizens. The administration, Degetau wrote, 
sometimes “consider[s] us to be American citizens,” as when the civil-service board 
opened the system to Puerto Ricans. At other times, as with the refusal of the State 
Department to respond to Degetau’s request for a standard passport, he continued, 
“doubts seem to arise.” The resultant ambiguity, he went on, caused Puerto Ricans 
“political and moral disturbance and . . . material harms.” By also claiming that “[m]y 
personal interests have been harmed” by the delay concerning the passport application, 
Degetau cast himself as a party seeking a concrete remedy and his request as a legal 
matter ripe for resolution. The Foraker Act, Insular Cases, Treaty of Paris, and U.S. 
military rule, Degetau elaborated, all indicated that Puerto Ricans had a legal right to U.S. 
citizenship. The Treaty of Paris, he wrote, considered Puerto Ricans born in Spain who 
did not preserve their Spanish nationality “as having accepted the nationality of the 
territory in which they resided.” That territory, Degetau read the Insular Cases to hold, 
was “a territory of the United States,” making those former Spaniards U.S. citizens. By 
then using the term “all the inhabitants” in describing the status of Puerto Ricans in the 
Foraker Act, Degetau continued, Congress gave island-born Puerto Ricans the same U.S. 
citizenship as continental-Spanish-born ones.127  
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Degetau had an additional argument in case of need: the Foraker Act created the 
political body “the people of Porto Rico” out of mainlanders and Puerto Ricans residing 
on the island. Presuming that a “political body cannot be constituted with American 
citizens and other members of distinct nationality or distinct citizenship,” Degetau again 
concluded that all Puerto Ricans were U.S. citizens. He saw a presumption of the same 
result in the Foraker Act rule that all Puerto Rican government employees “swear to 
maintain the Constitution of the United States.” As he argued elsewhere, such oaths were 
akin to mutually enforceable promises, the taker, agreeing to “maintain the Constitution 
of the United States against all enemies, national or foreign, thus solemnly contracting 
duties and acquiring rights of other citizens.” Finally, he reminded Roosevelt that General 
Guy Henry had in 1898 promised islanders “protection as citizens of the American 
Union.” To deny them that status would make them “feel deceived” for having extended 
“a warm welcome to the American Soldiers.” 128 
 Roosevelt and U.S. officials chose to moot, not answer, Degetau’s petitions. After 
Degetau sent his letter, the Washington Post reported civil-service plans to establish 
examination boards in three Puerto Rican cities. On December 27, 1901, the Secretary of 
State wrote Degetau that Puerto Ricans abroad would receive “the same protection of 
person and property as is accorded to the native-born citizens of the United States.” Days 
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later, the Secretary, eventually with Roosevelt’s support, asked the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs for legislation letting the State Department grant passports to U.S. insular 
residents regardless of U.S. citizenship. The Committee soon reported a bill that would 
make passports available to “those owing allegiance, whether citizens or not, to the 
United States.” After meeting with the chair of the committee, Degetau turned to Jean des 
Garennes, U.S.-citizen counsel for the French Embassy, to put into writing objections to a 
legislative mooting of his request for a U.S.-citizen passport. The efforts failed, and the 
bill became law. When Roosevelt issued executive guidelines for the issuances of 
passports to any “resident of an insular possession of the United States who owes 
allegiance to the United States,” he did not state whether Puerto Ricans were U.S. 
citizens. He and other officials avoided that issue because it was hard. Many believed that 
successful U.S. imperialism precluded recognition of newly acquired peoples as U.S. 
citizens. Yet, many also understood the Civil War and Reconstruction Amendments to 
make the peoples of the United States into citizens of the United States. Few relished a 
choice between constitutional violations and dooming U.S. imperial governance.129 
 Though Congress was willing to moot his passport claim, Degetau noted in late 
1901 that otherwise “congressmen don’t plan to turn to Puerto Rican matters.” Deciding 
to “make his case in other circles,” Degetau attended the annual conference of the 
                                                 
129 “A Letter from Mr. Degetau,” Puerto Rico Herald, 11 Jan. 1902, 4 (quote 1); “Civil Service in Porto 
Rico,” Washington Post, 10 Feb. 1902, 4; H.R. 8129, 57th Cong., 1st sess., Report no. 559, 18 Feb. 1902, 
available at CIHCAM 3/V/20 (quote 2); Theodore Roosevelt, Rules Governing the Granting and Issuing of 
Passports in the Insular Possessions of the United States (19 Jul. 1902), available at MD NARA 
350/5B/837/19929 (quote 3); [Degetau], Diary, 25 Nov. 1901, Feb. 1902, CIHCAM 11/L4; “Washington 
Attorney Honored,” Washington Post, 16 Apr. 1899, 5; “Funeral of F. R. Coudert,” New York Times, 23 
Dec. 1903, 9; “Jean des Garennes, French Professor, 66,” New York Times, 9 Jul. 1942, 21; Statutes at 
Large 32 (1902): 386; see also S. 2298, 57th Cong., 1st sess., 7 Jan. 1902, available at CIHCAM 11/L4; 
Congressional Record 35, pt. 5:4992-4995 (2 May 1902) (quoting Secretary of State John Hay as 
forwarding a draft of the passports bill to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on January 4, 1902); 
Congressional Record 35, pt. 6:5697-5699 (20 May 1902); Congressional Record 35, pt. 7:6588-6589 (11 
Jun. 1902). 
 109 
American Economic Association and delivered a lecture at the Columbian University in 
late 1901 and early 1902.130 
Building on his earlier arguments he used such opportunities to stress Puerto 
Rican civilization and to promote Puerto Rican capacity for self-government. In doing so, 
he drew on notions of honor among Puerto Rican Liberals that had shifted away from 
ideals of defending reputations through private violence and toward conceptions of 
masculinity based on restraint and civility. He thus celebrated Puerto Rican disinterest in 
bullfighting and Puerto Ricans’ ability “to file the claws of the Spanish lion” and thereby 
avoid the obligation of a revolution that would have transformed “a civilized, organized 
and relatively rich people [into] a beautiful cemetery.” The Treaty of Paris, by 
distinguishing “‘Spaniards born in the Peninsula’ and ‘natives of the territories,’” he 
suggested, had given many mainlanders the false “idea that Porto Rico . . . was peopled 
by ‘natives,’” “some race of semi-savage ‘Indians.’” Because of mainlanders’ 
expectations, he added, it was “a great surprise” to “the public” that the “Porto Rico 
Battalion” at President McKinley’s 1901 inauguration included not “men of small stature 
and sallow complexion,” but servicemen who displayed “moral conduct,” “military 
bearing,” and “dexterity.” In fact, he claimed, Puerto Rico less resembled Guam, 
apparently on “the boundaries of a savage condition,” than Cuba, “considered on a level 
with general civilized countries, and socially speaking, . . . compare[able] with any other 
people of the South American republics, or of Europe.” For similar reasons, he 
elaborated, Spain had established different government in the Antilles than in the 
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Philippines.131 
 During these months, Degetau expanded his social network at White House 
receptions and congressional hearings; by lobbying administrators; and through meeting 
and working with mainlanders who shared his commitments to freemasonry, spiritualism, 
and charitable reform. After making new acquaintances, he cultivated them, often with 
correspondence, conversation, and gifts. Soon, newspapers wrote that Degetau was a 
“highly . . . diplomatic” “man of very pleasing address[,] courteous manners,” and 
“brilliant attainments” who “created a favorable impression in the public life of 
Washington.” Degetau’s personal notes from mid-November 1901 to mid-February 1902 
confirm his reach. He reported often-daily visits to the Capitol and amicable 
conversations and correspondence with the president, a Supreme Court justice, 
Congressmen, and heads of numerous agencies. He also had warm, cooperative 
relationships with high U.S. officials in Puerto Rico.132 
But personal popularity did not change the island’s status. In January 1902 
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Degetau had told Congressman Henry Cooper that absent legislative action, he would 
bring a judicial test case. Shortly thereafter, Degetau sought to import from Biarritz, 
France, the paintings of a Puerto Rican artist he knew surnamed Molinas. Doing so raised 
the issue of whether the works were statutorily exempt from customs duties as “[w]orks 
of art, the production of American artists residing temporarily abroad.” In a letter to the 
Treasury Department, Degetau argued they were, and on April 28, 1902, the Secretary of 
the Treasury forwarded Degetau’s letter to the Attorney General for an opinion. On May 
13 the Attorney General opined that Puerto Rican artists were also “American artists” 
within the meaning of the statute, though cautioned that “it is clearly not inconceivable 
for a man to be an American artist within the meaning of such a statute and yet,” like an 
“American tribal Indian, or a native Alaskan,” be “not a citizen of the United States.”133 
Around the same time, Representative Llewellyn Powers of Maine introduced a 
bill by Degetau to make Degetau a delegate like other traditional territorial delegates, 
with a voice but no vote in the U.S. House. The House referred the bill to the Committee 
on Insular Affairs, where Degetau testified that the bill was a pragmatic, low-stakes way 
to align the Foraker Act and the Insular Cases. Currently, he explained, the Resident 
Commissioner had some traits of a representative of an island within the U.S. union and 
some of a representative of a politically distinct body. Because the Insular Cases had 
already decided that Puerto Rico was not politically distinct for purposes of foreign 
relations, Degetau implied, Congress could eliminate this ambiguity without unsettling 
existing doctrine. With most congressional statutes now applicable to Puerto Rico, the 
bill would also facilitate informed decision making by giving Congress ready recourse to 
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a Puerto Rican delegate. To concerns that Puerto Rican legislation would become a 
precedent for the Philippines, Degetau stressed that the archipelagos held different 
peoples facing separate circumstances and conditions. Though aware that Congress was 
on the cusp of passing an organic act for the Philippines that closely resembled that 
enacted for Puerto Rico, Degetau stressed differences in how U.S. military authorities 
had treated the two archipelagos. They had, he claimed, promised Puerto Ricans but not 
Filipinos U.S. citizenship and required from Puerto Rican but not Filipino officeholders 
naturalization-like oaths to uphold the U.S. Constitution, give allegiance to the United 
States, and renounce fidelity to foreign nations. Such acts, he added, were law under the 
Foraker Act. In any case, Degetau continued, Congress could avoid a precedent by 
drafting the law to so state.134 
With political friends supporting his efforts, Degetau initially appeared to make 
progress. Committee Chair Henry Cooper elicited that Degetau had represented Puerto 
Rico before the Spanish Cortes, a privilege that Puerto Rico but not the Philippines had 
enjoyed under Spain. Implying that Puerto Rico and the Arizona Territory differed only 
in population, not status, Republican committee member John Lacey of Iowa pointed out 
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that Arizona with “about 105,000 people,” but not Puerto Rico with “near a million 
people,” enjoyed floor privileges. Contrasting Puerto Rico with neighboring nations that 
many mainlanders associated with blackness, Lacey also noted that the “minister from 
Santo Domingo or the Minister from Haiti has the privilege of the floor of the House,” 
but not Degetau. Governor Hunt similarly described his support for and efforts on behalf 
of the bill. In mid-May, the Committee on Insular Affairs unanimously recommended 
Lacey’s bill to the House, and Degetau triumphantly telegrammed Hunt and Rossy, 
signing off to the latter, “Glory to God above.”135 
That small victory soon gave way to larger setbacks. In a June 2 letter to the 
Detroit Journal, Degetau declared himself “shocked and mortified” that the anti-
imperialist Bishop John Spalding had publicly argued that in “the tropics the race is and, 
probably always will be, indolent, ignorant, weak and sensual.” Degetau had previously 
expressed hope that education would eliminate mainlanders’ false criticisms of Puerto 
Rico. But Spalding made what Degetau termed his lazy, ignorant mistake despite having 
countervailing data at hand. Degetau implied that Spalding had ignored how “highly 
cultured” islanders were, how “[our] women are just as pure and our men just as good as 
those of any race under the sun.” Several weeks later, the U.S. Senate struck language 
extending Puerto Ricans a congressional voice from a bill that it passed, thus dooming 
the effort for the term.136 
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By mid 1902 a pattern had emerged. Degetau had access to powerful individuals 
and myriad outlets through which he could defend his people. On status and mainland 
perceptions of Puerto Rico and Puerto Ricans, however, he made little progress. These 
disparate outcomes resulted in part as Degetau failed to convince mainlanders to judge 
Puerto Rico on its best men, not its average members. Such best men in Puerto Rico, he 
indicated, were equals of white U.S. leaders and were the ones whose paternal influence 
shaped and controlled island society as a whole. This argument had been implicit in his 
Philadelphia Inquirer essay. He made it explicitly in a coauthored report on delinquency: 
“[J]ust as we see fathers, older brothers, and strong and weak relatives in a family, in 
society and the State we see rich, educated, influential, well-provided-for individuals who 
provide paternal charity to their uneducated, weak, miserable brothers . . . .” Thus, when 
Degetau helped the less fortunate, he also sought to exemplify the modernity, liberalism, 
and progressive reforms of better Puerto Rican men that he claimed made islanders 
worthy of U.S. citizenship. Many mainlanders disagreed, judging Puerto Rican on what 
they perceived to be representative members, not leading ones. As a result, Degetau’s 
claim that enlightened native leadership of a racially diverse island population made 
islanders worthy of U.S. citizenship relied on evidence that led some mainlanders to the 
contrary conclusion. Degetau’s support of Puerto Rican enrollment into mainland schools 
for blacks and American Indians sheds light on this dynamic.137 
After annexation, a mainland degree became a valuable, elusive commodity. 
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Puerto Ricans wrote Degetau for help enrolling in mainland schools. Degetau, who 
encouraged and sometimes facilitated such ambitions, discovered that many mainland 
schools required a fluency in English and an annual tuition beyond the reach of aspirants. 
The Tuskegee Institute and Carlisle Indian School were frequently exceptions to this 
rule.138 
Tuskegee and Carlisle traced their roots to the Hampton Institute, which Civil 
War veteran Samuel Armstrong had opened in Virginia in 1868. Seeing similarities 
between U.S. freedmen and what he perceived to be dark-skinned indigenous Hawai‘ians, 
Armstrong sought to uplift former slaves by offering them the vocational and agricultural 
education that his father had provided in Hawai‘i. Booker T. Washington, among the 
Institute’s top pupils, had become principal of the new Tuskegee Institute on Armstrong’s 
recommendation in 1881. Cast in the Hampton model, Tuskegee was a major trainer of 
black teachers. Richard Pratt, the founder of Carlisle, had come to education after 
“subduing” American Indians with the army between 1867 and 1875. Seeking to provide 
native prisoners educational opportunities, he had initially brought his wards to Hampton, 
but then had decided that because blacks faced more prejudice than American Indians, his 
students needed a separate school with opportunities to socialize with whites. With a mix 
of charitable and federal support, Pratt had launched and maintained an English-language 
vocational school committed to what he termed “acculturation under duress.”139 
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 Washington and Pratt saw opportunities in U.S. annexation of Puerto Rico and 
U.S. officials on the island saw opportunities in Washington and Pratt. As early as 
August 16, 1898, Washington began publishing letters in major U.S. newspapers arguing 
that blacks in general and the institute in particular were crucial to U.S. success in its new 
relationships to lands where the “[o]ne-half of the population . . . composed of mulattoes 
or Negroes” “need . . . the strength that they can get by thorough intellectual, religious 
and industrial training.” The United States, he wrote, had “one advantage . . . . The 
experience that we have passed through in the Southern States during the last thirty years 
in the education of my race, whose history and needs are not very different from the 
history and needs of the Cuban and Porto Ricans . . . .” The plan, Washington knew, 
could beget prestige and funds. It would cost $150 to cover tuition and expenses, and, as 
the Washington Post wryly noted, “[H]e invites anybody who feels like helping . . . to 
write him. We suspect that the inclosure of a check in the first letter would do no harm.” 
By the end of the year, Tuskegee had its first Puerto Rican student.140 
Then in early 1899, John Eaton brought decades of experience in southern, post-
emancipation U.S. education to Puerto Rico as its head of education. Formerly associate 
commissioner of the Freedmen’s Bureau, superintendent of Tennessee public instruction, 
and U.S. Commissioner of Education, he had substantially influenced education in the 
U.S. South. He also frequently visited Carlisle, becoming what the school’s newspaper 
called “one of Carlisle’s staunchest supporters.” Eaton laid groundwork for sending 
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Puerto Ricans to Carlisle. After serious illness cut short his tenure, his successor Martin 
Brumbaugh expanded his efforts, producing dozens of scholarships for Puerto Ricans 
seeking to attend Carlisle or a vocational school in the Tuskegee mold.141 
In 1901-1902, Brumbaugh pressed both schools on how many students they could 
accept. U.S. officials in Puerto Rico promoted these schools as part of what they 
understood to be their civilizing mission on the island. Familiar with the reputations of 
Tuskegee and Carlisle for uplifting purportedly inferior races, U.S. officials modeled 
schools reforms on the island after Washington’s and Pratt’s programs and hoped that 
returning students from them would become agents of U.S. culture on the island. Soon, 
somewhat fewer than 20 Puerto Rican students had enrolled at Tuskegee and more than 
40 had started at Carlisle.142 
 Degetau embraced the schools that were willing to accept Puerto Rican pupils. In 
a letter published by La Correspondencia in August 1901, Degetau recommended 
Carlisle as a modern institution, describing the commendable food and grounds and 
healthy, active, co-educated Puerto Rican students that he encountered there. Students 
complained of homesickness and manual work, he recounted, but less so after he had 
spoken with them. Degetau quickly took a role akin to prominent mainland supporters of 
Carlisle, Tuskegee, and Hampton. In February 1902 he had joined U.S. senators as an 
invited guest to the Carlisle commencement. Several months later he worked with high 
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U.S. officials to secure federal legislation to increase Puerto Rican enrollment there. Then 
he made a trip to Tuskegee, visiting with Puerto Rican students and exchanging letters 
and gifts with Booker T. Washington. A. T. Stuart, the superintendent of schools in 
Washington, helped him as he tried to place a ward at the Hampton Institute.143 
 Observers often saw these events differently. Degetau’s support for Puerto Rican 
enrollment at Carlisle and Tuskegee created opportunities and pressures for the mainland 
press and U.S. officials to corroborate portrayals of Puerto Ricans as uncivilized. To 
establish the usefulness of Tuskegee to U.S. empire and to seek an advantageous position 
for former U.S. slaves and their descendants in the newly expanded racial hierarchy of 
the U.S. empire-state, Booker T. Washington had depicted Puerto Ricans as less civilized 
and less American than mainland blacks, but also capable of fulfilling obligations of 
citizenship through training at Tuskegee. Washington told the Los Angeles Times that 
one island student “was quite savage when he came,” but that after “one of our boys, [a] 
young American[,] . . . gave him a good thrashing,” he “changed his methods.” Thus: “I 
cannot see why they [the Puerto Ricans] should not be educated into being good 
American citizens.” In April and May 1901 the New York Times, in articles entitled 
“Porto Ricans Coming Here to Study” and “Porto Rican Boys to Study at Carlisle,” had 
described two groups of Puerto Ricans—26 in all—arriving to study at Carlisle at state 
expense. Mainland readers had thus learned that U.S. officials expected islanders and 
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American Indians to benefit from the same education.144 
Such associations worried parents and students. In 1901, Arturo Schulze thanked 
Degetau for visiting his daughter, then worried that she might not “fulfill her higher 
desires” at “the Indian School.” Reflecting on her attendance, Providencia Martínez 
related that “I talked to my dear papa about the Indian school and the poor father he used 
to cry . . . . Down here we do not know anything about good Indians but of those that you 
read in books that are regular animals.” Some Puerto Rican students, listed as belonging 
to the tribe “Porto Rico” on certain forms, crossed off “Indian” and “tribe” on other 
forms, replacing them with “Puerto Rico” or “Puerto Rican.” José Osuna remembered, “I 
did not like the place. I never thought it was the school for me. I was not an Indian; I was 
a Puerto Rican of Spanish descent.” Similarly, Angela Rivera-Tudó later complained that 
the situation amounted to an unforgivable injustice, abusive treatment by 
our “masters,” directed to denigrating Puerto Ricans further, by their 
choosing the only college they had for educating and civilizing the savage 
Redskin Indians for also educating and “civilizing” the wretched Puerto 
Ricans. 
Such families, instead of attacking racial hierarchy, guarded what they saw as their 
rightful place in it.145 
The situation also created financial pressures on officials to equate Puerto Ricans 
and American Indians. Congressional funding for Puerto Ricans at Carlisle required that 
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interested parties like Degetau ally with congressmen committed to Puerto Rican and 
American Indian affairs by telling them that Puerto Ricans were a good fit at a school 
devoted to serving U.S. native peoples. Senator Joseph Foraker agreed, and tried to add a 
funding measure to a bill involving American Indian matters. The measure failed. Other 
funding did not materialize. Seeking to forestall the extinction of Puerto Rican attendance 
at Carlisle, Pratt asked Degetau to urge upon the “Indian committee” that “[t]here is some 
Indian blood among your Porto Ricans and on that ground there is a claim for them.” It 
was a strange request. Degetau sought not tribal status for Puerto Ricans, but U.S. 
citizenship, a relationship to the United States that not all American Indians yet enjoyed. 
Previously, he had dismissed the argument Pratt now proposed, describing a near-total 
Spanish genocide of indigenous Puerto Ricans that made characterization of Puerto 
Ricans as akin to American Indians an absurdity. But the request was also timely. Only 
five Puerto Ricans arrived at Carlisle after 1901, and, as money ran dry, those there left. 
By contrast, scholarship funds for Puerto Ricans remained available at Tuskegee, and as 
late as 1915, the Chicago Defender reported, Puerto Ricans attended there. 146 
By mid 1902, Degetau’s horizons had narrowed. With little to show for his 
attempts to influence mainland opinion, executive agencies, and political branches, he 
focused and integrated his efforts. In an English-language book that he envisioned 
writing to support U.S. citizenship and traditional territorial status, he planned to reprise 
his Philadelphia Enquirer essay, his readings of the Insular Cases, and his efforts before 
U.S. officials, and add analysis of the Foraker Act and Treaty of Paris and comparisons of 
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peoples in various U.S. territories. Though he ultimately abandoned that project, he 
continued intertwining historical and legal arguments, now looking for a legal rather than 
literary vehicle through which to advance them.147 
 
The Legalization of Labor: Santiago Iglesias and the American Federation of Labor 
Although labor-leader Santiago Iglesias had come to the mainland fleeing 
violence and repression, rather than bearing Federico Degetau’s electoral mandate, he 
shared Degetau’s faith in mainland alliances. Seeking to carve out a political space in 
Puerto Rico for organized labor and aware that his mainland socialist friends had failed to 
protect him in fall 1900, he wrote to the American Federation of Labor on December 6, 
1900. In addressing the craft-union-based organization known for its emphasis on 
expressive liberties, Iglesias both described “15,000 skilled workmen” in Puerto Rico 
without indicating that many were not unionized and promoted “freedom of assembly, 
freedom of the press and free speech.” The Federation—always competing with rival 
labor groups for members—welcomed the overture, authorizing funds to organize island 
affiliates. Iglesias then met with Federation President Samuel Gompers, who conveyed 
the Federation’s commitment to voluntarism, a philosophy promoting ostensibly private 
group actions like collective bargaining, boycotts, and demonstrations and disfavoring 
legislative intrusions into the employment relationship like minimum-wage laws. The 
“best thing the state can do for Labor,” Gompers stated, “is to leave Labor alone.” 
Gompers expressed his support for sending Iglesias to Puerto Rico as a paid organizer.148 
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In April 1901, the dispute between Iglesias’s Federación Libre and the 
Republicanos over worker loyalties and support for U.S. rule reignited. The New York 
Sun reported that a commission from the Republicano-aligned Federación Regional had 
visited Secretary of Puerto Rico William Hunt to denounce Iglesias as an anti-American, 
foreign, socialistic agitator. That month, Iglesias took advantage of ambiguities 
surrounding Puerto Ricans’ U.S. citizenship status and eligibility by taking out 
naturalization papers in Brooklyn. Back in Puerto Rico, Federación Libre members 
collected 6,000 signatures protesting poverty on the island. On April 16, Iglesias met with 
President McKinley, eliciting the President’s promise to work to improve island 
conditions. Iglesias then told reporters, “I represent” “actual workingmen,” and the 
“American Federation of Labor has extended its protection to this organization, and 
recognized me as its duly accredited representative.” When Senator Joseph Foraker wrote 
Degetau about the petition of the Federación Libre, Degetau replied that the Federación 
Regional was the true representative of workers and dismissed Iglesias as a socialist 
Spaniard with little connection to organized labor.149 
Gompers subsequently wrote to Iglesias that the Executive Council had appointed 
                                                                                                                                                 
Movement (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), 2 n.3 (quotes 3-4) (quoting Samuel 
Gompers, “Judicial Vindication of Labor’s Claims,” American Federationist 7 (1901): 284), 1-2 n.3 
(providing the text which I paraphrase in describing voluntarism); Samuel Gompers to Santiago Iglesias, 12 
Sep. 1901, SGL 46/283; William George Whittaker, “The Santiago Iglesias Case, 1901-1902: Origins of 
American Trade Union Involvement in Puerto Rico,” The Americas 24 (Apr. 1968): 380; Gervasio L. 
García and A.G. Quintero Rivera, Desafío y solidaridad: breve historia del movimiento obrero 
puertorriqueño (San Juan, P.R.: Ediciones Huracán, 1986), 35-41. Juan Ángel Silén puts the April 1901 
membership of the Federación Libre at 5,500. Apuntes para la historia del movimiento obrero 
puertorriqueño (San Juan, P.R.: Publicaciones Gaviota, Inc., 1978), 62. 
149 The New Associated Press, “Porto Rico Emigration Nothing Remarkable,” Los Angeles Times, 16 Apr. 
1901, 4 (quotes); [Degetau] to Foraker, 15 May 1901; Santiago Iglesias Pantín, Luchas emancipadoras 
(crónicas de Puerto Rico) vol. 1, 2d ed. (San Juan, P.R.: [Imprenta Venezuela] 1958 [1929]), 214-216; 
Gonzalo F. Córdova, Resident Commissioner, Santiago Iglesias and His Times (Río Piedras, P.R. : 
Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1993), 101; Whittaker, “The Santiago Iglesias Case,” 389 n.52; 
Foraker to Degetau, 25 Apr. 1901; “Is This True?” Los Angeles Times, 10 Apr. 1901, 8; The New 
Associated Press, “Petition to President,” Los Angeles Times, 16 Apr. 1901, 4. 
 123 
him as its sole paid organizer in Puerto Rico. Two weeks later Gompers wrote to the 
newly named governor, William Hunt, to ask that Iglesias be protected from harassment. 
Gompers also wrote President Roosevelt that Iglesias required legal guarantees and 
protections to do his work, and Roosevelt asked Hunt to ensure that Iglesias not be 
molested.150 
 Despite Gompers’s efforts, Iglesias confronted a maelstrom of official and extra-
legal hostility in Puerto Rico. Problems began when officials arrested him upon arrival, 
charging him with conspiring to raise the price of labor during August 1900 strikes and 
with failing to appear for the trial on that charge. Unable to raise bail, Iglesias sent a 
jailhouse protest to Governor Hunt and cables to the Associated Press and Gompers. 151 
 Seeing both a crisis and an opportunity, Gompers sprang into action. He met with 
Roosevelt on November 11. As he later recounted to Iglesias, Roosevelt was “greatly 
astonished” by, “expressed his regret” over, and “order[ed] investigation [into] your 
case.” Prominent mainland media like the Associated Press, and New York Times 
reported events from Gompers’s perspective, describing his preemptive efforts to secure 
protection for Iglesias, his meeting with Roosevelt after the arrest, and Roosevelt’s 
decision to investigate. Then Gompers cabled bail money to a reporter at the bilingual 
island-based San Juan News. In an accompanying letter, he denounced the case against 
Iglesias as unjust. When Governor Hunt arrived in Washington that month, Gompers also 
secured a meeting with him and with President Roosevelt. Predicting in late November 
that persecution could “redound to the success and advantage of our cause,” Gompers 
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counseled Iglesias to stand trial and “plead justification.”152 
 While out on bail, Iglesias put law itself on trial by seeking official protection 
from extralegal violence. He accused the Republicano-supported Federación Regional of 
having shot at Federación Libre offices. The police, he charged, had harassed Federación 
Libre members rather than arrest shooters. Two attempts on Iglesias’s life and eight 
armed attacks apparently followed. Iglesias saw these events as a test of whether “the 
laws and authorities in Puerto Rico are able to correct and punish such criminality” and 
whether in Puerto Rico “Liberty and Order are protected by the sovereign Constitution.” 
The priority for island workers under these conditions, Iglesias and a companion told a 
crowd of 1,500 later that month, was winning a U.S. citizenship accompanied by full 
constitutional rights.153 
 Initially, Gompers’s and Iglesias’s legal maneuvers failed. Republicano trial 
judges convicted Iglesias of conspiracy to raise the price of labor, sentenced him to more 
than three years in prison, and ordered that the Federación Libre—by then a constituent 
member organization of the American Federation of Labor—be disbanded. The 
Republicano newspaper El País approved, though Republicano leader José Barbosa 
privately told Degetau that while “it is often said that all individual rights of the U.S. 
Constitution apply in Puerto Rico, . . . practically that does not happen.” Rather, he wrote, 
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“the law of Association imposes restrictions on the right of Association that permit any 
mayor or police officer to make a joke of the right by declaring any meeting illegal and 
dissolving it, then making claims before the courts that cause them to sentence 
participants.” That, he claimed, was what had “just happened to Iglesias.”154  
 Iglesias and Gompers sought to portray his conviction as inconsistent with U.S. 
institutions and legal norms. Because the Federación Libre was “under the Constitution 
of the American Federation of Labor,” Iglesias contended, the court had effectively 
outlawed that longstanding mainland organization, which the San Juan News described as 
formed by “hundred of thousands of the best citizens of the Union.” “Governor Hunt is 
American and will recommend the annulment of the laws” under which he was 
convicted, he also told the News, “because they conflict with methods eminently 
American.” The annual convention of the American Federation of Labor quickly resolved 
to use all available means to undo the decision. Gompers argued that the “antiquated 
Spanish laws” under which Iglesias had been convicted resembled the conspiracy laws 
against which a not-so-distant generation of mainland laborers had struggled. “In 
defending the workmen of Porto Rico,” he explained, “we American unionists are but 
safeguarding and promoting our own vital interests.” The New York Times reported that 
Gompers was “prepared to carry the case to the United States Supreme Court on 
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constitutional grounds.” 155 
Newspapers quickly became vehicles for and partners in the men’s protests. The 
New York Times, Chicago Tribune, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, and 
Associated Press provided ongoing coverage. Quoting and summarizing Iglesias’s 
statements, they temporarily overlooked fraught mainland relations between organized 
labor and the courts. Iglesias’s acts were, the New York Times claimed, under “modern, 
that is, American, ideas . . . no offense at all.” The New York Evening Post declared, “If 
we have annexed a lot of barbarous medieval statutes, . . . [they] must be stamped out like 
yellow fever or any other tropical plague.” Federales, who had long complained of 
violence by the Federación Regional and persecution by Republicano officials, saw an 
opportunity. Their organ, La Democracia, referred to “our particular friend, the señor, 
don Santiago Iglesias,” and savaged “republicano judges with their . . . injustices[] and . . 
. ineptitude.” Earlier that year, Federal leader Luis Muñoz had joined Iglesias in fleeing 
extralegal violence and official repression in Puerto Rico by going into self-imposed exile 
in New York. There he had founded the Puerto Rico Herald and opened its pages to 
Iglesias. Now he used it to condemn attacks on the Federación Libre and to advocate 
freedoms of assembly, press, and speech.156 
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 Facing continuing and mounting pressure from mainland newspapers, President 
Roosevelt, and Gompers, mainlanders at the head of the Puerto Rican state began to favor 
applying progressive strands in U.S. labor and constitutional law to Iglesias’s case. For 
once, they sided with the Federación Libre against Republicanos. On January 2, 1902, 
Governor Hunt declared that “the right to organize to secure better wages by peaceable 
measures is perfectly lawful” and that potentially contrary laws were “unworthy of an 
American government and should be abrogated.” The U.S. Attorney General, at 
Roosevelt’s urging, separately argued in a communication to his counterpart on the island 
that Iglesias’s conviction violated U.S. constitutional norms. In a letter to the public 
prosecutor representing the island on appeal, the Puerto Rico Attorney General then cited 
the “right to assemble,” condemned Iglesias’s conviction as an “abridgement of personal 
liberty,” and declared that any law that “impairs this right” had “become a nullity with 
the change of sovereignty.” Heeding this advice, the prosecutor told the Puerto Rican 
Supreme Court at April 9 oral arguments that Iglesias’s appeal was well taken. Six days 
later, the court agreed, reversing the conviction.157 
These events strengthened Iglesias and the Federation and weakened 
Republicanos and the Federación Regional. In January 1901, the Federación Regional 
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had sent a representative to New York in order to discredit Iglesias and ally with the 
American Federation of Labor. The effort had failed. Then during Iglesias’s case 
Republicanos had appeared to back anti-labor laws while members of the Federación 
Regional had attacked a champion of workers’ liberties. By risking prison and injury and 
by rallying mainland newspapers, the American Federation of Labor, and President 
Roosevelt on behalf of organized labor, Iglesias had displayed influence, accrued 
prestige, and become a top labor leader to workers and officials. His victory also 
increased workers’ confidence in their ability to represent their interests and be heard, as 
illustrated by the 3,000 Federación Libre members and sympathizers who celebrated 
Iglesias’s victory with a parade and mass meeting. The decision, Iglesias later recalled, 
“[c]hanged the juridical status of the labor associations.” Police and judges continued to 
target Iglesias and the Federación Libre, but with fewer legal tools. Iglesias’s alliance 
with the Federation also gave him new opportunities to advance his arguments aligning 
the Federación Libre with U.S. practices and ideas. Thus, at the 1902 convention of the 
American Federation of Labor, Iglesias cosponsored successful resolutions calling on the 
Federation to lobby Roosevelt and to demand U.S. citizenship and associated rights for 
Puerto Ricans. The Federation also gained ground in Puerto Rico as Iglesias increasingly 
tied his fortunes to it rather than mainland socialists and led an energetic, island-wide 
organizing campaign.158 
 During these months, Iglesias and Degetau displayed the different ends for which 
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they sought mainland allies. Degetau, who moved in elite, highly educated circles, 
believed that countries should be judged on their best men. He sought to uplift workers, 
receiving their votes and speaking for—though rarely answering to—them. By contrast, 
Iglesias, a lifelong artisan whose associates were laborers, measured national civilization 
and success by worker wellbeing and rights, and more often he let worker complaints 
guide him. The men’s reactions to events in Hawai‘i would bring these differences to the 
fore. 
 In late 1901, reports of Hawai‘ian planters abusing Puerto Rican workers had 
returned to the news. The New York World had announced that islanders “cannot stand 
the severe strain put upon them by the Yankee planters” and were arrested “by the police 
on the charge of vagrancy.” La Democracia relayed that one dispute ended as “our poor 
countrymen hid in the woods where they were persecuted by gunfire and set after with a 
pack of hunting dogs.” Some Puerto Ricans in Hawai‘i eventually protested en masse, 
describing the events in a February 17, 1902, letter to the San Juan News. The events 
surrounding the protest formed part of a larger pattern of self-help by and official reaction 
to Puerto Ricans in Hawai‘i. According to official numbers, 2,930 Puerto Ricans had 
accepted offers to work on Hawai‘ian plantations. As they grew dissatisfied and left to 
seek better terms of employment, that number fell to 1,851 in late February 1902. Sugar 
planters refused to rehire them. Police initially arrested hundreds, primarily on charges of 
theft, prostitution, and vagrancy. Eventually arrests fell and planters ended their rehiring 
ban.159 
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 Degetau responded to his constituents’ concern for their countrymen in Hawai‘i 
by requesting a State Department investigation, but this time expressed skepticism in 
correspondence that soon became public. Seeing worker-planter relations as largely 
personal matters to be handled by the state, if at all, in private-law courts, Degetau 
focused his inquiry on only a portion of laborers’ complaints, especially those of false 
arrests, prosecutions, and convictions. Degetau, who ultimately wished to be treated as 
the equivalent of Hawai‘ian officials and not to have his fate determined by association 
with Puerto Rican workers, also received and apparently trusted assurances from 
Hawai‘ian officials. They had convinced him with their exculpatory 1901 report and, he 
argued, had sought to help him pursue U.S. citizenship for Puerto Ricans: 
[T]he representative of the Planters’ Association of Hawaii . . . told me 
that he sought to have the emigrants’ citizenship rights recognized so that 
they could vote in Hawaii[,] that he was disposed to prepare an appeal to 
the Supreme Court in a case upholding a sentence of Hawaiian courts 
refusing to recognize Puerto Ricans as U.S. citizens, and that . . . he hoped 
that I would argue the case . . . , understanding that this would guarantee 
success.160 
Degetau went on to argue that “it doesn’t seem likely that were the complaints true, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Francisco Valls de la Log, 25 Apr. 1902, CIHCAM 3/V/57; Smith to Cooper, 22 May 1902; Cooper to 
[State Department?], 27 May 1902; L.A. Andrews to A. M. Brown, 27 Jun. 1902, CIHCAM 3/VI/48; A.M. 
Brown to S.B. Dole, 10 Jul. 1902, CIHCAM 3/VI/48; Sanford Dole to Secretary of the Interior, 4 Sep. 
1902, CIHCAM 3/VI/48. 
160 [Degetau] to Valls de la Log, 25 Apr. 1902 ( “el Sr. Representante de la asociación de plantadores de 
aquellas Islas, . . . me manifestó su interés porque los emigrantes tuvieran sus derechos de ciudadanos 
reconocidos, para que pudieran ejercer el derecho electoral en el Hawaii[,] que estaba dispuesto á preparar 
un recurso ante el Tribunal Supremo en el caso de que se confirmase una sentencia de los tribunales de 
aquellas Islas negandose [sic] á reconocer la ciudadanía americana de los puertoriqueños [sic] y que . . . 
deseaba que yo fuese quien arguyese el caso . . . , por entender él que esta era una garantía de éxito.”); 
“Well Treated.” 
 131 
planters would manifest such interest in investing Puerto Ricans with constitutional 
guarantees and in providing them the vote.” In a separate meeting, Governor Sanford 
Dole told Degetau that many of the claims involving abuse of the criminal law were false. 
Degetau was predisposed to credit statements from a fellow member of a propertied, 
political class, and though working conditions on Hawai‘ian plantations were generally 
awful, Degetau concluded “that that letter to the press [by the emigrants] involved some 
evident exaggerations.”161  
 Iglesias took the opposite tack, cosponsoring a resolution to seek federal action to 
repatriate Puerto Rican emigrants in Hawai‘i and prosecute their abusers. The convention 
of the American Federation of Labor ordered an investigation of the charge that 
Hawai‘ian planters and officials had deceptively lured Puerto Ricans there, “maltreated, 
whipped, and treated [them] like criminals,” and met their protests and reclamations by 
having them “robbed, shot and taken to jail.” The Federation commission that visited the 
island deemed official conduct there unsatisfactory.162 
 Drawing on paternal and patriotic concepts, some Puerto Ricans in Hawai‘i 
petitioned Degetau to let us keep “the idea that we will manage to return to the homeland 
six or seven thousand of her sons and daughters” from a Hawai‘ian life that they 
compared to slavery and racial degradation. They asked for help both as heads of 
households, swearing truthfulness “in the name of our families,” our “wives, sisters, and 
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daughters,” and as dependents within a patriotic family, writing that “Puerto Rico is 
humanitarian and patriotic, so feels sorry for its sons and daughters just as a [loving?] 
mother would for the son she adores.” They needed help, they related, because 
mainlanders in Hawai‘i extended little “consideration [to] those not of the Saxon race.” 
They did not here argue against racism, but rather, like Degetau, objected to being treated 
like races that they believed were degraded. Claiming that planters were accustomed to 
Asian laborers, the writers asserted that Puerto Ricans did not share the “dishonor of this 
people” and so should not receive the same wages or “law that they apply to the Asian.” 
Planters and authorities were, “as in the times of the slaves and masters of plantations, 
denying the right of movement” as well as the right to withhold labor. To enforce such 
oppression, the emigrants asserted, employers arrived at workers’ doors with whips. They 
added that police arrested any Puerto Rican walking between plantations on the theory 
that “the emigrant who walks abroad has no family and robs to eat.” As a paternal, 
patriotic leader, “the person who represents the island of Puerto Rico in Washington,” 
Degetau should have valued “the honorable and sincere word that a dozen honorable 
workers offered under sacred oath” rather than “explicit assurances of the Governor of 
Hawaii.” Instead, they implied, he had dishonored working Puerto Ricans, trusted elite 
Hawai‘ian exploiters, and failed to live up to his paternal, patriotic obligations. In short, a 
Puerto Rico defined, judged, and led by the best men had failed them.163 
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Reconstruction Redux: Luis Muñoz Rivera and the Opposition Seek Mainland 
Allies 
While Luis Muñoz Rivera and Iglesias had begun to form an alliance after both 
had arrived in New York fleeing violence in Puerto Rico, in some ways it was Iglesias 
and Degetau who were most similar. Unlike these men, Muñoz took a more oppositional 
stand to U.S. rule. He did not align the Federales he led with a major non-governmental 
organization like the American Federation of Labor as had Iglesias or celebrate recent 
actions of the U.S. state as had Degetau. Instead, he founded the Puerto Rico Herald in 
1901 in New York City. A bilingual Spanish-English newspaper distributed by mail, the 
Herald aspired to reach journalists, clubs, hotels, congressmen, important public figures, 
and interested readers “in Porto Rico, Cuba, South America and the United States.” 
Advertisers, anticipating a more modest reach, primarily targeted Puerto Ricans on the 
island and in New York with Spanish ads for room, board, luxury goods, transportation, 
communications, and professional services. Like La Democracia, the organ of Federales 
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on the island that Muñoz had founded a decade and a half earlier, the Herald did not 
become self-supporting as it protested perceived abuses by Republicanos and their U.S.-
official supporters. In 1901-1902, the newspaper tried to delegitimize the U.S.-
Republicano coalition before island voters and mainlanders and to shame U.S. officials 
into abandoning it. During that time Federales and Republicanos engaged in pitched 
battles; the Federación Libre and Federales complained of extralegal, pro-Republicano 
violence; and Federales and U.S. officials identified voter fraud in favor of Republicanos. 
Federales did not boycott the vote as in 1900, but did again charge in the press that U.S. 
officials incited and condoned electoral violence. Comparing conditions in the island with 
conditions that white mainlanders had come to associate with Reconstruction became a 
key strategy.164  
Three days before the November 1 election of 1902, the newspaper announced 
that a new Reconstruction was underway in Puerto Rico: “[W]e study history and see . . . 
the scandals of the south repeated. . . . The similarity between the carpet-baggers of the 
south and the carpet-baggers of Puerto Rico is likewise a point worthy of notice. . . . The 
south peacefully overcame its wretched exploiters. Puerto Rico will also overcome hers.” 
It was a metaphor calculated to resonate with island and mainland audiences. To Puerto 
Rican readers, the reference to officials from the metropole tyrannizing locals was likely 
to recall Liberals’ resentment at the outsized role continental Spaniards had once played 
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in the Puerto Rican state. It thus aimed to align all Puerto Ricans—regardless of race—
against U.S. officials. For mainland readers, by contrast, the comparison was most likely 
to trigger memories of Reconstruction, not Spanish rule, and thus have racial overtones. 
In this reading, Federales cast themselves as Reconstruction-era white-supremacist 
Democrats in the U.S. South. U.S. officials on the island played carpet-bagging northern 
Republicans. Perpetrators of extralegal, pro-Republicano violence—already characterized 
by Federales as lower-class riffraff perverting island democracy—stood in for what had 
in white mainlander popular imagination come to be remembered as the violence and 
perversion of U.S. freedmen and their role in Reconstruction-era politics. The island 
government, comprised by Republicanos and republican appointees, represented the 
black Republican misrule that had supposedly pervaded Reconstruction.165 
 The approach had several benefits. At a time when the white U.S. mainstream 
celebrated so-called southern “Redeemers,” Federales could cast their electoral failures in 
romantic terms with reference to that “history.” They argued that intrusive federal rule 
temporarily subjected them, just as it had southern U.S. whites during Reconstruction, to 
a misrule that they had to suffer, resist, and overcome. This “Redemption” story—
ostensibly vilifying electoral winners in an illegitimate system—cast Federales as a 
legitimate, temporarily displaced political class. Quoting Paul de Roussier’s La Vie 
Americaine, the Herald characterized Reconstruction as a time when northerners came to 
the U.S. South to “oppress[] it” and “exploit the resentment of the former slaves against 
their former masters” “WHICH THEY [northern carpet-baggers] HAD KEPT ALIVE AND 
STIRRED UP THEMSELVES.” Without such outside agitation, the newspaper implied, 
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Republicanos could not win or hold power.166 
The analogy also answered mainland deprecations of Puerto Ricans without 
denying Puerto Rican racial diversity or explicitly deprecating islanders of color. A 
September 6, 1902, response in the Herald by four San Juan students to charges 
published in the Boston Globe by Peter MacQueen, a San Juan resident and veteran of the 
U.S. invasion of Puerto Rico, illustrated the difficulty. To MacQueen’s claim that “Puerto 
Ricans . . . are so mixed of race—negro, Indian, Spaniard, European—that all the evil of 
the races have come to a focus in them,” the students countered:  
The majority of the Puerto Ricans come from Spanish families and 
through their veins runs as pure blood as that which runs through the veins 
of the inhabitants of the United States, France, Italy, Russia, Germany or 
England. There are negroes, indeed, and there has never been a case in 
which one of them has been united in marriage to a white, reason by 
which it has been impossible to find such a mixture of races.167 
These were not sentiments calculated to endear Puerto Ricans of color to the Herald. 
Moreover, many mainland commentators and officials neither viewed Spaniards, Italians, 
and Russians as equals of U.S. and English peoples nor would credit claims of universal 
Puerto Rican racial purity over U.S. census statistics describing a 32% “mestizo” or 
“mulatto” island population. References to Reconstruction were less likely to alienate 
island voters of color. And because members of the U.S. media and state often 
remembered Reconstruction as a regrettable departure from white rule, it provided them a 
framework through which they might see Federales sympathetically, as oppressed whites 
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ready to govern a local population of color.168 
 But to emerge from “appalling tyranny” within the Reconstruction metaphor, 
Puerto Rico needed a new federal policy, a difficult predicate to secure. “Washington will 
flow down a thundering torrent of justice,” the Herald envisioned, “sweeping away” U.S. 
officials on the island. Though Reconstruction had taken years to end, Federales 
portrayed high administrators as immediate potential allies against bad local officials. 
Quoting Roussier, they claimed, “On the chairs of the Supreme Court, in the Senate, 
among the judges, there are no doubt men deserving of high esteem.” But high officials 
were unlikely to join Federales in opposition to local officials. They appointed, oversaw, 
and enacted the laws guiding U.S. officials on the island. Officials in Puerto Rico pursued 
superiors’ policies. As Muñoz had seen in past fights, superiors were loath to reverse 
subordinates.169 
Republicanos faced problems of their own. In 1902, having promised voters that 
cooperation with U.S. officials would bring good local legislation and incremental 
advancement toward Puerto Rican statehood, Republicanos faced attacks by Federales for 
their recent lack of progress. Having built relationships with and portrayed themselves as 
akin to mainland Republicans for some time, Republicanos had moved to advance their 
program in May 1902 by officially making membership in the national party a goal. 
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Degetau had publicly dissented, contending that islanders denied U.S. civil and political 
membership and U.S. citizenship had no place in U.S. national parties. But, he also told a 
Republicano, his 
word of honor to the U.S. Congress and sense of duty to our patria and 
party, compels me again to solicit from my colleagues the honor of being 
their candidate and from the electorate the honor of being reelected to 
continue the work I have undertaken in favor of [both] our American 
citizenship [and] the admission of Puerto Rico into the Union as an 
organized Territory to become in the not-distant future a state. 
Despite their differences, Republicanos nominated Degetau for reelection.170 
 Though Federales won no “torrent of justice,” they were able to make U.S. 
intransigence on status issues into a campaign issue. After also building an alliance with 
the Federación Libre, they gained a substantial minority of seats in the House of 
Delegates in the November 1902 elections. Republicanos maintained a reduced majority 
in the House, and Degetau won a second term as Resident Commissioner.171 
 
As Degetau contemplated a second term as Resident Commissioner, he elected to 
pursue a more legal strategy than did his political opponents and allies, one that would 
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soon come to center on the Supreme Court case of Gonzales v. Williams (1904). 
Throughout his first term he had sought a dispute in which he could intervene that to be 
settled would require a federal entity both to hear his claims to U.S. citizenship and 
territorial status and to clarify the status of islanders or their island. An opportunity had 
arisen on August 2, 1902, when the Treasury Department had issued a circular 
prescribing that Puerto Ricans be treated as aliens for immigration purposes. After 
learning of the policy, Degetau had considered seeking to be denied the right to enter 
New York under it, hoping thereby to frame a dispute as to whether Puerto Ricans were 
U.S. citizens or aliens. His friend Manuel Rossy, however, had reminded him that his 
position all but guaranteed his entry, alien or no. Instead, he had protested to the 
Secretary of the Treasury on October 5 in legalistic terms. Describing the Treaty of Paris, 
Foraker Act, and Insular Cases as together naturalizing islanders, Degetau had asked for 
a ruling. On October 15, Treasury had declined to address Degetau’s arguments, noting a 
recent decision of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New 
York, Gonzales v. Williams (1902), which had held Puerto Ricans to be aliens before 
upholding the immigration guidelines against which Degetau protested. No appeal had 
been taken, but time remained to file. With nearly two years until fellow Republicanos or 
Federales could challenge his action and seek to replace him in office, it appeared that 
Degetau had found a vehicle with which to test his strategy for clarifying the status of 
himself and his countrymen. His political rivals, he knew, would be ready to act if the 
effort failed.172
                                                 
172 Copy, Federico Degetau to Secretary of Treasury, 5 Oct. 1902, CIHCAM 3/VI/56 (quoting Circular of 2 
Aug. 1902); Manuel Rossy to Federico Degetau, 26 Jan. 1904, CIHCAM 4/VIII/14; Amicus Curiae Brief, 
no. 225, Gonzalez v. Williams, 192 U.S. 1 (1904), 2; Transcript of Record, Gonzales, 9. On law and 
people’s relationships to it as too variegated to render bottom-line analyses of its utility for social change 
 140 
                                                                                                                                                 
practicable, see John Fabian Witt, The Accidental Republic: Crippled Workingmen, Destitute Widows, and 
the Remaking of American Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004), 1-22. On the capacity 
of law to divide movements seeking common ends, see Joan G. Zimmerman, “The Jurisprudence of 
Equality: The Women’s Minimum Wage, the First Equal Rights Amendment, and Adkins v. Children’s 







“AMERICAN ALIEN”: ISABEL GONZALEZ AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1902-1905 
 
Federico Degetau’s second term as Resident Commissioner marked the 
culmination and eclipse of his strategy as the elected representative of the Puerto Rican 
people of using legal claims to U.S. citizenship to seek improvements in his constituents’ 
relationship to the United States. After pushing numerous U.S. officials to define Puerto 
Ricans as U.S. citizens, Degetau finally found a test case when U.S. immigration officials 
excluded Isabel Gonzalez from the mainland as an undesirable alien. Little about 
Gonzalez indicated that she would soon force the U.S. Supreme Court into a choice 
between undermining U.S. imperialism, repeating the mistakes of Dred Scott, or dodging 
the politically controversial constitutional issue of Puerto Rican citizenship status. Not 
yet twenty-one in 1902, Isabel Gonzalez had sought to mitigate financial hardship at 
home by migrating from San Juan to New York. But because Puerto Ricans held 
uncertain residence rights on the mainland, she first confronted immigration inspectors 
who refused to permit her to land in New York. With the help of her uncle, the former 
Antillean revolutionary Domingo Collazo, she challenged that decision in federal court, 
launching what the New York Times would describe as a “Porto Rican test case” on “the 
status of the citizens of Porto Rico.”  
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Both Frederic Coudert, a lead attorney in the 1901 Insular Cases, and Puerto 
Rican Resident Commissioner Federico Degetau saw Gonzalez’s dispute as a legal 
opportunity. Coudert hoped to convince the Court to integrate the narrow, vague, and 
fractured Insular decisions with which it had met his 1901 arguments into a new, more 
robust doctrinal approach to Puerto Rican status. Degetau still maintained that Puerto 
Ricans were U.S. citizens who, once recognized as such, would have confirmation that 
their island was on the road to statehood. Having failed to win this recognition from 
agencies, Congress, the President, or the press, Degetau aimed to present a judicial action 
squarely raising the issue of U.S. citizenship and thereby forcing the court to clarify 
Puerto Ricans’ status.  
Island politicians remained skeptical of the Coudert-Degetau gambit. Federales—
advocates of political confrontation—disparaged faith in U.S. institutions. Republicano 
leaders had also begun to doubt U.S. intentions, and soon quarreled over whether they 
should oppose or join the U.S. Republican Party.173 
 
Origins of a Test Case, 1902-1903. 
The year 1902 started badly for Isabel Gonzalez, who became pregnant for the 
second time shortly before her fiancé and brother left to find factory jobs in the 
Linoleumville neighborhood of Staten Island. Though her brother Luis Gonzalez sent 
money back to his mother and sisters in San Juan, Isabel Gonzalez left for New York in 
mid-1902 with plans to marry her fiancé, secure educational opportunities for a younger 
sister, and perhaps find factory work herself. Steaming away from San Juan, Isabel 
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Gonzalez had reason to hope that she would be among the many Puerto Ricans who, as 
Degetau had noted, had “frequently disembarked unmolested in New York.” Although 
U.S. officials had carefully avoided granting citizenship to Puerto Ricans, neither had 
immigration agents treated them uniformly as aliens. This changed while Gonzalez was 
en route to New York. Altering its policy toward Puerto Ricans, the Treasury Department 
instructed immigration officials that Puerto Ricans were henceforth “subject to the same 
examinations as are enforced against people from countries over which the United States 
claims no right of sovereignty.” Following the new rules, port officials transferred 
Gonzalez to Ellis Island.174 
At Ellis Island, Gonzalez confronted a powerful arm of the U.S. administrative 
state. Exercising both prosecutorial and judicial functions, and insulated from most 
formal judicial review, hundreds of immigration inspectors determined the residence 
rights of as many as 5,000 immigrants a day. Their line inspections were standardized, 
high-volume, and summary. They sent ambiguous cases before Boards of Special Inquiry 
that could end their non-public hearings in minutes and deny immigrants rights to an 
attorney or to see or rebut evidence. Several months earlier Wall Street lawyer William 
Williams had become the new Commissioner of Immigration at Ellis Island. Promoting 
cleanliness, politeness, and strict, efficient enforcement of immigration laws, he doubled 
his exclusion rate in his first year by aggressively construing the statutory bar on aliens 
“likely to become a public charge.” As a practical guideline, he directed inspectors to 
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treat aliens as suspect if they traveled with less than ten dollars. Inspectors often attached 
the label of “public charge” to unmarried mothers and their children, while Ellis Island 
policy dictated that “unmarried pregnant women were always detained for further 
investigation” and single women were only released if family members came to claim 
them. Here, Williams and his subordinates prefigured the welfare laws that other 
reformers would soon institute. Those laws, like Ellis Island guidelines, conceptualized 
women and children as dependents (though in fact many worked). In both cases, the state 
distributed and denied benefits to women and their children based on criteria that had 
more to do with middle-class respectability than with the realities that most working 
women and their children faced.175 
Isabel Gonzalez carried $11 in cash, apparently left her two-year old daughter 
Dolores Gonzalez in the care of her mother in San Juan, and telegraphed ahead to her 
family to pick her up. She was not, however, able to pass smoothly through the 
administrative process. Officials discovered her pregnancy during her early-August 1902 
line inspection. Consequently, a Board of Special Inquiry opened a file on Gonzalez, one 
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that would grow and circulate as her case progressed.176  
The next day, Gonzalez’s uncle, Domingo Collazo, and her brother, Luis 
Gonzalez, joined her at a hearing turning on whether she was “going to persons able, 
willing and legally bound to support” her and not entering for immoral purposes. Here 
the administrative inquiry reflected both a movement for racial exclusion and ideas about 
moral behavior of and proper relations between female and male family members. 
Inspectors weighed proof of legitimate family relations through presumptions that certain 
kinds of women were inadequate mothers and certain kinds of men were insufficient 
fathers and husbands. In a speech to Princeton’s senior class somewhat later, 
Commissioner Williams explained his strict policies in terms of the “radical sociological, 
industrial, racial and intellectual distinctions” separating northwestern and southeastern 
Europeans: “It will be a very easy matter to fill up this country rapidly with immigrants 
upon whom responsibility for the proper bringing up of their offspring sits lightly, but it 
cannot be claimed that this will enure to the benefit of the American people.”177 
The hearings raised matters that many people in Puerto Rico and on the mainland 
associated with dishonor, lower-class status, and racial inferiority: lack of membership in 
an economically self-sufficient man’s home, absence of sexual propriety, and 
classification as pregnant and abandoned. Collazo and Luis Gonzalez sought to portray 
Isabel Gonzalez as an upstanding, dependent woman in an honorable man’s household. 
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Isabel Gonzalez explained her first child through widowhood. For the second pregnancy, 
Collazo converted a missing fiancé into a husband whom he had seen “[a]bout two weeks 
ago,” but who “could not come today” because “he is working.” Collazo hedged his bets, 
however, offering to assume the role of patriarch. He earned “$25 a week” as “a printer” 
and was “willing to take [Isabel Gonzalez] and provide for her.” Inspectors were wary. 
They sent Collazo and Luis Gonzalez home, urging them to produce the husband: “his 
wife is here and he should come for her.” Two days later, still with no help from the 
father of Gonzalez’s expected child, Collazo’s wife, Herminia Dávila, tried again. 
Q. What does your husband do?  
A. He is a t[y]pographer and I do embroidery work; I also give lessons in 
embroidery work. 
Q. What is your husband’s business worth?  
A. $25 a week. 
Q. Does your husband know that you came here in the interest of your niece?  
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Can you satisfy this board that, in case this woman is released, you will stand 
by her and see that she does not get into trouble?  
A. Yes, sir, that goes without saying. 
Q. Your husband will aid you in assisting the woman?  
A. Yes, sir. 
While inspectors solicited Dávila’s claims to moral supervision, they concentrated on her 
husband’s income and authority, questioned her for coming to testify unaccompanied by 
her husband, and failed to record her name. They also refused to reconsider their demand 
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to see Gonzalez’s husband.178 
 When Isabel Gonzalez’s brother, Luis Gonzalez, testified, he tried a new tack, 
portraying Isabel Gonzalez as a victim of rapto, or seduction, but assuring the inspectors 
that her family had taken the necessary steps to restore her honor. Thus, though Isabel 
Gonzalez’s lover had not married her and did not intend to, Luis Gonzalez could explain: 
I have been to the church and have made arrangements and as soon as I have my 
sister with me, we are going there and are going to have them married. I have also 
gone to the authorities and told them and everything is waiting for the release of 
my sister . . . . My aunt . . . has made arrangements and is sure of making a 
reconciliation . . . and will have them married. 
Although Luis Gonzalez apparently believed that this would mollify inspectors’ concerns 
about Isabel Gonzalez’s family’s capacity to care for her, inspectors were indignant: “An 
arrangement then has been made by which a marriage is to take place without the 
husband’s consent?” Luis Gonzalez affirmed that this was the case. The Board excluded 
Isabel Gonzalez from entry.179 
With Isabel Gonzalez in detention on Ellis Island, the case now shifted onto 
explicitly judicial terrain. On August 18, 1902, Collazo swore out a habeas corpus 
petition for Gonzalez. At about the same time, “She told her story to a friend, who in turn 
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told it to [lawyer] Orrel A. Parker.” On August 19, Parker’s partner, Charles E. Le 
Barbier, filed Collazo’s petition with the U.S. Circuit Court for the Southern District of 
New York, which promptly paroled Gonzalez pending its decision. Seeing at stake in the 
case “the very difficult question of Constitutional law whether or not a Porto Rican was a 
citizen of the United States,” Commissioner of Immigration William Williams hired a 
private lawyer who, he later wrote, performed “exceedingly well.” On October 7, the 
Court announced its decision. Narrowing the issue to “whether or not petitioner is an 
alien,” it stated that she was an alien and upheld her exclusion. Though a loss for 
Gonzalez and her allies, the decision also gave them a chance to press courts to decide: as 
a native of an unincorporated territory, was she an alien or a national, a subject or a 
citizen? With Gonzalez now back in detention, Collazo found a way to present an 
“express solicitation” to Frederic Coudert, the lawyer known for his arguments in 
DeLima v. Bidwell and Downes v. Bidwell (1901) concerning the territorial status of 
Puerto Rico. Coudert soon filed an appeal with the U.S. Supreme Court. Pending a 
decision in that new action, the Circuit Court again paroled Gonzalez. Now the question 
was no longer whether immigration inspectors, following the guidelines designed by 
Commissioner Williams, deemed Isabel Gonzalez and her family desirable. Desirable or 
not, the case would determine whether she was a foreigner. It could also, Coudert wrote, 
“settle the status of all the native islanders,” including Filipinos, “who were in existence 
at the time the Spanish possessions were annexed by the United States.”180 
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 Consistent with his emerging persona as a public intellectual on matters of 
international law, Coudert described and proposed to solve the issues in Gonzalez’s 
appeal in a January 1903 Columbia Law Review article. He depicted the imposition of 
alien status on Puerto Ricans as the equivalent of a husband denying his obligations to 
and over his wife. “The new master, viz, the United States,” he wrote, ideally “takes her 
allegiance with a burden, and having deprived her of all claim on the old master, has 
taken his place.” U.S. failure to do so put Puerto Ricans like Gonzalez in an untenable 
position. “What ‘commodum’ or advantage does the Señorita reap from her situation,” he 
asked, before later casting “Miss Gonzalez[, as]…an undefined waif, on the sea of 
political certainty.” He continued, “[w]hat nation in the wide world will raise, nay, will 
be permitted by us to raise a finger or even a voice in behalf of this woman if she is 
injured,” then added that “she belongs to the United States, and may look to it for 
protection.” Moreover, the United States failed to exercise a masterly discipline that was 
the common obligation of husbands. As he wrote, “if she could commit . . . that crime [of 
treason], would she go unwhipped of justice because she had not been naturalized a 
                                                                                                                                                 
85/151/4~340/268/19045; D. Collazo, “Desde Nueva York,” La Correspondencia de Puerto Rico, 19 Dec. 
1903, 1; Petition of Federico Degetau, Resident Commissioner from Porto Rico, Gonzales; Brief Filed by 
Leave of the Court by Federico Degetau, Resident Commissioner from Porto Rico, as Amicus Curiæ, 
Gonzales; Frederic Coudert to Federico Degetau, 20 Apr. 1903, CIHCAM 4/II/144. In subsequent years 
some legal scholars included Gonzales among the Insular Cases. E.g., Pedro Capó Rodríguez, “The 
Relations between the United States and Porto Rico,” American Journal of International Law 13 (1919): 
483-525; Quincy Wright, “Treaties and the Constitutional Separation of Powers in the United States,” 
American Journal of International Law 12 (1918): 64-95. Many modern scholars would agree that it 
belongs there. Bartholomew H. Sparrow, The Insular Cases and the Emergence of American Empire 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006); Rivera Ramos, Legal Construction of Identity; Christina 
Duffy Burnett, “A Note on the Insular Cases,” in Burnett and Marshall, eds., Foreign in a Domestic Sense, 
389-392. On women, dependency, and U.S. citizenship, see, e.g., Adam Winkler, “A Revolution Too Soon: 
Woman Suffragists and the ‘Living Constitution,’” New York University Law Review 76 (Nov. 2001): 
1456-1526; Linda Kerber, No Constitutional Right to Be Ladies: Women and the Obligations of Citizenship 
(New York: Hill & Wang, 1998); Nancy F. Cott, Public Vows: A History of Marriage and the Nation 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000); Nancy F. Cott, “Marriage and Women’s Citizenship 
in the United States, 1830-1934,” American Historical Review 103 (Dec. 1998): 1440-1474; Linda K. 
Kerber, “Toward a History of Statelessness in America,” American Quarterly 57 (2005): 728-749; Martha 
S. Jones, “All Bound Up Together”: The Woman Question in African-American Public Culture, 1830-1900 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007). 
 150 
citizen of the United States?”181 
 Fortunately, Coudert argued, the problem was easy to solve. Article IX of the 
Treaty of Paris held that the “political status of [Puerto Ricans] shall be determined by 
Congress.” The treaty, he contended, was thus written to avoid naturalizing the Puerto 
Ricans who nonetheless necessarily ceased to be aliens upon annexation. Declining to 
join the Attorney General in calling Puerto Ricans “American subjects,” a term “alien to 
our trend of political thought,” Coudert proposed a term that he cast as unburdened by 
monarchical implications but otherwise synonymous with subject: “national.” “National” 
and alien were complements, he wrote, mutually exclusive yet “together . . . universally 
inclusive.” Citizenship was narrower: all “citizens must be nationals,” he explained, “but 
all nationals may not be citizens.”182 
The argument was a departure from that which he had presented the Supreme 
Court during the Insular Cases. Then he had claimed that while Filipinos could be 
nationals akin to American Indians, Puerto Ricans were similar neither to Indians nor to 
antebellum free blacks and thus bore no relation to the two categories of people who had 
been neither citizens nor aliens under prior U.S. law. Coudert still acknowledged the 
similarity between the status Puerto Ricans would hold if they were to become U.S. non-
citizen nationals and that upon which Scott v. Sandford (1857) depended. As he wrote, 
“Dred Scott was not an alien; he was a national, but he was not, under the famous 
                                                 
181 Frederic R. Coudert, Jr., “Our New Peoples: Citizens, Subjects, Nationals or Aliens,” Columbia Law 
Review 3 (Jan. 1903): 22-23 (quotes 1-3, 5, 7), 17, passim; Appellant’s Brief, Gonzales, 12 (quotes 4, 6). 
E.g., Veta Schlimgen, “Intermediate Citizens: ‘American Nationals,’ Filipino Americans, and U.S. 
Imperialism” and Christina Duffy Burnett, “Citizenship in the Time of Empire: The Noncitizen National in 
Constitutional and International Law” (both presented at the Organization of American Historians Annual 
Meeting, Seattle, Wash., 27-28 Mar. 1909). Astrid Cubano-Iguina has observed how gendered concepts and 
legal categories that have different implications for men and women developed in tandem in late-19th-
century Puerto Rico. “Legal Constructions of Gender and Violence against Women in Puerto Rico under 
Spanish Rule, 1860-1895,” Law and History Review 22 (2004): 531-564. 
182 Coudert, “Our New Peoples,” 32 (quotes 1-2), 17 (quotes 3-6), 19, 25, 29. 
 151 
decision, a citizen.” But Degetau no longer saw that similarity as dispositive. Instead, he 
reassured readers that his proposal would not reprise that infamous case because other 
nations in the interim had taken similar steps without betraying their national principles, 
ratifying slavery, or descending into civil war. They “have for years past had the same 
problem before them as we have now,” he related, “and have solved it in line with the 
theory herein set forth.”183 
Soon thereafter, Federico Degetau won permission to enter Gonzalez’s case as 
amicus curiæ. By this time he had failed to clarify the citizenship status of Puerto Ricans 
before political, administrative, public, and media audiences and in two attempted 
Supreme Court tests cases concerning his admission to the Supreme Court bar and his 
application for a passport as a U.S. citizen. Nonetheless, Degetau apparently still 
believed, as he had written in 1901, that “the profound respect that this pueblo has for its 
judicial institutions” meant that a decision of the Supreme Court could change the 
situation in Washington. As the case progressed, he agreed to provide the New York 
Independent an article in favor of U.S. statehood for Puerto Rico that would run after the 
Supreme Court ruled.184 
At the same time, and as he had during his first term, Degetau sought both to 
exemplify the fitness of Puerto Ricans for citizenship and to document instances where 
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an arm of the U.S. state acted as if Puerto Ricans were or should be U.S. citizens—even 
if they had done so inadvertently. He thus had the Secretary of the Puerto Rican Supreme 
Court certify that U.S. military authorities had administered to him an oath to meet 
citizenship-like obligations of national defense and to renounce, as during naturalization, 
all foreign allegiances. He then secured a report of the House Committee on Insular 
Affairs recommending that Puerto Rico enjoy the right to send a delegate to Congress 
like those from traditional U.S. territories.185 
Degetau’s efforts often faltered in the face of federal indecision. When Degetau 
inquired about census officials classifying Puerto Ricans as “U.S.” in the citizenship 
column of the 1899 census, he learned that their instructions included those “desir[ing] to 
be American subjects” under that head. Degetau also observed that the Foraker Act 
ordered the Commissioner of Navigation, to undertake, in his words, “the nationalization 
of all vessels owned by the inhabitants of Porto Rico,” while a second statute required 
U.S. vessels to be “wholly owned by citizens . . . of the United States.” Upon inquiry, 
Degetau discovered that the Bureau of Navigation had not reconciled the statutes, instead 
variously classifying owners of Puerto Rican boats as U.S. or Puerto Rican citizens, 
inhabitants of Puerto Rico, or citizens of San Juan.186 
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 In some cases Degetau encountered U.S. officials who delayed deciding Puerto 
Rican status matters pending the further judicial guidance that they now anticipated. The 
Department of Commerce and Labor embraced this strategy after February 1903 federal 
legislation transferred the Bureau of Immigration to it from Treasury. Throughout 1903, 
Commissioner of Immigration William Williams used his victory over Isabel Gonzalez in 
the U.S. Circuit Court to treat Puerto Ricans arriving at Ellis Island as aliens for 
immigration purposes. He told one superior that even though a billing error made it likely 
that he would pay the $250 fee of the lawyer at the Circuit Court out of pocket, “[s]uch 
loss will be very slight in comparison with the satisfaction of having secured a favorable 
decision for the Government in the Gonzalez case.” A few weeks after he wrote that 
letter, his policy caught fifty-year-old María Coy in its web. At Ellis Island, Coy’s lawyer 
recounted, inspectors deemed Coy “an invalid” of “extreme age” “unable to care for 
herself.” Her daughter, they concluded, despite her decade of experience making ends 
meet in New York, was an unreliable guarantor who “has to rely on her own daily labor 
for her support.” Rosendo Rodríguez, an acquaintance of Coy or her daughter and a co-
founder of the Las Dos Antillas revolutionary club of which Collazo had been a member 
in the 1890s, had also “promised to take [Coy] in.” Inspectors nonetheless deemed Coy a 
likely public charge.187  
Coy’s daughter subsequently hired a lawyer to appeal the decision, but lost. 
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Rodríguez then approached Degetau, addressing Degetau less as the representative of 
residents of the territory of Puerto Rico then as someone akin to a consul who represented 
all Puerto Ricans regardless of whether they lived in Puerto Rico or on the mainland. 
Degetau won Coy a rehearing, after which she gained entry to New York. He also used 
her case as a basis to claim U.S. citizenship, writing the Secretary of Commerce and 
Labor “protesting against the application of the restrictions of the immigration laws to the 
natives and residents of Porto Rico.” The Department declined to comment, electing 
instead to wait “until a decision has been rendered by the Supreme Court.”188 
In early 1903, Manuel Rossy, the Republicano Speaker of the Island House of 
Delegates, derided Degetau’s judicial strategy as blind to political realities. Separation of 
powers, he argued, was more theory than practice. Observing that congressional support 
for presidential expansionism showed “that legislative action is not as free from executive 
influence as one would guess from reading books,” he indicated that courts were unlikely 
to alter Puerto Rican status absent strong legislative guidance. “We here do not share 
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your view that” “conced[ing] the Commissioner of Puerto Rico a seat and voice like 
delegates to other territories . . . would mean recognition of Puerto Rico as an organized 
territory,” Rossy wrote, “just as your admission to the Supreme Court bar did not bring us 
citizenship.” Even U.S. citizenship, Rossy claimed, “your opinion notwithstanding, will 
have to be via legislation.”189  
 This intra-party dispute intensified as Republicanos moved closer to a merger 
with U.S. Republicans. As Rossy told Degetau, Republicanos planned to attend the 
Republican National Convention, where they hoped to be recognized as delegates. Such 
alliances with political parties in the metropole had long been a part of island politics, 
including among Republicanos’ Autonomista predecessors. They had always involved a 
balance of principles and expediency that sometimes included partnerships with parties 
willing to support Puerto Rican politicians’ immediate demands for official posts or new 
freedoms but not their longer-term goals. Luis Muñoz Rivera’s agreement in the 1890s 
with a monarchical Spanish party, for example, had divided Puerto Rican Autonomistas 
over the relative values of potential autonomy and fidelity to liberal-republican 
principles. Degetau had dissented then, and he dissented from Republicanos’ plans now 
too. He had entered post-invasion politics on the understanding “that Puerto Rico would 
be a state of the union like the others,” he stated. “[I]f the politics of the Republican 
Party” is “to keep us indefinitely as a dependency” and so “impedes making an explicit 
declaration” that Puerto Rico is “an organized territory with the intention of recognizing 
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us as a state in a reasonable time,” Degetau wrote, “I will not enter” that party. The 
question, he predicted, could hinge on whether “the Supreme Court declares us American 
citizens.”190  
 Isabel Gonzalez and her family pursued her appeal under different circumstances 
and for different reasons than did Coudert and Degetau. Luis Gonzalez sought 
reunification of his family. On February 5, 1903, he wrote to Degetau from San Juan not 
as the brother of the litigant in the case in which Degetau would soon submit a brief but 
as a potential beneficiary of charitable paternalism. He reminded Degetau of “the offer 
you made me to wish to be able to help me study something” when he had been “the 
young man from the laundry in San Juan who regularly washed your shirts.” But “as a 
poor man with obligations to my mother and two little sisters, I have not been able to 
devote myself to studies,” he explained, and instead “I decided to come to this country 
where my work” “in a rubber factory” “lets me live and help my mother.” Now, he wrote, 
his mother was “unwell.” Hoping to return and “live in reduced circumstances with what 
I can earn,” he concluded, “I seek your good heart to help me . . . remain more time in 
San Juan.”191 
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Three months later Luis Gonzalez instead brought his family to New York, 
buying tickets for Isabel Gonzalez’s mother, younger sisters, and daughter aboard the 
S.S. Ponce that departed San Juan on May 12. Aware that Ellis Island officials sometimes 
excluded unmarried immigrant mothers and their children, Isabel Gonzalez’s mother 
listed herself as married on the ship’s manifest and claimed Isabel Gonzalez’s daughter as 
her own. On May 18 Ellis Island officials cleared the ostensibly traditional, nuclear 
family members for entry and released them into the care of Luis Gonzalez and his 
mother’s sister, Herminia Dávila.192  
Isabel Gonzalez herself seems to have wanted both to secure her own position and 
to clarify and thus improve the status of all Puerto Ricans. Though her voice is absent 
from the administrative and trial records, she apparently assented to the shift from an 
argument designed to redeem her individual honor and secure her entry to New York to 
one intended to secure citizenship for all Puerto Ricans. While she was out on bond, the 
New York Times later reported, “the young man, who she came here to find, turned up,” 
the two wed, and she became “a citizen of this country through marriage,” thus acquiring 
a right to remain on the mainland. Rather than end her appeal on these grounds, however, 
she hid her marriage, delaying individual redemption in order to press her claim that all 
Puerto Ricans were U.S. citizens.193 
As a result of her discretion about the wedding, the official record came to portray 
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her as did immigration inspectors: dependent, silent, and an object of state policy. There 
is an irony here. Gonzalez made huge efforts to put claims to dignity and belonging 
before decision makers who worked for the U.S. state, a leading producer and custodian 
of archival materials. Because her efforts succeeded, the U.S. Supreme Court would read 
and repeat the “legal story” that immigration inspectors had crafted out of the testimonies 
witnesses had generated to sway them. Historians have only begun to correct this 
depiction of Gonzalez as a passive victim of governmental machinations. Yet she pressed 
and, as we will see, articulated claims to citizenship.194 
 While Gonzalez intentionally preserved ambiguity concerning the citizenship 
status she could claim through marriage, Degetau sought to ensure that the citizenship 
status she claimed as a Puerto Rican could not be questioned. The Foraker Act, he knew, 
made “citizens of Porto Rico” of those “continuing to reside” on the island on April 11, 
1899. The U.S. Attorney General, responding to a claim that Degetau had helped 
engineer, had construed that provision also to include Puerto Ricans “residing 
temporarily abroad.” But which absences qualified as temporary remained a matter of 
some debate. Moving to preclude any challenge along these lines, Degetau met with 
Collazo in mid-1903 on the pier of the New York and Porto Rico Steamship Company 
and asked him to confirm that Gonzalez had been present in Puerto Rico in 1899.195 
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 There is little evidence concerning how Collazo spent the years immediately 
following the U.S. invasion of Puerto Rico, but Degetau’s question and Gonzalez’s case 
provided him opportunities to engage questions of Puerto Rican status in new ways. 
Moving beyond the tight-knit world of revolutionary Antillean artisans with whom he 
had formed political clubs and published newspapers in the 1890s, Collazo began to build 
ties to island political leaders and seize a voice in matters of island-mainland relations. 
On May 25, 1903, he sought favor with Luis Muñoz Rivera, the leader of the Puerto 
Rican opposition party, by positively reviewing his new book of poetry, Tropicales. 
Writing to Degetau on August 27 that the 1899 census showed Isabel Gonzalez to be a 
San Juan resident, Collazo also sent Degetau his Muñoz review, describing it as part “of a 
series that I propose to publish and that will take a political character.” 
The new acquaintanceship took hold. Degetau sent Collazo his book, Cuentos 
para el viaje, which Collazo praised. Soon, they had friends in common. Collazo 
addressed Degetau familiarly and even let his name be used by an acquaintance seeking a 
job from Degetau. Collazo also made a “constant friend” of the director of the island 
newspaper, La Correspondencia, which in late 1903 published his letter describing his 
niece’s case as a matter of democratic norms and the differences between presumably 
Latin or Spanish Puerto Ricans and native Pacific islanders. U.S. “possession of 
‘dependencies’” and colonial governance of them, Collazo told islanders, had produced 
an “oligarchy in Puerto Rico” that was inconsistent with the “institutions” and 
“democratic . . . spirit” of the United States. Embracing the validity of racial hierarchies 
and seeking an advantageous place for Puerto Ricans within them, Collazo described the 
Court as deciding whether to treat Puerto Ricans like Filipinos or indigenous Hawai‘ians. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Lorenzo Mercado. 
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If the Supreme Court denied U.S. citizenship to Puerto Ricans, he explained, Puerto 
Ricans could also, like Filipinos, be “denied to the right to trial by jury,” as well as other 
rights. Though he had told Degetau that the Court would “say that we are not 
Americans,” he wrote in La Correspondencia that he “cherish[ed] hope.” “[T]wo of the 
judges who supported” the prior anti-Puerto Rico verdict, he explained, “have descended 
to the tomb: and it remains to be seen if their successors, Judges [Oliver Wendell] 
Holmes and [William] Day, agree in the opinion of the narrow majority.”196  
Throughout 1903 Puerto Ricans thus lived in institutional limbo, uncertain 
whether they possessed U.S. citizenship or remained alien to their new sovereign. 
Gonzalez consequently hung suspended between colony and metropole, alien and 
national, and citizen and subject. As she, her family and attorneys, and U.S. officials all 
understood, the attributes and distribution of U.S. citizenship remained unsettled long 
after Dred Scott (1857) and its 1868 reversal by the 14th Amendment.197 
 
Gonzales v. Williams (1904) 
 The U.S. Supreme Court received the briefs in Gonzales v. Williams in late 1903. 
U.S. Solicitor General Henry Hoyt’s filing on behalf of the United States focused on the 
peculiar purposes of U.S. immigration laws. Reviewing bars to entry by Chinese, 
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prostitutes, “idiots,” “insane persons,” “paupers,” certain diseased persons, and 
anarchists, among others, he highlighted Congress’s desire to protect the mainland from 
harmful immigration. Hoyt then described how Puerto Rico and the Philippines were 
remote in time, space, and culture and suffered (in his eyes) problems of climate, 
overcrowding, primitive hygiene, low standards of living and moral conduct, and the 
extreme and willing indigency that characterized the tropics. Until Congress crafted 
exceptions to the immigration laws, Hoyt concluded, the Supreme Court ought to respect 
congressional intent to protect the mainland from “these very evils at which the law was 
aimed.”198 
On November 30, 1903, Frederic R. Coudert, Jr., opposed the government with 
his brief on behalf of Isabel Gonzalez. He argued: 1) The Treaty of Paris transferred 
sovereignty over, and hence the allegiance of, Puerto Rico from Spain to the United 
States; and 2) Under English and U.S. law, such transfers effected transfers of subjection 
or nationality. If accepted, these two points were sufficient to win Gonzalez entry to the 
mainland; existing immigration laws only excluded aliens. This was the clear but 
minimalist argument that Coudert had made in his earlier law review article. But both 
Collazo in his letter to La Correspondencia and Gonzalez through her choices sought 
citizenship as well as non-alienage. In line with these goals, Coudert now contradicted his 
article to return to a version of the claim he had earlier presented the Court—that finding 
Puerto Ricans to be neither aliens nor U.S. citizens would be tantamount to reprising 
Dred Scott. He thus argued: 3) U.S. law appropriately deemed all U.S. subjects or 
nationals also to be U.S. citizens. Moreover, he assured the Court, recognizing Puerto 
Ricans as U.S. citizens would not hamper U.S. imperial designs. U.S. women and people 
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of color, he explained, possessed a U.S. citizenship similar to the status that other empires 
bestowed upon their subordinated peoples.  
Coudert discussed the status of Puerto Ricans in the United States by comparing 
the United States to France and England and Puerto Ricans to Europe’s colonial subjects, 
free U.S. blacks, American Indians, women, and children. Significantly, he did not cast 
Puerto Ricans as white men who deserved full membership in the U.S. political 
community. Instead, he construed U.S. citizenship narrowly. By extending that status to 
its newly acquired peoples, he argued, the United States would both continue the practice 
that it followed in states and incorporated territories and follow the example of other 
imperial powers that had found it convenient and natural to grant women and minorities 
narrow forms of membership. 
Turning to case law, Coudert portrayed a U.S. citizenship which generally 
accompanied U.S. nationality and that, similar to nationality in other empires, was 
widespread and minimal in its content. He chose cases in which the Court affirmed that 
men and women born within U.S. jurisdictions were U.S. citizens whatever their sex, 
race, or ethnicity. In the same cases, the Court had eviscerated those aspects of the 14th 
Amendment that implied a substantial array of rights entailed by U.S. citizenship. The 
Slaughter-House Cases (1873) virtually nullified the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 
Minor v. Happersett (1875), a case about women’s suffrage, eliminated voting as a 
potential federal-citizenship right. Striking a federal anti-race-discrimination law, the 
Court forbade Congress to regulate private action under the 14th Amendment in the Civil 
Rights Cases (1883). Wong Wing v. United States (1896) confirmed that the U.S. 
Constitution guaranteed some individual rights for all people, but offered few protections 
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specifically to U.S. citizens. Coudert did not have to add that in Plessy v. Ferguson 
(1896) and Giles v. Harris (1903) the Court had blocked the invocation of the 14th 
Amendment as a tool against what litigants had respectively portrayed as “caste” 
distinctions and intentional black disfranchisement. By late 1903, the U.S. Constitution, 
as interpreted by the Court, both distributed U.S. citizenship widely and attached slim 
protections to federal status. U.S. citizens had to look to their states for the balance of 
their rights. When U.S. women and people of color complained that their states denied 
them such rights, the Court declared itself impotent.199 
The problem that the Gonzalez case raised, Coudert contended, was how to adapt 
the postbellum jurisprudence of U.S. citizenship—itself adapted to the challenges of 
“expansion and assimilation” posed by recent acquisitions—to a new problem: U.S. 
“imperialism, i.e., the domination over men of one order or kind of civilization, by men 
of a different and higher civilization.” To make this distinction between earlier expansion 
and the new imperialism, Coudert relied upon myths of a vacant West and Southwest. 
Prior territories, he claimed, had only contained American Indians who did “not long 
survive contact with civilization” and an “insignificant…number” of people “largely of 
Caucasian race and civilization” whom the U.S. nation had integrated. Puerto Rico, by 
contrast, had a large, stable population. If previously migration to the frontier had “soon 
made the new lands thoroughly American,” neither “extermination” nor “assimilation” 
would solve “the problem of to-day.”200  
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Coudert rejected placing Puerto Ricans in the “seemingly paradoxical legal 
category of ‘American Aliens.’” He explained that doing so would make outsiders of 
residents of domestic territory. Under British common law that U.S. courts had long 
respected, he argued, transfers of legal allegiance like that effected by the Treaty of Paris 
automatically also transferred subjection. Moreover, because Puerto Rico was part of the 
United States under international law, holding against Gonzalez “would declare the law 
of the United States, as expounded by its highest tribunal, to be that there exists under the 
jurisdiction of the United States a large class of persons who are strangers and aliens here 
and in every other nation of the globe.”201 
So what to do with a people the nation would not assimilate, exterminate, or 
exclude? The Court, he suggested, could synthesize U.S. jurisprudence on citizens of 
color with sister empires’ treatments of colonized peoples. Doctrines limiting the claims 
of U.S. blacks, American Indians, and women, among others, could serve as a model for 
the legal status of residents of the newly acquired territories: grant citizenship, but 
withhold rights.202 
In its citizenship jurisprudence, Coudert contended, the Court had inadvertently 
paralleled the practices of other empire-states, notably France. France’s approach to 
status helped Coudert delineate what he took to be the central confusion in the case: a 
failure to distinguish tiers of citizenship and subjection. In France, “the holder of political 
rights or privileges in a State” was an “active citizen[],” the status to which the word 
“citizen” referred in normal U.S. discourse. By contrast, U.S. law recognized as U.S. 
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citizens nearly all U.S. nationals regardless of political rights: women, children, and 
blacks. Coudert explained that France had also always recognized the French nationality 
of its subordinate peoples, be they minors, married women, “Cochin” Chinese, 
“Taïti[ans],” or Algerians. It had then divided these peoples into two groups. People 
“such as minors, women and incompetents” were “passive citizens,” a status identical 
with “subjection at common law” and carrying “full civil but no political rights.” 
“[U]ncivilized or semicivilized tribes or people who become wholly subject to [French] 
jurisdiction” were called “subjects” and enjoyed neither French political nor civil rights; 
in matters of private law they were “left under their own rules and customs.” Thus, 
though French citizens and subjects in Coudert’s rendering differed in the types of 
private-law rights they enjoyed—the civil rights of the French nation or the traditional 
private-law rights of their locale—all French nationals enjoyed some form of private-law 
protection. U.S. citizenship, much less U.S. nationality, did not guarantee its holders such 
private-law protections. Access to federal courts aside, the U.S. Supreme Court had held 
that most rights deemed civil and popularly thought to attach to citizenship came through 
state law and state citizenship and could only be vindicated at the state level. Thus, the 
Court had three options: declare Puerto Ricans to be aliens, recognize an intermediate 
status between alien and citizen, or follow a model even more flexible than those of other 
great powers and grant Puerto Ricans a rights-poor U.S. citizenship.203 
 Coudert argued that the Court had to choose between deeming Gonzalez a mere 
U.S. subject or judging her to be a U.S. citizen, but assured the justices that neither option 
would guarantee her full political or civil rights. Dred Scott v. Sanford (1857), he 
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reminded them, had held that free blacks were not U.S. citizens, and yet were also “not 
aliens but American nationals or subjects because their allegiance, complete and absolute 
was owing to the United States.” Elk v. Wilkins (1884) had been to the same effect for 
American Indians who took up residence among white U.S. citizens. In both cases, U.S. 
history and democracy had repudiated the Court: the Civil War and the 14th Amendment 
undid Dred Scott, and the congressional Dawes Act (1887) reversed Elk. To create anew 
“a situation in which citizenship and subjection were not identical,” Coudert argued, 
would betray “the spirit of our Constitution[] and the jurisprudence of this Court” and 
depend upon “the two precedents in history of which we are least proud.” Luckily, he 
reasoned, there was no need to make subjects anew. There already was a status in U.S. 
law that the Court had adapted to the needs of U.S. imperialism: U.S. citizenship. 
Because the Court had already drained much of the content from U.S. citizenship, the 
justices did not have to deny it to Puerto Ricans. They could thus facilitate the project of 
imperialism while avoiding historical censure for repeating Dred Scott.204 
In his amicus brief to the U.S. Supreme Court, Federico Degetau took a 
dramatically different approach from that of Coudert. Degetau, a former Spanish citizen, 
associated his island with markings of male honor like economic self-sufficiency, martial 
experience, and exercise of political and civil rights. Reinterpreting rather than rejecting 
colonial and expansionist precedents, he drew imperial and cross-cultural comparisons. 
He did not seek “passive” U.S. citizenship akin to that enjoyed by women and people of 
color, nor did he seek to gain active citizenship for other colonized and marginalized 
people. Instead, he claimed—for Puerto Ricans like himself—a robust U.S. citizenship 
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associated with white men, civilization, economic, legal, and political opportunities, and 
military and tax obligations.205 
A key to this argument was the contention that Puerto Ricans were not “natives” 
in the colonial sense. The Treaty of Paris might vest Congress with discretion to 
determine the citizenship status of “native inhabitants” of Spain’s former possessions, he 
admitted. But he argued that these encompassed “the uncivilized tribes of the Philippine 
Islands” and not “Spanish citizens born in Porto Rico.” Just as some Cuban 
representatives had done during their constitutional convention the year before, Degetau 
portrayed liberties that existed under Spanish rule as both indicative of islanders’ capacity 
and as a baseline below which no new government should fall. Puerto Ricans, he 
contended, had enjoyed such rights as representation in the national legislature, national 
citizenship accompanied by constitutional protections, “the same honors and prerogatives 
as the native-born in Castille,” and broad autonomy. Even after U.S. annexation of Puerto 
Rico, Spain let returning Puerto Ricans be Spanish military officers, embassy officials, 
and Senators.206 
This attempt to conflate the status of those Puerto Ricans born in continental 
Spain with those born on the island tracked a goal that predominantly island-born 
Autonomistas had long pursued but not achieved during Spanish rule. The distinction 
between the two groups had persisted throughout negotiations over the Treaty of Paris. 
Though Degetau, then too an elected Puerto Rican representative, had sought to be heard, 
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Spain had negotiated unilaterally with the United States. Neither treating party had 
recognized rights of Puerto Ricans to participate. The resultant agreement reproduced the 
birthplace distinction, giving colonists born in continental Spain but not those born in the 
colonies the option to retain their Spanish nationality. By ignoring this history in 
construing the Treaty, Degetau aimed to position Puerto Rico favorably within the 
broader context of historical U.S. expansion. Claiming that Puerto Ricans differed from 
Filipino “tribes,” “Mongolians,” and the “uncivilized native tribes [of] Alaska,” he 
indicated that Puerto Ricans resembled the French and Mexicans who had been 
incorporated into U.S. citizenship in earlier U.S. cessions. He did not, of course, mention 
his efforts to enroll and support Puerto Rican students at such schools serving American 
Indians and U.S. blacks as Carlisle and Tuskegee.207  
The United States, Degetau admonished, was tardy in extending appropriate 
treatment to his traditionally rights-bearing, self-governing people. Though Puerto Ricans 
shared with American Indians simultaneous struggles to define the status of their people 
and their land and imperfect accesses to dual status as U.S. citizens and distinct peoples, 
Degetau stressed differences in how the United States approached the two groups. Under 
U.S. naturalization laws, which required that applicants renounce allegiance to a foreign 
sovereign, Puerto Ricans could not become U.S. citizens. But tribal American Indians 
could renounce tribal allegiances and become U.S. citizens. Because Congress had not 
organized Puerto Rico “with the separate national character accorded to some Indian 
Tribes,” he explained, the United States provided less access to U.S. citizenship to Puerto 
Ricans than to American Indians. Moreover, on the mainland the U.S. Civil Service 
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Commission and West Point equivocated over participation by Puerto Ricans, and Puerto 
Rican voting rights varied by jurisdiction. But it was not too late. He noted that the 
United States had made advances toward treating Puerto Ricans—especially Puerto Rican 
men—like U.S. citizens. They paid U.S. taxes, swore allegiance to the U.S. Constitution 
and laws, elected a non-voting delegate to the House of Representatives, and were 
Americans and citizens of a U.S. territory. Now, the Court could redeem U.S. democratic 
traditions.208 
Degetau also sought to distinguish the active Puerto Rican citizenry from Cubans 
and Filipinos by describing the differences between what “was asked by the American 
Government of the inhabitants” of each locale. Using language that could have described 
a marriage contract, he recounted that President William McKinley had instructed the 
Secretary of War in 1898 that Cubans were to grant their “honest submission” to receive 
from the United States “support and protection.” Under a different presidential 
instruction, he continued, Filipinos swore to “recognize and accept the supreme authority 
of the United States.” Here, the relationship that he described sounded like that of child to 
parent. By contrast, he claimed, Puerto Ricans had become U.S. citizens as a result of 
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military orders ratified by Congress. In line with military rules, 1,100 prospective Puerto 
Rican officeholders (including Degetau) had renounced their allegiance to Spain and 
agreed to “support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies 
home or foreign.” This, Degetau claimed, effected “a plain renunciation of all foreign 
allegiance and an explicit acceptance of the duties of citizenship.” The oath invoked male 
realms of political rights and participation by speaking of defending the nation from 
foreign enemies, occupying political office, and upholding the U.S. Constitution. Taken 
together, Degetau’s comparisons implied that Cuba agreed to receive protection from the 
United States like a wife; the Philippines accepted the authority of the United States like 
a child; Puerto Rico swore allegiance to and took up the defense of the United States, like 
a man.209 
Degetau portrayed a population actively and naturally blending into the United 
States against which barriers to citizenship seemed out of place. Under the Foraker Act, 
he related, mainlanders resident in Puerto Rico, along with all Puerto Ricans, constituted 
a single body politic—the people of Puerto Rico. Since mainlanders retained their U.S. 
citizenship while becoming Puerto Rican, which he treated as equivalent to becoming a 
citizen of Puerto Rico, Puerto Rican citizenship could not be an alternative to U.S. 
citizenship. Thus, Degetau argued, Puerto Rican citizenship was territorial citizenship, 
coexisting with the U.S. citizenship that the 14th Amendment guaranteed to all those born 
within the U.S. nation. Focusing on fields dominated by men, Degetau also illustrated 
how Puerto Ricans needed U.S. citizenship to exercise autonomy and control within 
business and law. Without U.S. citizenship, U.S. policy nationalizing Puerto Rican 
                                                 
209 Amicus Brief, Gonzales, 25-26 (quoting Degetau’s own certificate); Foraker Act, Statutes at Large 31 
(12 Apr. 1900): 77. 
 171 
vessels would cripple the industry—another law required such vessels to be owned and 
commanded by U.S. citizens. Non-citizens could not be bank directors or prosecute 
actions in the Court of Claims. Although the Foraker Act indicated that Puerto Rico 
ought to benefit from most U.S. laws, many statutes applied only to U.S. citizens. 
Degetau’s arguments implicitly asked the court to consider him, an accomplished civil 
servant, rather than Gonzalez, an unmarried mother, as the model for Puerto Rican 
citizenship. He closed on a personal note, which reprised one his earlier gambits in 
pursuit of U.S. citizenship. “If I were an alien, I could not have attained the highest honor 
in my professional career, that of taking, as a member of the bar of this Honorable Court, 
the oath to maintain the Constitution of the United States, this oath being incompatible 
with allegiance to any other power.” 210 
 By the time the Court held oral arguments on December 4, 1903, the issue had 
shifted from whether Puerto Ricans were aliens to what non-alien status they held. 
According to one observer, Solicitor General Henry Hoyt argued that Degetau had only 
“been admitted by the courtesy of the” Court to its bar. Chief Justice Melville Fuller 
disagreed. “[T]he Commissioner,” the observer recalled him saying, “was there by right.” 
When Hoyt then “confessed that it was not possible to establish [a] line of distinction” 
between Degetau’s and Gonzalez’s status, the observer continued, Hoyt all but 
conceded.211 
Degetau’s well-honed performance as a cultured, white Puerto Rican gentleman 
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was thus largely successful. The justices were willing to consider that someone like 
Degetau could be a U.S. citizen, or something similar. Yet they also knew that more than 
Degetau’s individual status was at stake. As all parties in the case appeared to agree, 
Puerto Ricans and most likely Filipinos held a common status under U.S. law. If Degetau 
were a U.S. citizen, then Gonzalez and likely very many Filipinos were U.S. citizens too. 
Coudert, in his oral arguments, faced resistance concerning his portrayals of the 
statuses other than alienage that the Court could accord Puerto Ricans. A key source of 
that resistance was a justice who had not taken part in the 1901 Insular Cases, the Court’s 
most junior member, William Day, who had accrued his experience with U.S. empire and 
law as Secretary of State in the late 1890s and as lead U.S. negotiator for the Treaty of 
Paris. His objection came when Coudert described a choice between reprising Dred Scott 
by creating U.S. subjects and extending Puerto Ricans a U.S. citizenship with minimal 
content: 
Mr. Coudert: …there have been two instances…in which subjection or nationality 
and citizenship were not determined by the same tests…. 
Justice Day: Would not ‘allegiance’ be a better word than ‘subjection’ there? 
Mr. Coudert: Well, I use the world ‘subjection’ because it is the common-law 
term…. 
Justice Day: You will probably not find that term in any American discussion of 
the relations between the people of either the United States or its territories. 
Mr. Coudert: [T]he Attorney-General at this bar stated that…these persons were 
American subjects;…perhaps it would be more proper to have called them 
liegemen…. 
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Justice Day: I prefer that term to the other.212 
Rather than affirm Puerto Rican alienage or grant Puerto Ricans broad U.S. citizenship 
rights, Day proposed a term intermediate to “alien” and “citizen”—“liegemen”—that did 
not carry what Coudert had portrayed as the monarchical implications of “subject” and its 
associations with Dred Scott. Day apparently wanted to decline Coudert’s proposal that 
the Court recognize a relatively modest version of U.S. citizenship and thereby avoid 
creating U.S. subjects or new rights for Puerto Ricans. Though Day was reluctant to 
acknowledge explicitly that the Court had drained much meaning from U.S. citizenship, 
that did not mean he had qualms about U.S. treatment of women, people of color, or 
colonized peoples. In Downes, for instance, Justice White had depicted U.S. citizenship 
as a status rich in rights without addressing the ways that unequal U.S. treatment of 
women and people of color appeared to belie that claim. Coudert forged ahead. 
Functionally, he reiterated, it did not matter whether Puerto Ricans were “liegemen, 
nationals or subjects, all of which terms are absolutely identical as far as the law is 
concerned.” The Court, he insisted, had to choose: reintroduce “subjects” into U.S. law or 
extend Puerto Ricans U.S. citizenship.213 
On January 4, 1904, Chief Justice Fuller announced the unanimous holding of the 
Court: “[W]e…cannot concede…that the word ‘alien,’ as used in the [immigration] act of 
1891, embraces the citizens of Porto Rico.” Reviewing U.S. law he explained that the 
United States had made “[t]he nationality of the island…American” and integrated Puerto 
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the idea of U.S. non-citizen nationals. 
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Rico into the United States. In Puerto Rico, the United States had created a civil 
government with heads named by the U.S. President; implemented congressional 
oversight; established a U.S. district court; run judicial process in the name of the U.S. 
President; nationalized Puerto Rican vessels; and put most U.S. statutes into force. This 
was a modest victory for Puerto Ricans. It struck down the Treasury guideline under 
which Gonzalez had been held. It did not, however, address congressional power to 
regulate the movement of Puerto Ricans from the island to the mainland. As to whether 
Puerto Ricans were U.S. citizens, nationals, subjects, or liegemen, Fuller wrote: “We are 
not required to discuss…the contention of Gonzales’s counsel that the cession of Porto 
Rico accomplished the naturalization of its people; or that of Commissioner Degetau, in 
his excellent argument.” This strategic silence solved Justice Day’s dilemma and united 
the Court. While refraining from interfering with congressional and administrative 
control of new territorial acquisitions, justices also declined the choice between either 
reprising Dred Scott by reintroducing “subjects” into U.S. law or acknowledging that 
U.S. citizenship now carried very few rights. The decision avoided openly contradicting 
the widely held belief that U.S. citizenship and U.S. nationality were coextensive, but left 
Congress and administrators room for maneuver in the control of new territorial 
acquisitions. As in Downes v. Bidwell, vagueness proved valuable as the Court sought to 
accommodate U.S. empire and constitutional democracy.214 
 
“[N]either Americans nor foreigners”: Law and Politics after Gonzales, 1904-1905 
 Like the Treaty of Paris, the Foraker Act, and the Insular Cases before it, 
Gonzales v. Williams (1904) altered the legal, social, and political landscape for Puerto 
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Ricans. Isabel Gonzalez and Domingo Collazo struggled, in its wake, with the damage it 
had done to their honor through its failure to recognize Puerto Ricans as U.S. citizens. 
Federico Degetau faced a choice: construe the ruling as the result of his failure to frame a 
sufficiently focused test case or concede that courts were not the best institution from 
which to win U.S. citizenship for Puerto Ricans. Island politicians who had already 
concluded the latter had another decision to make: would cooperation or confrontation 
bring more liberal U.S. policies in Puerto Rico? 
 Aware that the events of Gonzales v. Williams (1904) had denied that Gonzalez 
was a dependant woman—either as a wife or as a relative to be taken in by Collazo as an 
independent man—she and Collazo tried to undo and rework the dishonorable reversals 
that U.S. officials had imposed on them. Newspaper reports described Gonzalez as one 
who “had come here in search of a man who had promised to marry her and had failed to 
keep his promise.” Collazo recalled that immigration inspectors had presumed he would 
not fulfill his patriarchal and honorable obligations of support of dependent, female 
relations. “Isabella Gonzalez, a niece of my wife,” he wrote, “was forbidden to land,” by 
inspectors, “the reason alleged being that she was . . . liable to become a public charge.” 
Both sought to set the record straight. On the day of the Court’s ruling, one of Gonzalez’s 
lawyers, Orrel Parker, told the New York Times of her matrimony and consequent change 
in status. Her honor, it was thus revealed, had been restored. Rebutting inspectors’ 
conclusions in a letter to the New York Times, Collazo identified his niece as the 
presumptively married “Mrs. Gonzalez” and explained that the inspectors’ decision came 
“notwithstanding my guaranteed assurances of her support as a member of my family.” 
But Gonzalez also sought to benefit from a self-portrayal similar to the one U.S. officials 
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had imposed on her. Signing a letter to Degetau with her maiden name and mentioning 
her “mother” but no father, she asked Degetau to become the symbolic head of her needy, 
presumably female household. Any money he offered, she indicated, would go to female 
education, a “charitable errand” that was a longstanding cause of his. “One reason I came 
to the United States,” she wrote, “was for the education of a little sister who I today have 
by my side and who I would like to place in one of these colleges of poor students in 
which many of our countrymen are placed.” Gonzalez deployed a complicated mix of 
concepts of independence and dependence. Seeking male protection, she sought to win 
her sister an education that would promote her economic independence. Gonzalez’s 
dependence upon Degetau, in turn, implicitly rested on an absence of husbands and 
fathers.215  
 For Republicanos like Manuel Rossy, Gonzales was primarily evidence that 
Degetau’s judicial strategy had been misguided. It “did not interest opinion,” he related, 
“because everyone expected what occurred.” “If the Supreme Court could make U.S. 
citizens of the inhabitants of a country based just on . . . annexation,” Rossy reasoned, the 
United States “would have to concede citizenship to whatever upstart or enemy that it 
happened to annex.” This, he claimed, would mean that the United States “would not 
form a true nation, because germs destructive of its sovereignty would arise within in.” 
Instead, he claimed, citizenship would only come by federal statute. Some prominent 
Republican lawmakers already supported such a measure, and the Republican caucus in 
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Washington had made Degetau a member. If pursued, Rossy implied, an alliance with 
Republicans would help Republicanos make progress toward U.S. citizenship and 
potentially even eventual U.S. statehood. Thus, he reported, he and other Republicanos 
had formalized plans to select and send delegates to the 1904 Republican National 
Convention.216 
Degetau was not deterred. True, he had to delay his article on Puerto Rican 
statehood for the Independent. But as an opposition newspaper reported, he embraced the 
Gonzales decision, viewing it as “a stepping stone to a more decided recognition of the 
rights of Puerto Ricans in the United States.” On January 9 Degetau launched a new 
action, writing the Board of Election Commissioners in Chicago about the voting rights 
of Puerto Ricans. Five days later an attorney for the board, William Wheelock, told 
Degetau that “a couple of Porto Ricans applied to be registered as voters” recently. They 
had claimed that U.S. annexation of Puerto Rico made them U.S. citizens eligible to vote 
in Chicago. Based upon the lower-court decision in Gonzales v. Williams, “I held that 
they were not voters,” Wheelock explained. Sending Wheelock his Amicus Brief in 
Gonzales and that decision, Degetau asked him to reconsider.217 
While awaiting Wheelock’s reply, Degetau won floor privileges, though still no 
vote, in the House of Representatives. Because the Senate refused to act, he also 
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remained a Resident Commissioner. There was, in his words, a new “peculiar 
indefiniteness of the status” he thus held, “in the language of the law, only a ‘Resident 
Commissioner’” yet “‘with functions similar to those of a Delegate.” Using his new 
powers to seek clarification of the status of all Puerto Ricans, he introduced a bill asking 
Congress to “expressly declare” islanders “to be citizens of the United States.”218 
Two weeks later, a new test case on the citizenship status of Puerto Ricans took 
shape when Juan Rodríguez, a nineteen-year-old native of Puerto Rico, requested that the 
Board of Labor Employment at the United States Navy Yard register him as a candidate 
for possible employment. Because navy-yard rules stated that “[n]o applicant will be 
registered unless he furnished satisfactory evidence that he is a citizen of the United 
States,” his application appeared to raise the question that the Gonzales Court had 
avoided. Some months earlier, President Roosevelt had tried to avoid such problems by 
declaring that applicants “who show[] birth or naturalization in Porto Rico will not be 
required to show further evidence of citizenship.” Yet, as government lawyers would 
soon argue, Roosevelt’s rule could be read to encompass only a subset of federal jobs and 
not that for which Rodríguez had applied. The matter reached the Assistant Secretary of 
the Navy, who concluded “that as Mr. Rodríguez is not a citizen of the United States he is 
not eligible for registration.” Two days later the Board denied Rodríguez’s application.219 
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On February 23, Wheelock wrote Degetau that upon reconsideration he had 
affirmed his judgment that Puerto Ricans were not U.S. citizens eligible to vote in 
Chicago. He dismissed Gonzales as having “carefully avoid[ed]” “[t]he question of 
citizenship.” Annexation could not naturalize islanders, he wrote, because Downes v. 
Bidwell (1901) held “that power to acquire territory by treaty implies . . . power . . . to 
prescribe . . . what [its inhabitants’] status shall be.” As then-Secretary of War Elihu Root 
had appeared to do during U.S. military governance of Puerto Rico, Wheelock defined 
Puerto Rico as outside the United States, hence unaffected by 14th Amendment insistence 
on U.S. citizenship for “all persons born or naturalized” there. And like Frederic Coudert 
in 1903, he read the Treaty of Paris to reserve determination of the political status of 
islanders to Congress. Treating U.S. citizenship for Filipinos as reductio ad absurdum and 
arguing that Filipinos and Puerto Ricans likely held the same status under their respective 
organic acts, Wheelock concluded that neither act naturalized. To what he described as 
Degetau’s claim that Puerto Ricans “are citizens of the United States” because they “had 
a right to vote for you” as “Resident Commissioner . . . to Washington,” he replied that 
citizenship was not always a prerequisite to voting and that Chicago repeatedly denied 
the franchise to people accustomed to voting elsewhere. When Degetau then sought the 
identities of the rejected Puerto Rican applicants who now appeared to be potential test-
case litigants, Wheelock informed him that “as is the rule in such cases [of refused 
registrations] neither their names nor address were kept.”220 
 Rodríguez’s rejected application for navy-yard employment thus became 
Degetau’s most promising test case, and he reunited with Jean des Garennes, the U.S.-
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citizen counsel for the French Embassy, to take it. Degetau and des Garennes had earlier 
collaborated during Degetau’s passport challenge, at which time Degetau had described 
to President Roosevelt a civil-service decision that classified Puerto Ricans as U.S. 
citizens. When Degetau got in touch with George Leadley, lately Chief of the Civil 
Service Record Division, for confirmation, however, he learned that only one civil-
service commissioner had “prepared an opinion to the effect that the natives of Porto 
Rico were citizens of the United States, in the International sense.” “[T]he other two 
Commissioners [had] dissented,” Leadley reported on March 29, and “[t]he opinion was 
never published.” Soon thereafter, Degetau and des Garennes filed their Petition for 
Mandamus asking the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia to compel the navy-
yard board to register Rodríguez.221 
As Rodríguez’s case kept Degetau in Washington through April and May and into 
June, Republicanos in Puerto Rico prepared for the November election and moved ever 
closer to a merger with U.S. Republicans. On April 25, leaders met in Ponce to elect 
delegates for the Republican National Convention. An attendee told Degetau that R. H. 
Todd, the Mayor of San Juan, aspired to be Resident Commissioner, as did Mateo 
Fajardo, the Mayor of Mayagüez who had joined Domingo Collazo on the Puerto Rican 
Commission during the U.S. invasion and now advocated Republicano integration with 
U.S. Republicans. But opinion in Ponce, the attendee reassured Degetau, held that neither 
could do the job as well as Degetau. On May 30, Degetau wrote Representative Joseph 
Babcock of Wisconsin to decline membership in a committee of the Republican Caucus. 
“I did not deem it entirely consistent . . . to take a side in the internal differences of our 
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national political parties” he explained, “so long as I was not recognized as a citizen of 
the United States, and was called ‘Resident Commissioner.’” A week and a half later 
Degetau, des Garennes, and Navy Yard officials stipulated that Rodríguez was a citizen 
of Puerto Rico, leaving it to the judge to decide whether such citizens were qualified for 
registration. As Degetau left for Puerto Rico, Republicano delegates arrived at the 
Republican National Convention. They secured two votes there, the same as Hawai‘i and 
the Philippines, and on June 21 proposed—but did not win—a platform plank favoring 
U.S. citizenship and territorial government for the island.222 
 After reaching San Juan on June 24, Degetau campaigned on his judicial strategy. 
Opposition newspaper La Democracia predicted that his July 9 speech in San Juan on the 
“political status of the island and its inhabitants before the legislative, executive, and 
judicial departments of the United States” “will be less a lecture than a political 
document.” Two and a half weeks later, it described Degetau’s well-attended Ponce talk 
on “the status of Puerto Rico,” in which he argued “that the Supreme Court in 
Washington had to determine it.” Like many Republicanos, La Democracia disagreed: 
“Few share this opinion” of Degetau’s, it reported, for many “express the view that it is 
the National Congress that can and should take action concerning American 
citizenship.”223  
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 Though La Democracia joined Mateo Fajardo, Degetau’s opponent for the 
Republicano nomination for Resident Commissioner, in favoring a political strategy over 
a judicial one, it rejected Fajardo’s plan to influence Congress from within the U.S. 
Republican Party. Ridiculing Fajardo’s praise of U.S. efforts on behalf of island health 
and prosperity, the newspaper labeled him a “Little Candidate[]” who, it implied, had a 
misplaced faith in U.S. good intentions. Instead, La Democracia advocated a more 
confrontational approach, frequently looking to the experiences of other groups that 
struggled for autonomy from intermediate positions in the global order. In some cases 
this meant Mormons, Cubans, or Boers, all groups that included members who saw their 
groups as racially superior to at least some other communities and that sought autonomy 
from a U.S. or British empire-state that perceived them as racial or moral inferiors.224 
 But in 1904, with Japanese victories in its war with Russia mounting, it was that 
island nation that became the newspaper’s key referent. As a country that once “did not 
figure among the civilized nations,” La Democracia related, “Japan has realized a work 
that justly astonishes and that is the admiration of all Europe,” becoming the first race to 
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challenge global dominance by whites. Because the “superiority of the white race above 
the red and black was never doubtful,” the newspaper explained, the Russo-Japanese 
“conflict of races” involving the “highly civilized” “yellow man” would establish 
whether, in the words of liberal-Zionist Max Nordau, “our [white] race” is “really 
supreme” or “we will have to recognize the yellows as our equals and resign ourselves to 
share the world with them.” As Japan scored major early victories, the newspaper 
trumpeted that “fear of a final disaster grows daily” among the Russians who once 
“contemptuously called the [Japanese] monkeys.”225  
Japanese successes were a thrilling, unsettling development for La Democracia. 
Perhaps, the newspaper worried, Puerto Rico resembled Korea. “Japanese generals 
devastated” that peninsula in the 16th century “as the Spanish did in America,” it wrote. 
“By its geographic situation, Korea is destined to have an important role in the commerce 
of Asia,” the newspaper added, echoing an oft-expressed sentiment about the place of 
Puerto Rico in the Americas. And with a logic many applied to the United States, it wrote 
that as “an industrial, producer country,” Japan “need[ed] new and large markets” and 
would not let a “rival seize such an important territory” within its sphere of influence. But 
Puerto Rico could also hope to become Japan. Tobacco—a leading Puerto Rican 
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industry—was also a major crop in Japan, the newspaper claimed. Some Puerto Ricans 
saw their island as having escaped from rule by a decadent Spanish Empire and to rule by 
a modern, rising, and coercive U.S. power from which they now sought self-government. 
Japan, the newspaper indicated, was merely one step ahead. “Two centuries of lethargy” 
there had preceded militarily coerced concessions to western powers, the newspaper 
related, which had only recently ended with “Restoration of the Mikado Power.” Though 
Japan outstripped Puerto Rico militarily, the Japanese insisted that they not be measured 
“as a fighting people only.” Just as many Puerto Ricans envisioned their island making 
moral and intellectual progress if given the chance, a Japanese official, according to La 
Democracia, claimed, “We aspire to be a nation” “at the head . . . of all manifestations of 
human knowledge” without “help from any power” beyond “the justice and moral 
support Japan has the right to demand of the world.” The newspaper did not specify 
whether the Japanese example gave Puerto Ricans hope as a second non-white people 
with the potential to be the equals of European peoples or because as a white people the 
success of non-white Japanese was a fortiori proof that Puerto Ricans could similarly 
thrive.226 
 For Republicanos unhappy with their lack of power in their party and opposed to 
integration with U.S. Republicans, the Federales’ celebration of confrontation could be 
appealing. Memories among island-born politicians of resentment over prior Spanish 
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unwillingness to make government posts on the island available to Puerto Ricans 
remained fresh. Thus, Republicanos frustrated that their support of U.S. rule had not 
brought them good or better government posts were particularly susceptible to proposals 
to take harder lines with U.S. officials. To recruit such rivals, Luis Muñoz and other 
Federales had dissolved their party in early 1904 and formed a new Partido Unionista. 
Aspiring to represent all islanders favoring greater home rule, Unionistas declared 
themselves equally in favor of Puerto Rican statehood, autonomy, and, in a likely first for 
a major island party, independence. Critiquing Republicano faith in an alliance with U.S. 
Republicans, La Democracia reported that the U.S. “republican administration” acted 
“disgracefully,” making it “perhaps . . . necessary that the Democrats come to do us 
justice.” The strategy worked. On July 31, La Democracia reported, a “[L]ARGE 
ASSEMBLY” of “REPUBLICANOS . . . RAISED . . . THE FLAG OF THE <UNIÓN OF PUERTO 
RICO>” in Ponce. More Republicano defections followed. Unionistas also sought a boost 
from the growing organized-labor movement. In 1900, Santiago Iglesias’s Federación 
Libre had encompassed craft unions representing several thousand artisans in a handful of 
urban centers but few of the hundreds of thousands of agricultural workers who formed 
the bulk of island labor. Four years later, the Federación was building on enthusiasm 
generated by the visit of American Federation of Labor President Samuel Gompers to 
launch a campaign to organize rural workers. Exploiting Iglesias’s longstanding feud 
with Republicanos and prior working relationship with Muñoz in New York, Unionistas 
won his support—he began writing a regular column in La Democracia—and that of 
many of his followers.227  
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Unionista gains among Republicanos and organized laborers left Degetau in a 
weakened party with fewer members sympathetic to his opposition to a Republicano-
Republican alliance. When he nonetheless continued to seek re-nomination, La 
Democracia republished his campaign jeremiads against other Republicanos. In one, 
Degetau claimed that the Republican National Convention “put Puerto Rico . . . on the 
colonial basis” by giving Puerto Rico two votes like Hawai‘i and the Philippines rather 
than six votes like other U.S. territories. Even “Indian Territory,” Degetau asserted, 
which lacked the public schools, bridges, asylums, prisons, local courts, and half the 
inhabitants—“including . . . Indians”—of Puerto Rico, received six votes. By nonetheless 
seeking to join the Republican Party, Degetau argued, Republicanos like his rival Mateo 
Fajardo acted in ways “diametrically opposed to the principles to which we Puerto Rican 
Republicanos have sworn loyalty.” U.S. Republicans also pursued national policies 
“contrary” to “our Puerto Rican program,” he charged, by declaring in their platform, in 
implicit support of a “continuation of the present state of economic and political affairs,” 
that “‘[w]e have organized the government of Porto Rico, and its people now enjoy 
peace, freedom, order, and prosperity.’” Republicanos like Fajardo condoned such 
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oppression, Degetau implied, by declaring “that ‘before governing ourselves we should 
prove that we know how to do it.’” The choice for Republicanos in nominating a 
Resident Commissioner, he concluded, was between himself “fighting for our 
citizenship” and Fajardo’s cynical embrace of U.S. Republican colonialism. Several 
weeks later, Republicanos elected Fajardo.228  
 Back in New York in the summer and fall of 1904, Domingo Collazo used his 
connection to Gonzales v. Williams (1904) to propel himself into the pages of the New 
York Times, writing letters about the relationship between Puerto Rican status and 
mainland electoral politics. Contending that Puerto Ricans should be U.S. citizens and 
that Puerto Rico should be a traditional territory, he argued that a Democratic electoral 
victory was the best means to those ends. Gonzales v. Williams (1904) left islanders like 
amnesiacs “who have forgotten who they are,” he wrote, “[b]ecause, if they ceased to be 
Spanish citizens and have not been American[] citizens, what in the name of heaven have 
they been?” He told mainlanders that the ambiguity, was “arbitrary and flagrantly unjust” 
because “a Jamaican negro or an Italian from Calabria could reach the category of 
American citizens by means of naturalization” while Puerto Ricans who owe “actual 
allegiance to the very same flag” cannot. A new test case was not the answer, he added, 
for “unless . . . something extraordinary and unfor[]seen happens to enable the highest 
tribunal to settle the question,” the Supreme Court would let Puerto Rican citizenship 
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status “continue[] to be in suspense.”229 
Instead, Collazo suggested changing the status of Puerto Rico from one the courts 
had approved to one that faced legal objections. Currently, he wrote, Puerto Ricans were 
“legally ‘ruled’ as ‘colonies,’” which “invert[ed] the spirit of the American Constitution 
and inject[ed], by so doing, into the veins of the Republic the venom of autocratic laws.” 
Those with “inalienable American citizenship” lost rights in Puerto Rico, and U.S. 
national security suffered as “indignant natives” “deprived of . . . self-government” 
became a potential “source of vulnerability and weakness.” Collazo added that 
“Republican carpetbaggers” and their co-partisans claimed that were Puerto Rico to 
become an “integral part[] of the Union,” it would become constitutionally obliged to pay 
a proportional share of U.S. federal expenses that it could ill afford. But Collazo also 
believed that Congress could “waive [Puerto Rico] from the[se] duties.” Given that the 
United States had “imposed on Puerto Rico an exotic government . . . departing from the 
Constitution,” he wrote, it could also take the necessary steps “to bring the island a 
territorial government in consonance with the Constitution.” Like Unionistas and some 
Antillean revolutionaries in 1896, Collazo thus supported William Jennings Bryan as the 
Democratic candidate for President, predicting that Democratic victories would bring a 
law recognizing that Puerto Ricans have been U.S. citizens “since Jan. 1, 1899.”230  
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On November 8, Collazo’s and Degetau’s aspirations failed to materialize. 
Republican Theodore Roosevelt won reelection as U.S. President, Unionista Tulio 
Larrinaga became Resident Commissioner-elect, and Unionistas captured the House of 
Delegates.231 
 Though their case had ended and Degetau’s term would soon expire, he and Isabel 
Gonzalez continued their activism around U.S. citizenship in December 1904 and early 
1905. On December 12, the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia denied the 
demand of Degetau’s client, Juan Rodríguez, to be registered by the navy-yard board. 
Degetau, his co-counsel Jean des Garennes, and Rodríguez appealed.232 
 A month later Degetau appeared as a lame-duck Resident Commissioner on the 
floor of the House of Representatives, drawing on concepts of honor and natural law to 
advocate U.S. citizenship for Puerto Ricans. As “loyal[] Americans,” he contended, 
Puerto Ricans “have won our American citizenship.” By declining to resist invasion in 
implicit exchange for the “long-loved American institutions” and by offering service and 
loyalty after being promised U.S. citizenship, Degetau argued, islanders had “lawfully 
contracted” a “permanent tie” to the United States. Though “Porto Rican officers” also 
sympathized with the U.S. cause, he added, they had “heard the voice of their military 
honor” and “remained loyal to the flag that they had sworn to support.” Drawing on his 
earlier writings, Degetau asserted that island soldiers served a U.S. master equally well, a 
source of pride for Puerto Ricans “because we understand that we are American citizens.” 
But it would not be a source of “patriotic pride” “[i]f we were placed in an inferior civic 
condition” he related. Islanders valued “the sacred[] . . .civic duty . . . of maintaining and 
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232 “El señor Degetau,” La Democracia, 29 Nov. 1904, 2; Transcript of Record, Rodriguez, 8-10. 
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defending, with the other American citizens, the same ideal of justice articulated in the 
Constitution.”233 
 Degetau joined des Garennes to submit a mid-February 1905 brief in Rodríguez’s 
case, reprising Coudert’s earlier arguments on the approach of courts to U.S. citizenship 
for Puerto Ricans. In Gonzales, Degetau had largely presumed that Puerto Ricans were 
either aliens or citizens. In this view, in his and des Garennes’s words, Gonzales decided 
“the negative aspect of the question of citizenship, to-wit, that of ‘alienage,’” in 
Degetau’s favor. But, the men now implicitly acknowledged, the Court could still accept 
Coudert’s 1903 argument that Puerto Ricans were U.S. non-citizen nationals. In response 
they reminded the court that Congress had made most federal statutes applicable in 
Puerto Rico. Those statutes, they contended, included ones referring to U.S. citizens. In 
Gonzales, Degetau had inferred from this decision that Congress believed Puerto Ricans 
were not aliens. Now, he and des Garennes argued that because the statutes referred to 
U.S. citizens and “not . . . ‘nationals,’” the decision to apply them in Puerto Rico 
indicated a congressional belief that Puerto Ricans were not only U.S. nationals but also 
U.S. citizens. Noting that the Supreme Court had “declared that Porto Rico is a territory 
of the United States,” the men argued that Puerto Ricans were also U.S. citizens under a 
federal statute declaring “‘[a]ll persons born in the United States [with irrelevant 
exceptions] . . . to be citizens of the United States.’”234 
 Reading the Foraker Act to naturalize Puerto Ricans as well, Degetau and des 
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Garennes reprised took a Coudert-like turn to international law, positioning that 
jurisprudence and not the Insular Cases as an interpretive guide. They cited international-
law commentator Robert Phillimore and Supreme Court Justice and prominent 
constitutional-law commentator Thomas Cooley for the proposition that U.S. acquisition 
and incorporation of foreign territory transformed the people of such territory into U.S. 
citizens. They then indicated that the necessary incorporation was not that which Justice 
Edward White had found lacking in Downes v. Bidwell (1901). Rather they quoted an 
earlier High Court definition: “‘To incorporate means to form into a legal . . . body 
politic.’” Because the Foraker Act dictated “‘that the citizens of Porto Rico [and others] 
shall constitute a body politic’” shown to be within the United States by the federal 
requirement that its officers swear “‘to support the Constitution of the United States,’” 
they reasoned, the Act made U.S. citizens of Puerto Ricans.235  
Despite Degetau’s portrayals in Gonzales of Puerto Ricans as independent, 
militarily and legislatively experienced male citizens, he and des Garennes now deployed 
Coudert’s depiction of U.S. citizenship as widely distributed and relatively modest in its 
implications. Similar to Degetau’s 1899-1900 arguments, the men contended that the 
“middle ground” of being a “‘national[]’” but not a citizen “does not exist” under the 
U.S. “constitutional organization.” Unlike France or Spain, they wrote, “[o]ur 
constitution is not based on the principle of the sovereignty of the nation,” for it is “‘[w]e 
the people’” who “‘ordain and establish it.’” But universal citizenship did not mean 
universal rights, Degetau and des Garennes assured the Court, citing the “‘minors and 
married women’” who were citizens in the United States if not in France while insisting 
                                                 
235 Brief for Appellant, Rodriguez (quotes) (citing as the source of the quotation “Copeland v. Memphis A. 
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(italics altered in original); see above note 180. 
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“that political privileges are not essential to citizenship.”236 
 Degetau’s final status claims as Resident Commissioner proved unavailing. On 
March 4 Congress adjourned the 1903-1905 term, ending Degetau’s tenure as Resident 
Commissioner without making him a Delegate or Puerto Ricans U.S. citizens. Three days 
later the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia lifted a page from Gonzales and 
ruled for Rodríguez on non-citizenship grounds. President Roosevelt’s instructions that 
those demonstrating Puerto Rican citizenship “will not be required to show further 
evidence of citizenship,” it held, applied.237 
 Though she was still married and thus still a dependent, Isabel Gonzales, whose 
voice had been noticeably absent during the hearings and trials that had brought her and 
Degetau to the U.S. Supreme Court, now seized a public voice. Beginning in April 1905, 
she wrote to the New York Times that she did not view the Supreme Court ruling in her 
favor as a victory. “Gen. Miles went to Porto Rico to save us, and proclaimed to the wide 
winds his ‘liberating’ speech,” she wrote, but instead of U.S. citizenship Puerto Ricans 
got “the actual incongruous status—‘neither Americans nor foreigners,’ as it was 
vouchsafed by the United States Supreme Court apropos of my detention at Ellis Island 
for the crime of being an ‘alien.’” The romance between the United States and Puerto 
Rico in her tale implicitly ended in a rapto—a breach of promise—like that her brother 
had described to immigration officials in 1902. Having deceived Puerto Ricans out of one 
honorable status—Spanish citizenship—the United States was obliged to extend Puerto 
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Ricans a new honorable status—U.S. citizenship. But instead of meeting its obligation to 
Puerto Rico, the United States made the plight of the victim, Puerto Rico, into what 
Gonzalez now termed her “crime.” The island’s predicament became the basis of 
investigations into Gonzalez’s honor. In using this romantic metaphor to protest U.S. 
policies in Puerto Rico, Gonzalez did not seek a passive citizenship like that which 
Coudert described. Instead, she sought restoration of the “liberties and franchises” that 
constituted the active, male citizenship advocated by Degetau in her case. Her implicit 
claim: harmed like a woman, Puerto Rico ought to be recompensed like a man.238 
  
 In its decision in the case of Gonzales v. Williams on January 4, 1904, the 
Supreme Court “decided,” Domingo Collazo complained, “that it had not decided 
anything.” Ruling that Puerto Ricans were not aliens for purposes of the immigration law 
at issue, the justices explicitly declined to clarify whether Puerto Ricans were U.S. 
citizens. That narrow ruling let the Court avoid a hard choice: undercut U.S. imperial rule 
by equalizing the rights of peoples in new territories or reject what some saw as 14th 
Amendment insistence that all people born within U.S. jurisdiction and territorial 
sovereignty be U.S. citizens. Judicial vagueness, it appeared, would remain the doctrinal 
basis of choice for U.S. empire.239 
 The outcome in Gonzales helped shift Puerto Rican politics away from Degetau’s 
heretofore popular approach to status matters. Island leaders in 1904 increasingly saw 
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legislation and not judicial rulings as the most promising means to liberalization of U.S. 
rule in Puerto Rico. When Republicanos split over whether to pursue such legislation 
from within or outside the U.S. Republican Party, Federales, with their commitment to 
more confrontational approaches, saw an opening. Reorganizing as the Partido Unionista, 
they recruited organized workers and dissatisfied Republicanos under an inclusive 
platform seeking self-government through statehood, autonomy, or, in a likely first for a 
major island party, independence. The effort produced a Unionista coalition that would 
dominate island politics for two decades. 
 Unionista electoral victories brought the end of Degetau’s six-year-long, 
increasingly judicially oriented campaign to accrue and deploy expertise on U.S. law and 
institutions in pursuit of winning for Puerto Ricans the full benefits of membership in the 
U.S. Union as U.S. citizens, perhaps soon to be citizens of the U.S. state of Puerto Rico. 
By most measures the campaign failed. The United States had consolidated a colonial 
regime in Puerto Rico on Degetau’s watch. Neither Congress nor courts had recognized 
Puerto Ricans as U.S. citizens. And statehood seemed less likely in 1905 than it had in 
1899. Yet, with Unionistas now in power and Degetau out of office, partly as a result of 
the strategies that he had pursued, Puerto Rico found itself lacking its most fervent 
advocate both of U.S. citizenship for Puerto Ricans and of legal action as a means to 
advance their ends. 
Untethered from litigation and speaking in her own voice, Gonzalez wrote in 
1905 that the evasion by the Court in her case marked Puerto Ricans as inferior to “full-
fledged American citizens” and showed General Miles’s pledges on behalf of the United 
States to be “nothing but bitter mockery and waste paper.” Though she would reemerge 
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as a commentator on U.S.-Puerto Rican relations years later, it was her uncle, Domingo 
Collazo, whose activities soon after the Gonzales decision prefigured a growing role in 
the politics of Puerto Rican status. Having advocated Democratic partisan politics rather 
than test cases as the surest route forward for his island, Collazo, like the Unionistas, 
faced the challenge of articulating and pursuing a program to achieve their ends in the 
face of ongoing U.S. Republican popularity and power.240
                                                 







“THE FORGOTTEN ISLAND,” 1905-1909 
 
 Although they had asked the Supreme Court not to recognize Puerto Ricans as 
U.S. citizens in Gonzales v. Williams (1904), the Republican administration and its allies 
in later years warmed to the idea. They came to agree with the lawyers they had earlier 
opposed: recognition of Puerto Ricans as U.S. citizens would neither bring islanders 
rights nor hamper U.S. policy in the Philippines. Secretary of Puerto Rico Regis Post 
declared that U.S. citizenship would be a “perfectly empty gift.” It would neither threaten 
“any of our control” nor extend new rights to islanders, but would placate Puerto Ricans 
who “consider [non-citizenship] rather a slur on their honor.” Governor Winthrop and 
President Roosevelt backed the policy, as did the Senate Committee on Pacific Islands 
and Porto Rico. That committee contended that in 1900 U.S. citizenship for Puerto 
Ricans could have set a precedent that could “prove prejudicial to our interests in 
connection with legislation for the Philippines.” But with legislation having now been 
enacted for both archipelagos and the Supreme Court having offered guidance in the 
Insular Cases, the committee stated that “most of the questions which then gave rise to 
apprehension have [now] been solved.”241 
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 Puerto Rican labor leader Santiago Iglesias and American Federation of Labor 
President Samuel Gompers sought to maneuver this apparent momentum toward 
citizenship into protection of the rights of Puerto Ricans. The men deemphasized 
Gompers’s failures to secure recognition of all the rights that he sought for mainland 
workers. They also made little mention of Gompers’s especially modest efforts and 
progress on behalf of agricultural laborers who, like many in Puerto Rico, were people of 
color or Spanish speaking. Instead, the men depicted a national consensus in favor of 
extensive rights for U.S. worker-citizens. At the same time, Iglesias sought to draw on 
and extend recent political and organizational gains while improving working conditions 
for potential and existing constituents.242 
 Having established themselves as the dominant Puerto Rican electoral force, 
Muñoz and other Unionistas sought to translate their more confrontational approach to 
U.S.-Puerto Rican relations into steps toward fulfilling their campaign promises to win 
greater Puerto Rican self-government. Some advocated disrupting island governance to 
protest for greater home rule. Domingo Collazo, who had recently analyzed his niece’s 
Supreme Court case in mainland and island newspapers, proposed another approach. 
Despite being an ex-revolutionary typographer from a plebeian family who had no 
appreciable base of support on the island, Collazo offered himself as a liaison between 
Unionistas and the U.S. Democratic Party. This strange alliance, he argued, would help 
secure Puerto Rico incorporation into the United States and with the incorporation, self-
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government. But the alliance foundered on one central mismatch; though some U.S. 
Democrats expressed willingness to distinguish Puerto Ricans from the Filipions whom 
they presumed to be truly degraded, many Democratic Party politicians objected to 
Republican imperialism based upon beliefs that many overseas peoples were their racial 
inferiors. But even though some U.S. Democrats expressed willingness to distinguish 
Puerto Ricans from the Filipinos whom they presumed to be truly degraded, it would be 
difficult to ally with politicians whose objections to Republican imperialism were rooted 
in beliefs that many overseas peoples were their racial inferiors. 
 
Labor Rising? 1905-1906 
 After years as a politically isolated, urban craft union, Santiago Iglesias’s 
Federación Libre entered 1905 seeking to extend fresh gains: new agricultural unions, 
membership in a legislative majority, and a recent law mandating an eight-hour workday 
for government employees. Aware that the American Federation of Labor claimed a 
constitutional right to strike on the mainland, Iglesias and his colleagues gained 
Federation support for their claim to a U.S. citizenship carrying “the same rights and 
privileges possessed by the people of all other States.” In fact, Iglesias was overreaching 
here: he implied that U.S. citizenship would bring island workers new, valuable rights, 
but U.S. courts did not in fact recognize mainland workers’ asserted general right to 
strike. What citizenship promised islanders was the right to make claims to rights similar 
to the claims that mainland laborers made.243  
                                                 
243 Report of Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth Annual Convention of the American Federation of Labor 
Held at San Francisco, California, November 14 to 26 Inclusive, 1904 (Washington, D.C.: The Law 
Reporter Printing Company, 1904) [hereinafter 1904 Federation Report], 174 (Resolution No. 116) 
(quote), 135; Santiago Iglesias, Report on San Juan, P.R., in American Federationist, “What Our 
 199 
Iglesias also secured Federation support for his demand for greater powers for 
elected island legislators. In 1905, labor conditions were favorable for agricultural labor 
activism in the heavily sugar-producing regions of southern Puerto Rico. Sugar prices 
were up and island production of sugar was twice what it had been five years before. The 
fied worker were a dense and mobile population. They could migrate between plantations 
depending upon labor conditions; they were accustomed to and in a position to negotiate 
in term of wages; and they had access to the ports and cities where ideas circulated, 
people gathered, and island unions had traditionally formed. Density also created a key 
condition for solidarity and for a mass movement that could withstand at least some 
repression. For Iglesias, nearby Ponce meant that he had close at hand a branch of his 
labor organization, a means of communication, and access to state officials. Thus, in 
early March, Iglesias joined Ponce-area union representatives to petition sugar planters 
for higher wages, nine-hour workdays, and an end to child labor. Most employers in the 
area ignored the demands of Iglesias and his allies. Soon, Iglesias counted approximately 
14,000 workers on strike. Within days, Iglesias told the American Federation of Labor, 
insular police commanded by their gubernatorially appointed Chief were threatening, 
arresting, beating, shooting, and barring and disbanding meetings by “peaceful” 
strikers.244 
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For Federation President Samuel Gompers, the campaign to defend and protect 
strikers also offered a chance to advise Iglesias on pursuing and documenting complaints. 
On May 5, Gompers wrote Iglesias that he had told Puerto Rico Governor Beekman 
Winthrop about written charges of “criminal and brutal assault” by “insular police . . . 
violating [strikers’] right of free assemblage and free speech.” Over the next week, he 
informed Iglesias, he also complained to the Associated Press of anti-labor bias in its 
Puerto Rico coverage and published a response to one instance of such coverage in the 
Washington Star. Asking Iglesias for further evidence, including statements from others, 
Gompers stressed that he would “count upon the absolute reliability of any statements 
which you and others may make.” On May 15, Iglesias cabled Gompers that their effort 
“ends satisfactorily.” Most workers, he wrote, secured a 30% wage increase; six new 
unions had been formed.245 
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 In early 1906, as Iglesias had requested, Gompers lobbied in Washington for U.S. 
citizenship for Puerto Ricans. Both political parties in Puerto Rico supported the measure 
as did the Executive Council, the presidentially appointed upper legislative chamber in 
Puerto Rico. On January 4, 1906, Republican Senator Joseph Foraker of Ohio introduced 
a bill to naturalize the islanders en masse. Seeking to use U.S. foreign policy to nudge 
Congress into actions, President Roosevelt appointed Resident Commissioner Tulio 
Larrinaga to be a delegate to the Pan-American Congress, and then asked Foraker on 
March 25, 1906, that “the citizenship bill . . . pass . . . prior to [Larrinaga’s] going there.” 
In early April, Chairman of the House Committee on Insular Affairs Henry Cooper 
introduced a citizenship bill. By mid-May committees in both chambers had 
recommended passage.246 
 As U.S. lawmakers contemplated U.S. citizenship for Puerto Ricans, Iglesias and 
his colleagues assisted striking sugar workers in the northern Puerto Rican municipality 
of Arecibo. Though sugar prices fell that year, production increased by more than half. 
The Arecibo area matched the area around Ponce: high sugar production, a dense 
population of mobile workers, and home to an urban center of island officials, 
communications technologies, and several Federación Libre unions. Gompers also lent 
support, commending strikers, authorizing disbursement of strike-benefit funds, and 
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lobbying high officials in Puerto Rico on their behalf. When dozens of insular police 
arrived in Arecibo in May 1906, arrests, convictions, and shootings of strikers followed, 
resulting in one death. Gompers declared himself “shocked” by the “brutal manner” of 
the police that Iglesias described and convinced the Washington Star to publish copies of 
Iglesias’s complaints. On May 28 he presented the complaints to Roosevelt, who solicited 
a report from Governor Winthrop. Winthrop flatly denied the charges as “a series of 
falsities from beginning to end,” insisting that the “administration has not taken sides,” 
police were “impartial,” and “courts are honorable and just.” Gompers then told Iglesias 
that though “[I] am not now doubting your trustworthiness,” you must “make full and 
complete answer” “before further action can be taken.” In the meantime, Gompers later 
recalled, he heard from Iglesias that “the men had no guarantees of the right of meeting, 
etc.,” and so the strike collapsed.247 
 Iglesias responded by instigating new fights. Having clashed with police, 
prosecutors, judges, and the governor during strikes, Iglesias next addressed these men’s 
superiors in Washington. Building on a petition by 5,000 American Federation of Labor 
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members attacking Governor Winthrop’s administration and asking Roosevelt to 
intervene, Iglesias maneuvered to transform mass labor activism into political power. The 
Federation, struggling to respond to advocacy by the Republican-affiliated National 
Association of Manufacturers in favor of open shops, had recently liberalized its policy of 
partisan neutrality to let its organizations side more effectively with Democrats. On 
August 21, citing this policy shift, Iglesias and his colleagues in the Federación Libre 
resolved both to register the organization with the Puerto Rican state as a political body 
and to “lend its support without distinction of political party to all candidates recognized 
as friends of the workers.” With Federación delegates forming a minority of the 
Unionista majority in the House, this new stand was a way to use organizational strength 
to exert pressure on Unionistas who had previously opposed principal Federación 
legislative goals. But it also risked provoking reaction. Labor newspaper Unión Obrera 
supported the strategy by depicting a struggle between the freedom labor leaders sought 
and a slavery in which other Unionistas acquiesced. Claiming the mantle of male honor, 
it explained: “Unionistas are on their back seeking favors from the boss who whips them” 
while labor leaders “seek citizenship standing upright.” The Federación also proposed 
seven labor leaders, including Iglesias, to be among thirty-five Unionista candidates for 
the House of Delegates in 1906. Unionistas balked, accepting less than half the proposed 
candidacies. Relations deteriorated. Unión Obrera relayed Unionista complaints that 
labor leaders sullied the reputation of the party with U.S. authorities, and Iglesias soon 
found himself in a third-party campaign. Aware that Unionistas could buy votes and that 
most laborers had not yet joined the island labor movement, the newspaper argued that 
“money” and “the ignorance of the pueblo” made “the fight . . . extremely unequal.” 
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Nonetheless, Unión Obrera insisted, Unionistas had snubbed “honored and free citizen[]” 
workers, and so labor leaders would “honorably meet the mission imposed upon them” 
and serve “the larger plan of unionism” by standing for office.248  
 Beginning on August 29, Iglesias transformed his dispute with Governor 
Winthrop over official wrongdoing during the Arecibo sugar strikes into a campaign 
issue in which Federación leaders appeared to be martyrs for workers’ causes. In more 
than a dozen articles, Iglesias published correspondence between Gompers, the White 
House, and Winthrop. Following Gompers’s earlier advice, he also included telegrams 
and sworn complaints of official wrongdoing in Arecibo from both victims and 
witnesses. The articles made specific charges, provided places and dates, and named 
victims and malefactors. Taken together, they described police insulting, threatening, and 
attacking strikers; abusing women and children; disrupting meetings; and falsely arresting 
workers. At least one court, complainants added, denied strikers meaningful 
representation and browbeat their witnesses. Though enemies of labor “[o]rder that we be 
insulted and killed,” Unión Obrera told voters, “no one frightens us.” On October 27 the 
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series concluded by calling on President Roosevelt to intervene.249  
 On November 6, 1906, Unionistas dominated the island election, retaining the 
Resident Commissionership and sweeping the House of Delegates, including Luis Muñoz 
Rivera’s election to that House. Federación candidates secured just 1,345 votes. Despite 
the failures of the strikes and campaigns of 1906, Iglesias’s initial actions suggested 
continuing faith in electoral politics, U.S. citizenship, and labor activism. Gompers told 
the Federation in November that he had submitted to Roosevelt evidence that Iglesias had 
sent him “controverting each point [by Governor Winthrop] and re-asserting in detail 
every charge . . . , all of which was formally sworn to.” Later that month, Iglesias and his 
Federación reaffirmed their advocacy of self-government and U.S. citizenship for Puerto 
Ricans. But the Federación was in decline. Union membership soon fell, agricultural 
strikes ceased, and Federación electoral weakness persisted. Though Iglesias had found 
stronger allies and made more effective claims in 1905-1906 than he had previously, the 
combination was still not yet potent enough to sustain his labor activism. Pending a new 
strategy involving additional allies and better claims, the labor movement languished.250 
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Domingo Collazo: Journalist, Politician, Unionista, and Democrat, 1906-1908 
 The Unionista party also languished in late 1906. Two years after first winning 
island elections, they had made little progress toward the self-government they sought. 
For Domingo Collazo, who had commented on Puerto Rican status and U.S. electoral 
politics in the New York Times following his niece’s Supreme Court appeal, Unionistas’ 
difficulties were an opportunity. Drawing on his knowledge of U.S. electoral politics and 
his years of experience seeking to liberalize the relationship of Puerto Rico to its 
metropole, Collazo both developed a synthesis of Democratic and Unionista policies and 
built a reputation among Puerto Ricans as a New York-based journalist and politician 
who pursued this partisan agenda. 
 Collazo announced his fidelity to Unionista aims in December 1906, telling the 
New York Times that the “total electoral success . . . of the home rule party” reflected the 
“unyielding desire” for self-government among Puerto Ricans. Next, in articles published 
by the main Unionista newspaper in Puerto Rico, La Democracia, Collazo supported and 
amplified arguments of party leaders on the mainland. On January 4, 1907, after the 
Evening Post ran a letter accusing Unionista Resident Commissioner Tulio Larrinaga of 
dereliction of duty, Collazo repeated Larrinaga’s claim that Puerto Ricans suffered from 
structural inequality; Larrinaga was not indifferent to his countrymen, the men indicated, 
but rather had to do his best depite representing a million Puerto Ricans on less funding 
than other representatives had for 200,000-odd constituents.251 
Later that month Mariano Abril, a leading figure at La Democracia then 
sojourning in New York, wrote articles on Japan and honor. In one he reported that 
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pressure from California unions opposed to Japanese labor immigration had led 
California to place Japanese children in black and Chinese segregated schools. Japanese 
officials resented the policy and, fresh from their victory against Russia, responded with 
implicit, credible military and economic threats.252 
In a second article, Abril turned to the trial of a millionaire who had supposedly 
committed a lethal crime of passion. Other newspapers, Abril relayed, contended that a 
Spanish “jury would absolve” the defendant if given the chance. Abril commented that 
“[i]n the Latin pueblos, above all, the offense to honor or the betrayals of love, are 
washed with blood.”253 
Collazo revisited and intertwined these themes in late February. The Japanese, he 
wrote, believed in their “social equality.” Aware that “only the Blacks and Chinese sit in 
separate schools,” they sought “the same advantages of public instruction that are granted 
others from foreign countries,” including “Italians, Germans and Jews.” Having 
“[p]roved that equality by defeating Russia,” Collazo elaborated, the Japanese “prefer to 
go to war” rather than suffer unequal treatment. Collazo anticipated that Japan and unions 
would both accept extension of Chinese Exclusion laws to Japanese immigrants in lieu of 
segregation. But he knew from experience the coercive and dishonoring potential of 
immigration laws and warned that the Japanese might eventually balk at “jump[ing] from 
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the frying pan into the fire” of receiving “the same meanness at U.S. ports that they give 
the Chinese.” 254 
 Unlike Japan, however, Puerto Rico had no navy or trade agreement to strengthen 
its negotiating position with the United States. It also lacked the voting representative in 
the U.S. Congress that most domestic U.S. populations enjoyed. When it failed to win 
U.S. citizenship during the 1905-1907 term, it consequently had little recourse. Collazo’s 
next columns sought to explain why the bill failed or, as he put it, why islanders’ 
“honored service” encountered an “ungrateful” “master.” The reason, he wrote, lay with 
Republican Speaker of the House Joseph Cannon of Illinois. Cannon saw Puerto Ricans 
as racial inferiors, “too ignorant to be American citizens and to govern themselves” and 
not “honorable enough for the American citizenship.” He used and would use his power, 
Collazo wrote, paraphrasing Cannon, to block islanders’ “equitable participation on the 
public matters of our patria until you have stayed out from under the burning tropical sun 
of the tropics and gotten the whiteness essential to enjoying our citizenship.”255  
Over the next two years, now as a regular commentator in La Democracia, 
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Collazo promoted a Democratic national victory as the surest path forward. Support for 
mainland Democrats was, he argued, an obligation of citizenship and honor. The party 
“oppose[d] . . . colonial exploitation,” believing that “[a]ll men under the American flag 
have title to the protection of the institutions that the flag symbolizes.” It favored 
independence for the Philippines and perceived Puerto Rico to be “a more assimilable 
country . . . than that little pile of volcanic islands,” the “organized territory” of Hawai‘i. 
Hence, he claimed, Democrats sought the “political rights and privileges” of “the 
territorial form of government,” including U.S. citizenship and “an autonomist regime.” 
Collazo did not have to remind readers that William Jennings Bryan, soon to be the 
Democratic nominee for President, had long argued that the difference between 
traditional territorial governance and the Republican method was that between democracy 
and monarchy. Instead, he asserted that “citizens are justly desirous of the triumph of the 
Democratic Party,” “it being the duty of all <citizens of Puerto Rico> to defend the 
personality and honor of their country.”256  
In promoting Democrats, Collazo stressed the importance of federal leaders who 
would mitigate or eliminate the ill-defined, subordinating, interrelated status of Puerto 
Ricans and of Puerto Rico. Aware that Republican lawyers and judges labeled islanders 
“American” non-alien subjects, Collazo blamed the uncertain citizenship status of Puerto 
Ricans on Republican “bloodhounds of imperialism” who killed naturalization bills. This 
intransigence, he wrote, was like that of Spanish General Weyler in Cuba, which had 
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“worked more in favor of the independence of Cuba than” his former colleague and 
leader, “the Liberator of Cuba,” José Martí. By contrast, Collazo promised, Democrats 
stood ready to recognize Puerto Ricans as U.S. citizens.257 
Even more important than U.S. citizenship, Collazo contended, was the status of 
Puerto Rico as a place. Because Puerto Rico would not be “an integral part of the United 
States” under the Insular Cases until it was incorporated by Congress, Collazo claimed, 
U.S. citizenship was, “like the pieces of glass that served in the 16th century to deceive 
the innocence of the Indians,” a pretty, empty gift that would not take “Puerto Ricans 
from their current condition of colonial servitude and raise them to the level of full 
citizenship that is enjoyed in the Territories.” What islanders lacked was self-government 
and a respectable relationship to the United States and other nations. Elected Puerto 
Ricans, suffering “an exotic government [that] depart[ed] from the Constitution,” could 
not legislate, he contended, because presidential appointees on the Executive Council 
vetoed all their bills. The “international status” of Puerto Rico reduced it to a “country 
without a name in the international world.” “[D]egraded to the category of <possession>, 
which is to say, fief,” he added, the “‘forgotten’ island” found reform to be a 
“Sisyph[ean]” endeavor as “tourists, ex-professors, and ex-‘carpetbaggers’” circulated 
“erroneous impressions” that created “unjust . . . public sentiment” which islanders were 
powerless to dispel.258  
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Turning to Cuba as an inspirational and cautionary tale, Collazo argued that under 
current conditions independence would threaten the home rule for Puerto Rico that 
incorporation of the island into the United States would guarantee. Martí, he wrote, had 
argued that a “government” and its “methods and institutions” “must be born of its 
country.” While Cuba had achieved such government with its “Republic,” Puerto Rico, to 
his mind, remained a “<colony> . . . , without name and humiliated before the world.” 
Collazo did not, however, advocate Puerto Rican independence, stating that “[o]ur 
aspiration to [that status] is today merely conditional, and only sought when we see our 
hopes defrauded and it becomes the only road open.” Martí, he reminded readers, had 
warned that strong economic ties between a weak and strong country threatened the 
independence of the former, a situation Cuba now faced. Hawai‘i had avoided this 
problem by becoming an incorporated territory with, in Collazo’s words, “the American 
citizenship [and] a decent and logical position within the federal evolution of these 
sovereign States.”259  
In 1908 Collazo became active in the Democratic presidential campaign, using it 
as an opportunity to push for a new U.S. policy in Puerto Rico, expand his social-political 
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network, and build his reputation as a politician. Marveling at the public affection 
President Theodore Roosevelt generated as “the most effective self-promoting press 
agent of his time,” Collazo pursued a similar strategy, reporting on and securing media 
coverage of his activities and accomplishments. In 1908, Collazo was writing for several 
Latin American newspapers and editing the Spanish-language La Semana in New York. 
Collazo attended the Republican National Convention as a correspondent. In Early July, 
he lobbied party leaders as a delegate to the Democratic National Convention. Acting as 
translator and occasional commentator for a New York Times reporter, Collazo shaped 
and encouraged press coverage of a Puerto Rican club where he served as Secretary. The 
club’s members included naturalized U.S. citizens in New York like Collazo and wealthy 
islanders visiting the city. They socialized, promised to fundraise for Democratic 
presidential candidate William J. Bryan, and proposed to organize an estimated 10,000 
eligible islanders to vote on his behalf. In August, Collazo reported, Bryan warmly 
received him in Fairview, Nebraska, as a member of the committee notifying Bryan of his 
nomination. Two months later, Collazo placed himself in famous company by writing of 
his encounters with men like the hero and martyr of the Cuban Revolution José Martí, 
Unionista party head Luis Muñoz Rivera, Nicaraguan poet, journalist, and politician 
Rubén Dario, and Republican Senator Chauncey Depew of New York.260 
Collazo also attacked Republicans. Echoing caricatures of U.S. Reconstruction, 
                                                 
260 D. Collazo, “Metropolitanas,” La Democracia, 31 May 1909, 2 (“el más eficaz press agent de sí mismo 
que han conocido los tiempos”); Collazo, “Metropolitanas,” 1 Aug. 1908; D. Collazo, “Metropolitanas,” La 
Democracia, 27 Sep. 1909, 2; D. Collazo, “Correspondencia de New York,” La Democracia, 26 Jun. 1908; 
“Will Ask Bryan to Quit,” New York Times, 2 Jul. 1908, 2; Letter to Editor, D. Collazo, “Porto Rico’s 
Three Delegates,” New York Times, 2 Jul. 1908, 8; “Porto Rican Vote Pledged to Bryan,” New York Times, 
1 Aug. 1908, 2; D. Collazo, “Metropolitanas,” La Democracia, 29 Aug. 1908, 2; D. Collazo, 
“Metropolitanas,” La Democracia, 17 Oct. 1908, 2; “Trocando los frenos,” El Águila, 31 Mar. 1908, 
available at CIHCAM 8/L1. On immigrant enclaves and the homeland as mutually constitutive spaces that 
together formed an imagined transnational space, see Jesse Hoffnung-Garskof, A Tale of Two Cities: Santo 
Domingo, New York, and a Changing World since 1950 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2008). 
 213 
Collazo argued that “Porto Ric[an] national interests cannot be . . . safe in the hands of 
professional carpet-baggers” who seek to impress superiors in Washington rather than 
govern for the benefit of the island. Doubting that Republicans would alter the system, he 
later claimed that former military-governor of the Philippines William Taft, after 
becoming President, “captured the nostalgia of the carpetbaggers” by fondly 
remembering his prior post at the head of the U.S. government in the Philippines. 
Echoing the New York Sun, Collazo explained that Taft realized “it is not the same to be 
President,” “servant of a people,” “as to be boss and lord of colonies.”261  
 Collazo also attacked Republican imperialism as disregarding rule of law, 
resembling the fall of the Roman Republic, and reprising Napoleon’s rise. After 
criticizing the White House for “carry[ing] to the nation what was permitted in colonies,” 
Collazo recounted a Sun article about a U.S. traveler who complained of the President’s 
“despotic conduct” and “monarchical tones.” Collazo charged that Republicans 
contributed to the problem by attacking the Supreme Court, which was sometimes at odds 
with Roosevelt, as an “absolute monarchy.” Echoing the Sun’s traveler, he added that just 
as hero worship “facilitated Caesar’s overthrow of the Republic” and “Napoleon’s 
ascension” resulted when “the democracy abdicated its power . . . in obeisance to a 
national hero,” so too “the virility, the civil sufficiency of the North American citizen has 
been lost.” “The condition of vassalage,” Collazo concluded, “is being learned rapidly 
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Republican imperialism, Collazo complained, also cost Puerto Rico benefits of 
access to U.S. markets. In a paraphrase of William Jennings Bryan, he wrote:  
With Central America largely under the republican protectorate of Mr. 
Roosevelt, Taft and Root; Haiti, soon to have [illegible?] fiscal links; the 
Philippines, a permanent American possession under its current 
government; Cuba, stumbling drunkenly while its its supposed caretakers 
in Washington fatally wound its independence; Santo Domingo, stripped 
of international life and relegated to the schoolhouse bench by the hall 
monitor; and inevitable further expansions by the republican 
administration into the Caribbean and the continent, which will 
undoubtedly culminate in a zollverein customs union, Puerto Rico has 
more reason than ever before to see a threat to its wealth.263 
Here, presuming readers’ familiarity with them, Collazo condensed a decade of U.S. 
foreign relations in the Caribbean and with the Philippines into a paragraph. In Central 
America, these included: U.S. securing of Panama Canal rights following U.S. 
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involvement in Panamanian independence; Roosevelt’s big-stick policy in Central 
America; and Secretary of State Elihu Root’s attempts to build good will throughout the 
Americas. Collazo referenced U.S. operation of the Dominican customs house since 1905 
and U.S. machinations to eclipse Germany in Haiti. Collazo similary assumed readers’ 
knowledge of U.S. colonial governance in the Philippines and of a U.S. domination of 
Cuba that included a now-two-year-old reoccupation. These and similar activities had 
brought enormous capacity in sugar—a leading Puerto Rican industry—within U.S. 
control. By suggesting that Republicans intended to bring these regions within U.S. tariff 
walls, Collazo associated Republican victory with Puerto Rican economic distress.264 
Though Collazo’s candidate did not win—on November 3, Republican William 
Howard Taft became president-elect—Collazo’s campaign work and analyses of 
mainland politics and Puerto Rican status made him into a public commentator on and 
active participant in U.S.-Puerto Rican politics. In subsequent weeks Collazo served as a 
Puerto Rican commissioner lobbying Congress on coffee tariffs and elicited from Bryan 
an attentive explication of his attitude and intentions toward Puerto Rico during and after 
the presidential campaign. But with the next opportunity to unseat the Republican 
President four years hence, Collazo—and his Unionista colleagues—still lacked a 
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strategy with which to advance their political agenda.265 
 
The Budget Crisis of 1909 
 More than four years after taking the island House of Delegates and the Resident 
Commissionership, Unionistas sought new ways to win the self-government that had so 
far eluded them. Denigrating cooperation with U.S. officials as ineffective, many 
Unionista leaders advocated even greater confrontation as a means to bring attention and 
sympathy to their island. Doing so was likely to stir up and reshape longstanding debates 
in Washington evaluating U.S.-Puerto Rican relations in light of U.S. ideals and history 
and the experiences of other empires and subordinate peoples. To try and control the 
direction that those debates would take, Collazo joined with some Democrats in equating 
Republican-run Puerto Rico with the Reconstruction-era U.S. South. Nearly all elected 
Republicans declined to defend a Reconstruction policy that most U.S. whites 
remembered as having failed. They instead cast Puerto Ricans as racial inferiors in 
particular need of tutelage. That negative characterization of newly acquired peoples 
bolstered Democrats who had opposed U.S. expansion in 1898, but put Collazo in a bind. 
While most Democrats and increasing numbers of Republicans agreed that participation 
by blacks in politics had been a key mistake of Reconstruction, disfranchisement of 
Puerto Ricans of color was a non-starter for Unionistas’ many non-white constituents. 
Reconciling this tension was the key challenge for Collazo in making the Reconstruction 
metaphor effective as a basis for claims by Puerto Ricans to home rule, U.S. citizenship, 
and full membership in the U.S. polity. 
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 Unionista leaders’ dissatisfaction did not primarily arise from the non-recognition 
of Puerto Ricans as U.S. citizens about which Collazo again complained in early 1909. 
As Resident Commissioner Tulio Larrinaga charged in a congressional address and 
before paternalistic, reformist, and influential Friends of the Indian and Other Dependent 
Peoples that U.S. rule in Puerto Rico undid “forty years [of] struggling with the Spanish 
Government to obtain our rights.” Those lost rights, the Unionista newspaper La 
Democracia elaborated, included not only national citizenship, but also many political 
and civil rights and greater self-government. Now, Unionista Executive Council member 
Martin Travieso told the Friends, Puerto Ricans sought “no less than that which has been 
done for the Indian tribes”: “the opportunity of governing itself.”266 
Mainlanders refused this demand, Larrinaga contended, by casting Puerto Ricans 
“as an inferior people”—lazy and in offices for personal gain. But really, he continued, 
island laborers had long worked twelve-hour days while Puerto Rican legislators had paid 
to travel to the Spanish Cortes where they had freed their slaves. The “persistent desire to 
represent” islanders “as unworthy,” he concluded, was an attempt by “the greatest 
champion of human rights and liberty on the face of the earth” “to cover” its “injustice” 
and “moral wrong” in failing to extend islanders “a government more in accordance with 
the principles of the American democracy.”267 
U.S. citizenship was beside the point. Agustin Navarrete, a Cuban-born journalist 
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with roots in the Puerto Rican autonomist movement of the 1880s and 1890s, told readers 
of La Democracia that U.S. citizenship status promised islanders few new political rights. 
Drawing on the legacy of the Civil War, he added that because Puerto Rico would only 
enter “the federal pact that fixes the indissolubility of the link that exists between all the 
States” if it “c[a]me to form a State of the Union,” U.S. citizenship would not preclude 
Puerto Rican autonomy or independence.268 
 In the first half of January 1909 Unionista in the House of Delegates moved to 
protest “the tyrannical yoke imposed on Porto Rico” under the Foraker Act by displaying 
their “irrevocable independence” “at all costs” “within legal means.” While following its 
standard practice of waiting to act on the appropriations bill until all other bills had 
passed or failed, the House of Delegates passed several bills to rebalance governance by 
increasing Unionista influence at the expense of mainlander influence. One bill proposed 
to create an industrial school outside the Puerto Rican Department of Education, and 
hence outside the control of the Department’s chief, mainlander Edward Dexter of 
Illinois. One would alter selection of judges to the advantage of Unionistas. And one 
would cripple the U.S. District Court for Puerto Rico. These bills, though passed by the 
House, were not enacted, as the presidentially appointed upper legislative chamber, the 
Executive Council, then vitiated or rejected the House proposals as illegal, anti-
American, or corrupt. The House responded by stonewalling on the island budget. The 
chambers adjourned on March 16, 1909. With no funds authorized for the year ahead, 
each chamber sent a commission to Washington to influence the federal response to the 
crisis they had produced.269 
                                                 
268 Augustin Navarrete, “La ciudadanía y el status,” La Democracia, 6 Aug. 1908, 2. 
269 Chauncey M. Depew, “Porto Rico: Speech on the Effort of the Porto Rican House of Delegates to 
 219 
 Acknowledging that their intransigence might produce short-term setbacks, 
Unionistas framed the crisis as an opportunity to vindicate Puerto Rican honor and pursue 
long-term change. The commissioners whom Unionistas sent to Washington from among 
their number in the House of Delegates, La Democracia reported, addressed a “hostile” 
“country” in the U.S. capitol that doubted Puerto Rican “capacity.” The commissioners 
thus did not seek “immediate reforms,” but “to fulfill a duty.” With acts of the Executive 
Council having “dishonored the United States” and having been “incompatible with 
Puerto Rican honor,” the newspaper wrote, commissioners would help “Puerto Rico save 
its dignity and rights” and “the prestige” and “honor of the House.”270 
 Beginning on March 24, in memos and meetings, commissioners from the House 
made their case before President Taft, Secretary of Interior Richard Ballinger, federal 
lawmakers, and mainland media. For years, commissioners told Taft and Ballinger, the 
appointed Council members ignored the elected House, thereby “creating a profound 
feeling of resentment.” Initially the House had deferred, but a decade into U.S. rule, 
Larrinaga later explained, the island public had grown discontented with 
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accommodations that produced no progress toward self-government. Unionistas, the 
House Commission explained, thus had “no other means of defense than the justice of 
their cause, nor other protection than their own rights.” Executive Council members 
countered that the crisis showed the House lacked the political maturity to draft 
meritorious bills and reach reasonable compromises. At the same time, House members 
met regularly with media in Washington and New York, hoping to sway public opinion. 
During these efforts the commission chose Domingo Collazo as its secretary and 
interpreter. He particularly helped Unionista party head and commission member Luis 
Muñoz Rivera, who then lacked fluency in English, during his travels to New York to try 
to improve press coverage of the Commission.271  
 Reaction was swift. La Democracia reprinted and summarized dozens of press 
clippings on opposing sides and from across the United States. Contending that 
appropriations were a lower, different class of problem than self-government and so an 
inappropriate means with which to seek it, Secretary Ballinger condemned the House of 
Delegates in his March 30 report to Taft. After the House Commission returned to Puerto 
Rico, President Taft told Congress in a May 10 message that since 1898 “Porto Rico has 
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been the favored daughter of the United States,” receiving U.S. largesse while accruing 
the “education” to prepare it to “safely . . . exercise the full power of self-government.” 
With the crisis, he wrote, island delegates showed a “willingness . . . to subvert the 
government,” demonstrating that “its members are not sufficiently alive to their oath-
taken responsibility, for the maintenance of the government.” Concluding that “we have 
gone somewhat too fast in the extension of political power to them,” he advocated a law 
that would, as currently done in Hawai‘i and the Philippines, leave a prior Puerto Rican 
budget in place until a subsequent one replaced it.  
After this indictment from the presidential bully pulpit, Collazo observed that 
most mainland newspapers sided with Taft against elected islanders. On May 11, an 
administration ally on this issue, Republican Senator Chauncey Depew of New York, 
introduced the bill that Taft had suggested. A second provision, which Depew told his 
colleagues “the President considers very essential,” would instruct all island authorities to 
report to the agency that had overseen administration of Puerto Rico immediately prior to 
institution of civil governance there: the Bureau of Insular Affairs within the War 
Department. A sponsor of the House version of this bill described this provision as 
placing “all matters pertaining to the government of Porto Rico in the jurisdiction of” a 
single bureau. By demanding greater self-government, it appeared, Puerto Rico had 
convinced many in Washington that they were not prepared to exercise it.272 
 As legislative debates over Taft’s proposals began in summer 1909, Congressmen 
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resurrected and reformulated old comparisons of U.S. policy in Puerto Rico to 
Reconstruction, practices of fellow empires, and to U.S. treatment of other subordinated 
groups. Some legislators focused on the purported Puerto Rican incapacity for self-rule, 
chastising Unionistas as patronage politicians who had asked the Executive Council to 
buy their votes and were not ready for statehood or Canadian-style autonomy. Republican 
Senator Elihu Root of New York, who had shaped U.S. insular policy as Secretary of 
War in 1899-1904, compared Unionista intransigence in budget negotiations to their 1900 
decision to boycott island elections. Drawing on a Black Legend of Spanish rule, Root 
told colleagues, “One of the serious evils of Spanish American government has long been 
that when one party finds itself unable to accomplish what it desires it seeks to coerce the 
home government by refusing to go on with the operation of government.” Puerto Ricans, 
who had not outgrown that “childish” tactic, he elaborated, were “not yet capable of self-
government” and in need of “a long course of education.” Democratic Representative 
James Slayden of Texas doubted the efficacy of even long education. Referring fellow 
representatives to the British experience in Africa and the West Indies, he argued, “We 
are mainly Anglo-Saxons,” “[t]hey are largely mongrel[s],” and “history tells us that 
distinct, radically different races have rarely if ever dwelt together in political 
harmony.”273 
 Other legislators stressed self-government and citizenship. Democratic 
Representative Finis Garrett of Tennessee argued, for instance, that even if “Puerto Rico 
never will, so long as the Spanish blood preponderates there, govern itself like we govern 
                                                 
273 Congressional Record 44, pt. 4:4337-4347 (9 Jul. 1909) (remarks of Sen. Elihu Root of N.Y.) (quotes 1-
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Muñoz’s Federales had boycotted the polls. In 1904 the Federales had reconstituted themselves into the 
Partido Unionista. See Chapters 1 and 3 above. 
 223 
ourselves,” islanders deserved the chance that “[e]very tribe in Africa” has to “govern[] 
itself in some way.” Representative Henry Cooper, a longtime advocate of liberalizing 
U.S. rule in Puerto Rico, categorized Puerto Ricans as superior to Filipinos, comparing 
them to such undoubted citizens as children, women, and Hawai‘ians. Arguing that 
Puerto Ricans resembled children, he thus implied, merely strengthened Puerto Rican 
claims to U.S. citizenship. Democratic Senator Hernando Money of Mississippi accused 
Senator Root of having “forgotten a little of his English history.” “Every solitary 
accession of British liberty,” he asserted, “has come from the power of the Commons and 
the people over the purse” that Unionistas had exercised. Commissioner Larrinaga 
implied that he agreed that Puerto Ricans resembled U.S. white, male citizens fighting for 
democracy and liberty when he told the House that Unionista delegates were property-
holding professionals with mainland and continental degrees whose predecessors under 
Spain had secured emancipation and a republican form of government.274 
 U.S. lawmakers also debated whether U.S. rule in Puerto Rico represented a 
return to what many remembered as intrusive, Reconstruction-era Republican misrule in 
the U.S. South. As Democratic Representative Thomas Martin of Virginia explained:  
[W]e have had an experience in this country with what I term a ‘carpetbag 
government,’ and that is a government made up of men from some other section 
of the country, or some other country, over whose selection the people governed 
have no voice, a government imposed not by consent, but by superior power upon 
them; and no right-minded man would want to return to that condition in this 
country. 
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The United States, he charged, had instituted “another specie of the same genus in Porto 
Rico.” Republican Representative Marlin Olmsted of Pennsylvania answered such 
charges not by defending Reconstruction, but by denying its equivalence to U.S. rule in 
Puerto Rico. Only a few mainlanders held high posts in the Puerto Rican state, he 
claimed, and all were disinterested and “never before . . . accused of bad acts.”275 
 Though the analogy to Reconstruction had drawbacks for islanders, Collazo 
embraced them during the crisis. In his columns, he argued that Puerto Ricans should join 
post-Reconstruction U.S. southerners in enjoying home rule, U.S. citizenship, and full 
membership in the U.S. polity. Taft’s bill temporarily stalled in the House, he argued, 
because southern Democrats objected to “‘government by carpet-baggers.’” Here he 
depicted a Democratic willingness to extend disgust for Reconstruction to any 
Republican intrusion into local rule. But when he added that U.S. officials in Puerto Rico 
were “carpet-baggers” who, as had occurred during the American Indian genocide, 
would “sweep [Puerto Ricans] off their homeland,” he overreached. Democratic 
opposition to Reconstruction was rooted as much in white supremacy as in federalism, 
and many Democrats joined Representative Slayden in seeing Puerto Ricans as racially 
inferior “mongrels.” Such politicians were unlikely to accept Collazo’s comparison of 
Puerto Ricans to both American Indians and Reconstruction-era southern whites, with its 
implication that the confederacy, islanders, and native peoples shared morally equivalent 
hardships. When Senator Root turned the debate from Republican misrule to Puerto 
Rican capacity by arguing that islanders needed a long education before enjoying self-
government, Collazo appeared to recognize the futility of telling Democrats that Puerto 
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Ricans were as politically capable as Reconstruction-era southern whites. Instead he 
launched ad hominem attacks, claiming that Root took orders from Tammany Hall and 
the trusts.276 
Nonetheless, Collazo and other Unionistas condemned what they portrayed as a 
vicious, counterproductive U.S. racism that operated extra-legally, was alien to Puerto 
Rico and its heritage, and impeded their aspirations for home rule. La Democracia thus 
reported on savage U.S. lynchings, Ida Wells Barnett’s campaign against lynching, and 
blacks’ efforts to organize for civil rights. The newspaper also republished a piece 
arguing that while “there is no question of ‘color’” in Latin America, “[i]n no other 
nation is the color prejudice as deeply entrenched as in the United States.” Collazo 
recounted how upon appointing a black commissioner to Liberia, Taft got caught 
between “offend[ing] the negros” and disregarding white commissioners’ objections to 
traveling on an equal footing with their black colleague. Collazo argued that Taft’s 
solution of providing separate naval cruiser for each commissioner was expensive and 
endangered the mission. In attacking white commissioners’ “imbecile preoccupations,” 
Collazo voiced an anti-racist vision similar to that of the Cuban revolutionary he had 
once followed, José Martí. Similarly, when Puerto Ricans faced racially charged 
criticisms in Hawai‘i, Collazo shot back that “[t]he humanity is equal in all parts.” 
Collazo’s Reconstruction metaphors, however, implicitly argued not that all races were 
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equal but that most Puerto Ricans were white and that white Puerto Ricans could be 
trusted to control island affairs. Similarly, La Democracia reprinted an article in July that 
argued that mainlanders mischaracterized some Puerto Ricans as non-white and 
misperceived other Puerto Ricans who were not white as threats to and thus implicitly 
consequential in governance of the island. “If there were not people of African blood in 
Puerto Rico or there were few,” the piece concluded, “we would have had enough white 
people to organize a state before now.”277  
To reconcile his professed racial egalitarianism with his embrace of Democratic 
criticism of Reconstruction, Collazo portrayed Democrats and not Republicans as 
partisans of blacks, Ulysses S. Grant, and the Civil War. Blacks might vote Democratic, 
Collazo thus wrote, because in 1906 Roosevelt and Taft had summarily dismissed 167 
black soldiers unjustly accused of rioting in Brownsville, Texas. Taft had also defiled 
Grant’s name by mentioning his alcoholism on Decoration Day, Collazo charged. “[I]t 
was enough,” he explained, “to have mentioned that the general, with his triumph over 
the South, broke the chains of the slave and consolidated the Union of his patria.” On 
Lincoln’s birthday, Collazo lauded “celebrations in honor of . . . that martyred President,” 
then insisted that the solidly Democratic “South . . . does not contest the halo of the 
savior of the Union.” Collazo’s improbable claims notwithstanding, most Democrats 
remained committed to white supremacy. Thus, though Republican rule in Puerto Rico 
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did deprive islanders of self-government, any analogy between it and Republican-led 
Reconstruction remained vulnerable to the argument that Puerto Ricans were less capable 
of self-government than former Confederates had been.278 
 On July 15 the U.S. political branches overcame Democratic objections to a 
supposed Reconstruction in Puerto Rico and enacted Taft’s proposals stripping the House 
of Delegates of its budget veto and placing the island under the jurisdiction of the Bureau 
of Insular Affairs within the War Department. Despite this apparent defeat, Unionista 
leaders reported in late July and early August that they had won important congressional 
allies during the fight. Collazo quickly pointed out that U.S. colonial rule in Puerto Rico 
had begun to hamper U.S. foreign policy throughout Latin America. Rather than the 
“‘envy of Latin America’” that McKinley had predicted, the island had become a 
“horrendous scarecrow for the Hispanic pueblos.” Now, Collazo continued, even Taft 
joined Unionistas in favoring reform of the Foraker Act, with the President asking the 
Secretary of War to report on the matter.279 
 
Before Congress turned its attention to potentially far-reaching reforms in Puerto 
Rico, Republican Senator Marlin Olmsted asked Puerto Rico Governor Regis Post to 
survey the opinions of leading men in Puerto Rico on such matters. The suggestion set in 
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motion events revealing that divisions on the island had come to co-exist with near-
consensus as to the desirability of U.S. citizenship for Puerto Ricans. On August 31, 
1909, Post distributed dozens of surveys that began by asking respondents to comment on 
proposals to extend U.S. citizenship to Puerto Ricans through collective or individual 
naturalizations. Unionista leaders responded with apprehension. By soliciting opinions 
directly from people he chose, they worried, Post could be aiming to sideline the 
Unionista Party or to build a record that could cause Congress to treat Puerto Rico 
ungenerously. The Unionista newspaper La Democracia thus attacked the questionnaire 
as harmful to Puerto Rico while offering guidance to those Unionistas who chose to 
respond. In addition to asking party members not to contravene Unionista principles, the 
newspaper reminded readers that it was Unionista policy to seek complementary status 
for Puerto Rican people and Puerto Rican lands: Were the island destined to be an 
independent country, Puerto Rican citizenship would be appropriate; if statehood was in 
its future, U.S. citizenship was best. But with that decision pending, the party’s leadership 
contended, “We are not in a position to settle on a citizenship.”280 
Despite Unionista leaders’ objections to the survey, over one hundred fifty people 
responded. Nearly half were Unionistas. The results suggested consensus among 
mainlanders in positions of power on the island and Puerto Rican politicians and labor 
leaders that islanders should have some form of access to U.S. citizenship. Abraham 
Peña, a longtime colleague of Santiago Iglesias in the island labor movement, advocated 
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collective naturalization and not individual naturalization, claiming “that we should not 
beg for an American citizenship to which we have a right.” Most respondees from the 
major island political parties and the Puerto Rican organized-labor movement agreed. B. 
S. Rodey, a mainlander and judge in the U.S. District Court for Puerto Rico, publicly 
described his efforts to win Puerto Ricans collective naturalization, though he also 
announced hat he would prefer individual naturalization to no naturalization. Some other 
mainlanders favored individual naturalization to the exclusion of a collective grant of 
U.S. citizenship to Puerto Ricans. Despite these areas of agreement, however, leaders on 
the island appeared unlikely to put aside their recent battles over the budget to present a 
unified front in favor of some form of U.S. citizenship for Puerto Ricans. Then in early 
September 1909 Governor Post resigned.281
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A “PECULIARLY GOVERNED” ISLAND: THE TWILIGHT OF U.S. CITIZENSHIP IN PUERTO 
RICO, 1909-1917 
 
 Santiago Iglesias was not displeased that the United States had condemned the 
protest for self-government by members of the Unionista majority party in Puerto Rico 
by weakening the sole elected legislative body on the island—the House of Delegates—
and placing the island under the administration of the Bureau of Insular Affairs in the 
War Department. In fact, the Puerto Rican labor leader welcomed U.S. administrative 
rule. Enjoying little support in the House of Delegates, Iglesias hoped to ally with the 
new presidentially appointed governor and War Department masters of Puerto Rico. 
These men were potentially important friends. Between them, they led one of the most 
administratively powerful arms of the heterogeneous U.S. state, and as to matters 
involving Puerto Rico they largely set executive policy, shaped federal and Puerto Rican 
legislative agendas, and enjoyed the ear of the president. In communications to the 
American Federation of Labor, its president Samuel Gompers, and President William 
Taft that newspapers covered, he indicated to U.S. and Puerto Rican officials, workers, 
and voters that Puerto Rican organized labor was a natural ally of the U.S. administrative 
state. Iglesias’s labor organization, the Federación de Trabajadores Libres, and U.S. 
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administrators responsible for Puerto Rico, he argued, shared an enemy—Unionistas who 
pursued “Anti-American politics” and acted to the “injury of the labor interests”—and a 
recognition that islanders needed administration like “progressive education” and “the 
intervention . . . of GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY.” Favoring expansive federal 
power in Puerto Rico over greater home rule was an anti-democratic proposition on an 
island where residents did not cast votes for Congress or President. Nonetheless, Iglesias 
admitted that “the Government of Porto Rico is not a democratic one” while claiming that 
it nonetheless made “the island progress with intensity.” Characterizing self-government 
as a chance for Unionistas to exploit the “fatal ignorance” of under-educated Puerto 
Ricans and thus “bring slavery, ignorance and disgrace for 90 percent of the population,” 
Iglesias instead proposed another agency, a Department of Agriculture, Commerce and 
Labor.282 
Iglesias took a roseate view of dependence, evincing little public concern that 
administration officials would abuse their authority. Yet, during these years, U.S. 
officials routinely coerced peoples throughout the U.S. empire-state. U.S. courts upheld 
maximum-hours laws for women and children as non-violative of liberty of contract by 
explaining that such dependent citizens—marked as inferior to adult men—could not 
represent their own interests. Widespread black disfranchisement rested on purported 
black failures to vote responsibly. And mainland commentators promoted U.S. colonial 
rule in Puerto Rico by depicting the island as a victim of Spanish colonialism, as unable 
to match Anglo-Saxon capacity for self-government, and as a permanent child subject to 
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a paternalistic U.S. tutelage suffused with discipline. Nonetheless, Iglesias imagined U.S. 
administrators governing island workers as good parents nurtured maturing children. 
Conceptualizing U.S. citizenship in terms of honorable exchanges of mutual obligations, 
Iglesias depicted Puerto Rican workers earning a status that would guarantee their 
transformation from administrative wards into autonomous political agents like adult, 
white, U.S. men. As he wrote, islanders tendered the United States allegiance by 
remaining “under the flag of the United States for ten years,” tolerating foreign 
investment, and respecting U.S. laws and officials. Implying that they thus merited U.S. 
citizenship, he contended that U.S. refusal “to recognize to the people of Porto Rico . . . 
the absolute right to be American citizens” let Unionistas cast U.S. officials as placing 
Puerto Ricans in the “shameful position” of “inferior human beings.” By contrast, he 
stressed, the Federación Libre “defend[ed] . . . the American public education and 
liberties” that Iglesias claimed dependent citizenship would bring. Those liberties, 
Iglesias vaguely indicated, encompassed some mix of rights to be free from active state 
coercions and to enjoy better economic outcomes. Thus, he explained, without U.S. 
citizenship “peaceful strike[rs]” were “subject[] to untold persecutions and shameful 
treatment at the hands of officials”; workers related to “sugar corporations” like so “many 
thousands of serfs” in Europe and faced “the same calamities, intermissions, and crises 
suffered by [the] American labor movement about forty years ago.” But with U.S. 
administrative help and U.S. citizenship, he argued, island laborers would 
“mathematically repeat[]” the “history” of implicitly white U.S. and European laborers 
and escape these conditions.283 
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 By the end of 1909 the political backlash in Washington against Unionistas’ 
protest earlier that year had subsided, creating favorable conditions for those seeking 
liberalization of the Foraker Act. After Santiago Iglesias led an island labor delegation to 
petition President Taft for U.S. citizenship for Puerto Ricans on November 27, Taft asked 
the Treasury and War Departments to investigate, evaluate, and recommend reforms to 
the laws for Puerto Rico. On December 21, 1909, Bureau of Insular Affairs law officer 
Paul Charlton wrote a memorandum contending that U.S. citizenship could be safely 
extended to Puerto Ricans. The “only rights which a citizen . . . acquires by reason of his 
federal citizenship,” he wrote, “are: (1) The protection of the United States . . . by a 
passport . . . ; and (2) Access to the federal Courts[, b]oth . . . rights . . . uniformly 
possessed by citizens of Porto Rico” already. Describing Puerto Rican political leaders as 
both beholden to “party bosses” and desirous of collective U.S. citizenship and an elected 
island senate, Secretary of War Jacob Dickinson then in January 1910 recommended to 
Taft a balance between islanders’ desire and purported incapacity for democratic 
institutions. He proposed a senate of eight appointed and five elected senators; 
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streamlined, individual naturalization; disfranchisement of non-U.S.-citizens and those 
who did not meet a literacy, property, or taxpaying requirement; and creation of Iglesias’s 
proposed Department of Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor.284 
In the weeks that followed, new Governor of Puerto Rico George Colton wrote 
Dickinson and his subordinates that politics in Puerto Rico resembled those of post-
emancipation societies, urban political machines, and lands populated by people of color 
at the periphery of the U.S. empire-state. In the 1880s, Colton had ranched in New 
Mexico, a territory with both a large Spanish-speaking community of Mexican descent 
and ongoing conflicts between American Indians and the U.S. military. Later, he had 
joined the 1898 U.S. invasion of the Philippines as a Lieutenant Colonel in the First 
Nebraska Volunteers before organizing the Manila customs service and the customs 
receivership in the Dominican Republic. Drawing on this “personal experience dealing 
with similar people elsewhere,” he told Dickinson that “rules of action that might be 
appropriate in an Anglo-Saxon country would not always be expedient if adopted among 
a people of Spanish education and customs.” Rather, like Iglesias, he claimed that most 
Puerto Ricans’ interests would be served by the combination of an administrative state 
that checked elected elites and “education and property” voting qualifications. “[T]he 
principal trouble in Porto Rico,” he wrote, was that the “political machine” behind 
Unionista leader Luis Muñoz’s “intolerant bossism” won “the sympathy of the ignorant 
classes.” This, he contended, was the “condition [that] existed in our Southern States 
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during the days of ‘reconstruction,’” where “those qualified to participate in self 
government” were “prevented from having any voice.” Drawing on the specter of Haiti 
and describing Puerto Ricans in animalistic terms, Colton argued that the danger was that 
an “ignorant class” who “followed their leaders blindly, with little more than an instinct,” 
“like sheep,” would let politicians “by their wild actions . . . make a veritable Haiti of the 
country.” Thus, despite their differences, Colton and Iglesias agreed “that labor will 
receive no consideration whatever from the Cacique system in vogue.” 285 
 In February 1910 the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Insular Affairs 
opened hearings on Dickinson’s proposed bill. Puerto Rican witnesses and U.S. 
Congressmen tangled over the relationship of U.S. citizenship to honor, race, rights, and 
the status of Puerto Rico as a place. Unionistas Luis Muñoz and Cayetano Coll y Cuchi 
asked the committee for collective naturalization and an elected senate and denounced 
provisions requiring that islanders naturalize in order to vote or hold office. Explaining 
that Puerto Ricans had enjoyed national citizenship under Spain, they contended that 
while U.S. citizenship was a “great honor” it was also a “right” that “the dignity of the 
people should not be begging for.” After prior annexations, they testified, the United 
States had collectively naturalized new residents or placed the matter in the hands of their 
territorial legislatures, and “no matter how good or high the civilization of Mexico, 
Louisiana, and Florida were when they were ceded, they could not have equaled the 
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present civilization of Porto Rico.” Yet Dickinson’s plan treated each islander like a 
“foreigner or alien” and, by imposing a citizenship requirement for office holding that 
American Indians did not face, placed Puerto Ricans “in the federal laws below the 
Indians.” The resultant citizenship, Muñoz later explained, would be the “humiliating” 
result of a “despotic,” not “honorable” process. Moreover, Coll y Cuchi explained, failing 
to recognize Puerto Ricans collectively as U.S. citizens let islanders “think[] that Porto 
Rico may [be] turned into a republic.”286 
Muñoz’s and Coll y Cuchi’s claims provoked Republican Representative Albert 
Douglas of Ohio, who drew the men into a discussion of the value of U.S. citizenship:  
Mr. Douglas. Is it not true that if the people of Porto Rico had the 
opportunity voluntarily to become citizens of the United States and 
refused the privilege that they ought to be willing to relinquish the small 
right of holding office in Porto Rico? 
Mr. [Muñoz]. That would be all right if American citizenship in Porto 
Rico would mean what it means here in the United States. 
Mr. Douglas. It does. It would not give you the right to vote in New York 
City, but I can not do that. 
Mr. Cuchi. I would not be able to vote for President or to send a man to 
Congress. 
Mr. Douglas. You could not do that if you lived in Washington. 
Mr. Cuchi. Washington is peculiarly governed. 
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Mr. Douglas. So is Porto Rico—very peculiar.  
The exchange was a microcosm of a dozen years of conflicting Puerto Rican and U.S. 
claims around U.S. citizenship. After Douglas described U.S. citizenship in aspirational 
terms as a “privilege” on which political rights ought to hinge, Muñoz reminded him that 
the status would not fulfill Puerto Rican hopes for equal rights. Switching to a more 
technical register, Douglas then sought to disassociate federal citizenship from state 
political rights. At this point, Coll y Cuchi interjected to remind him that federal law and 
not state law denied Puerto Ricans a voice in U.S. governance. That, both men agreed, 
linked the status of Puerto Ricans to the equally knotty tangle of the status of Puerto Rico 
as a place.287 
 Beginning in April 1910, Governor Colton encouraged Congress to act by rallying 
islanders and their administrators around a consensus set of proposed reforms. Writing 
Secretary Dickinson that former Democratic presidential candidate William Jennings 
Bryan had been warmly received by Unionistas during his ongoing tour of Puerto Rico, 
Colton proposed asking Bryan to help him broker a compromise between the 
administration, Iglesias’s Federación, and Unionistas. Negotiations and cables followed, 
until all sides supported: collective naturalization; disfranchisement; a department of 
agriculture, commerce, and labor; an elected senate; and an absolute gubernatorial veto. 
Now, rather than solicit a congressional enactment opposed by elected representatives of 
its purported beneficiaries, Dickinson and Colton lobbied Congress for the new bill 
jointly with Iglesias, Unionistas, and American Federation of Labor President Samuel 
Gompers. In June 1910, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a somewhat different 
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bill, proposing to make all Puerto Ricans U.S. citizens but not immediately extending 
them an elective senate.288 
Opposition in the Senate remained. For example, Republican Senator Elihu Root 
of New York, the architect when Secretary of War of the initial U.S. policy in Puerto 
Rico, opposed U.S. citizenship for Puerto Ricans. As he told a confidant, “If we give 
citizenship to the Porto Ricans the next step inevitably would be a demand for statehood 
with the same kind of pressure which New Mexico and Arizona are now exerting.” 
Instead he proposed eventually making “our relations to her approximate our relations to 
Cuba, with a protectorate [like] that which we virtually have over Cuba.” Gridlock 
ensued. The Senate did not act. The bill died.289 
 Iglesias made gains while attempting to ally with U.S. administrators. Dickinson’s 
draft legislation had sided with Iglesias against the island’s political class by putting little 
new power into elected Puerto Ricans’ hands, disfranchising many, and creating federally 
controlled administrative posts. Puerto Rican politicians had then focused their ire on the 
provision most contrary to Iglesias’s vision: individual naturalization. Colton’s 
compromise had placed island politicians and U.S. administrators behind collective 
naturalization, disfranchisement, and a department of agriculture, commerce, and labor. 
Though Iglesias had conceded his opposition to an elected senate, he had won support for 
a proposed absolute gubernatorial veto that would deprive elected Puerto Ricans of power 
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to enact laws without the support of U.S. officials. That year Colton also advocated an 
Employers’ Liability law and made a supportive Labor Day proclamation. Iglesias 
recognized these advances, and in late 1910 sent Gompers positive reports about Colton. 
Weeks later Gompers deemed Colton “the first American official in Porto Rico who has 
ever taken up the labor problem intelligently and sympathetically.”290 
During congressional consideration and non-enactment of Puerto Rico legislation 
in 1910 differences had become visible between and among island leaders and federal 
officials concerning the desirability of self-government, sovereignty, and U.S. citizenship 
for Puerto Ricans. Unionistas favored immediate home rule in Puerto Rico unencumbered 
by federal oversight. Iglesias, his Federación Libre, Governor Colton, War Department 
officials, and Senator Root advocated ongoing federal control. Root proposed to control 
Puerto Rico as a separate, dependent nation, like Cuba. Iglesias, Colton, and War 
preferred continuing U.S. administration. Iglesias envisioned protected workers 
becoming educated, autonomous political agents, while Colton and War officials sought 
to build island support for a modified colonial regime. Unionistas, who differed among 
themselves concerning the desirability of Puerto Rican sovereignty, asked in their 
platform that Puerto Rico be an independent nation, an autonomous territory, or a state. 
For all parties, U.S. citizenship was a language with which they built alliances, vilified 
adversaries, and pursued legislative and administrative priorities.291 
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Iglesias and Colton formed a public partnership to seek collective naturalization 
of Puerto Ricans in late 1911, after Iglesias wrote Colton soliciting his support for the 
measure. In an October 30 reply that Iglesias circulated widely, Colton declared himself 
“unreservedly in favor of” the proposal, which he depicted as popular with islanders. 
Having privately criticized Unionistas as “machine” politicians, Colton now marginalized 
them, aligning himself and not them with Puerto Rican opinion by offering his “full co-
operation” to a Federación Libre that he claimed “represent[ed] . . . the largest class of 
people in the Island.” He promoted this stand in ways both consistent with his advocacy 
of continued administrative rule in Puerto Rico and responsive to some mainlanders’ 
worries that islanders were racially or politically unfit for U.S. citizenship. Making no 
mention of U.S. citizenship bringing Puerto Ricans rights or eventual statehood, Colton 
compared islanders to women, children, and immigrants—all peoples who were or were 
becoming U.S. citizens and either did not exercise or were thought by many mainlanders 
incapable of competently exercising full political rights. Islanders did not share 
mainlanders’ “rugged temperament,” he wrote, but were “sympathetic, lovable and 
loyal,” adding “a note of commingled sweetness, patience, and idealism.” Moreover, he 
added, “many thousands of foreigners, with to say the least no better qualifications than 
[Puerto Ricans], have immigrated to the United States and individually become citizens.” 
Drawing on popular reverence for U.S. citizenship and its potentially narrow legal 
compass, Colton advocated collective naturalization of Puerto Ricans in terms that 
presupposed permanent U.S. rule of their island. They were “a part of us and our 
country,” he explained, “entitled . . . to all of the benefits of our institutions sentimental 
and otherwise.” Conversely, Colton implied, withholding U.S. citizenship symbolically 
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marked Puerto Ricans as inferior outsiders, an indignity they felt keenly.292 
Six weeks later Senator Root wrote the newly appointed Secretary of War, Henry 
Stimson, to counsel him not to join Governor Colton in publicly advocating U.S. 
citizenship for Puerto Ricans. Presuming that Stimson opposed statehood or substantial 
rights for Puerto Ricans, Root argued that naturalization would breed discontent and 
damage U.S. citizenship. Root depicted citizenship without self-rule as a greater indignity 
than the current ambiguous Puerto Rican status, predicting that naturalized islanders 
would “resent having the other citizens of the United States take part in governing them 
while they are refused the right to take part in governing any part of the rest of the 
country” and so would “demand all the rights of citizens.” Ignoring that many women, 
racial minorities, and lower-class whites could not vote on the mainland, he argued that 
making Puerto Ricans into U.S. citizens having “nothing to do with the government” of 
the United States would be “a revolution in . . . American citizenship” likely to “make 
serious trouble.” Instead, Root proposed resurrecting his policy as Secretary of War 
toward Cuba. “[T]he relations of [Puerto Rico] to the United States should be 
approximated as rapidly as is possible to a protectorate,” he wrote, thus freeing the 
United States from the difficulties of possessing and governing the island. Under the 
Monroe Doctrine and through threats of invasion and receivership, he explained, the 
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United States could exclude other powers from the island and control its governance.293 
Stimson declined Root’s advice, and in his 1911 annual report publicly advocated 
continued U.S. administrative rule in Puerto Rico and collective naturalization of Puerto 
Ricans. Seeking federal legislation, he made what he termed sentimental and practical 
cases for U.S. citizenship. As a “sentimental” matter, he wrote, “continued refusal to 
grant [U.S. citizenship to Puerto Ricans] will gravely wound the[ir] sensibilities”; on the 
“practical” side, the Puerto Rican abroad was a “man without a country.” This latter 
claim was a questionable one. While overseas, Puerto Ricans already enjoyed benefits of 
U.S. citizenship: U.S. passports, consular protections, and passage through U.S. 
immigration and customs as “American[s].” Juridically, they differed little from those 
who were unambiguously U.S. citizens. Instead, the reference seems to have been to 
Edward Hale’s 1868 pro-expansion story of the same name. That story opens with a 
judge sentencing a man raised on the borderlands of U.S. expansion never again to hear 
about or see the United States. Subsequently confined to U.S. naval vessels, the man 
becomes “nervous, tired,” and “heart-wounded” over his loss of nation. Though many 
sailors sympathize with his plight, bureaucratic indifference prevents his pardon. Puerto 
Rico faced a similar plight. An expansionist, nationalist United States caused substantial 
psychological harm to recently acquired peoples resident in territories “belonging” to the 
United States, then thoughtlessly used law to deprive those people of the right to act, be 
recognized, and see themselves as full members of the nation. Stimson indicated that 
Puerto Ricans, like Hale’s protagonist, had “earned” membership in the U.S. nation 
through “sustained loyalty.” But by distinguishing Hale’s “practical” story from 
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islanders’ desire for U.S. citizenship, Stimson implicitly feminized and racialized 
islanders, rendering them dissimilar from Hale’s white, male, mainland protagonist and 
disassociating them from the traits of capacity, action, and accomplishment associated 
with the word “practical.” Making their concerns “sentimental,” a term frequently placed 
in opposition to reason and a literary genre associated with women, reinforced the 
impression.294 
During their joint pursuit of U.S. citizenship, Iglesias, Governor Colton, and 
Secretary Stimson regarded each other well, made political gains, and maintained relative 
industrial peace. By the end of 1911, Iglesias publicly praised Stimson’s and Colton’s 
statements favoring U.S. citizenship, and Colton told War that Iglesias was an important 
ally who, “with some difficulty, kept the members of [the Federación] friendly to the 
American Government by holding out to them the hope that citizenship could come.” In 
these years, Iglesias focused resources on Washington, soliciting, publicizing, and 
praising statements from the president and congressmen supporting U.S. citizenship for 
Puerto Ricans and overseeing a lobbying effort in which dozens of island unions 
petitioned Congress for “a bill, declaring, THAL ALL CITIZENS OF PORTO RICO 
SHALL BE CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES.” “[W]e have,” Iglesias told the 
Federation, bent “our efforts most assiduously to the conquest and consolidation of the 
civil rights and political guarantees of the people of Porto Rico rather than to struggling 
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in the industrial and economic field.”295 
 In fall 1912, Iglesias and his followers sought to transform their administrative 
alliance into electoral power by running labor candidates and attacking Unionista policies 
and leaders. To that end they produced two documents addressed to island workers and 
turned out one of them in an English edition, thereby also speaking to U.S. officials and 
other mainlanders. The choice that faced readers, the authors wrote, was between U.S. 
“good government” and a Unionista rule akin to racial slavery. Many Unionistas, they 
noted, had served in the Autonomous Cabinet of 1898, which Iglesias and his followers 
portrayed as a “tyrannical, . . . monarchical colonial government.” Before the U.S. 
invasion, they wrote, workers had been “submissive slaves,” “the proposed granting of 
‘universal suffrage’” to whom some current Unionistas had opposed as likely to “hurt . . . 
whites” and “cause racial struggles.” Relief had only come with U.S. forces, and still 
Unionistas oppressed workers through local office holding, thereby controlling “at will 
the police, the judiciary and public offices.”296 
Despite the good intentions and veto power of the governor and the mainlander-
dominated Executive Council, the authors argued, control of the House of Delegates by 
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Unionistas also posed a threat to island workers. Writing against a legal-cultural dynamic 
and history familiar to island workers, they cited laws of legitimacy, seduction, and 
marriage to make their case.  
In Puerto Rico, legitimacy laws exemplified how hierarchies of class and race 
interwove with state power and social expectations to dishonor and economically 
disadvantage laborers. Lower-class Puerto Ricans regularly formed consensual unions 
rather than marrying. The practice dated to Spanish rule when complaints about religious 
fees for weddings were common, divorce was essentially impossible, and the church was 
largely absent. It had persisted after U.S. reforms had eased access to civil ceremonies 
and divorce. As elsewhere, many Puerto Ricans recognized a sexual double standard 
around honor. For women, honor meant sexual propriety. Men, by contrast, both 
recognized a duty to control female relations’ sexual practices and saw pursuit of 
nonmarital sexual relationships as a prerogative and affirmation of manhood. Elite men 
sometimes reconciled these norms by pursuing extramarital sexual relations with lower-
class women. The practice infuriated many working-class men and produced out-of-
wedlock births. Spanish laws had generally marked these disproportionately working-
class, out-of-wedlock children as either natural or illegitimate, statuses that had reduced 
those children’s inheritance rights.297 
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Iglesias and his followers criticized what they termed “monarchical . . . privileges 
for the upper classes” as inconsistent with “[c]ivil equality and the equality of women to 
men.” They were partly counter-balanced, they claimed, by the Spanish law of seduction, 
under which “fathers who suffered the disgrace” of “villains” seducing their daughters 
could ensure that each “seducer” would either “immediately repair the offense” through 
marriage or suffer “punishment.” Either case, the authors wrote, “vindicat[ed] the purity 
and honor of Puerto Rican maidens and . . . punish[ed] debasers of the honor of the 
daughters of the country.”298 
According to Iglesias and the Federación, in years past it had been U.S. officials 
who had defended and Unionistas who had opposed the civil equality and honor of Puerto 
Rican workers. In 1902, a coalition between U.S. officials and Republicanos had 
legitimized consensual unions and offspring therefrom. Another law had given 
acknowledged natural children equal inheritance rights. After Unionistas took over the 
House of Delegates, they “overthr[ew]” these “American institutions” and “effectively 
annulled” the Spanish law of seduction, making it “nearly impossible to punish villains 
who outwit and dishonor the daughters of the country.” While castigating Unionistas, the 
argument did not implicate U.S. officials. Though U.S. judges had once liberally 
recognized consensual unions as common-law, or natural, marriages, the practice had 
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entered decline in the late-19th century. Iglesias and his followers argued that these limits 
were the rare U.S. innovations that proved poor fits for the island; years after 
implementing liberal U.S. marriage and divorce laws more than a third of island births 
remained out of wedlock.299 
 Though Iglesias and his colleague drew few adherents in the 1912 electoral 
campaign, they provoked substantial Unionista ire. Prior to the election, Unionistas had 
come to see separatism as their best route to greater self-government. Contending that 
Congress would never make Puerto Rico a state, they had removed statehood from 
among the alternatives that they sought in their party platform. And long hopeful that 
Democrats favored extending greater autonomy to the island, they had also announced 
that were Democrats to win the national elections in 1912 and not extend Puerto Rico 
home rule, Unionistas would abandon that goal, leaving independence as the only status 
they sought for their island. Iglesias and his colleagues, with their insistence that island 
masses would benefit from continued U.S. administration, thus opposed Unionistas on 
their marquee issue: status. In January 1913, soon after the new House of Delegates 
convened, José de Diego, its speaker and a leading Unionista independista, attacked 
Iglesias for effective and purportedly unpatriotic lobbying in Washington. Iglesias and his 
colleagues, De Diego charged, “machinate in Washington, in the Department of War, 
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before congressional committees,” accusing islanders “of immorality and despotism” to 
deny “the undeniable capacity and the indestructible right of the Puerto Ricans to rule 
their own destinies.” When it later summarized the speech, Unionista newspaper La 
Democracia further attacked Iglesias. Using Iglesias’s birth on the Iberian peninsula to 
impugn his loyalty, the paper described Iglesias’s advocacy of U.S. citizenship for Puerto 
Ricans as solicitation “by a Spaniard disloyal to his own citizenship, [of] the American 
citizenship for the Puerto Ricans.” Ignoring the difficulties of organizing the island’s 
more than half a million, overwhelmingly rural laborers, de Diego added in his speech 
that Federación Libre members numbered a mere handful of thousand artisans because 
“patriotic . . . Puerto Rican workers. . . will never join . . . those who . . . persecuted the 
dignity and the liberty of our fatherland.”300  
 Federación Libre members responded by publishing the pamphlet The Tyranny of 
the House of Delegates of Porto Rico and distributing it among U.S. and Puerto Rican 
laborers and politicians. In it they countered De Diego’s appeal to Puerto Rican 
patriotism with a vision, Atlantic in scope, of emancipated citizens toppling monarchical 
slaveholders. While serving in the Autonomous Cabinet under Spain in 1898, the 
Feceración related, many current Unionistas had, like “aristocrats” “in the majority of 
Latin American Republics,” tried to set up an “oligarchy.” They had been “feudal 
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patriarchs,” the organization elaborated, each with a “lordly dominion” like that that “the 
memorable French Revolution swept away.” After U.S. military governors freed labor 
leaders, declared a free press, encouraged criticism of officials, and protected worker 
meetings, the Federación wrote, Unionistas still saw workers as “the pariahs and 
disfranchised in Europe, and the slave in America,” “declar[ing] from the very midst of 
the House of Delegates that” the “organized massed” “should be suppressed.” Unionistas 
aimed to “strangle . . . blessed [U.S.] freedom,” they continued, so that the “modern Porto 
Rican slaveholder . . . [could] walk tranquilly through these towns, his seigniorial 
domain, while the freeman, the civilian, the energetic defender of the rights of his fellows 
citizens, has to leave.” But, the Federación argued, Unionistas would fail. Effacing the 
distinction between U.S. citizenship, which Iglesias still sought—and citizenship of 
Puerto Rico—which Puerto Rican already enjoyed, the Federación claimed that 
citizenship gave Puerto Rican workers “personality,” “elevate[d] and dignif[ied] them, 
and made them “respectable.” Iglesias and his Federación no longer cast workers as mere 
wards dependent on U.S. protection. They had become, in the words of the Federación, 
“free citizens, absolute masters of [their] acts and convictions,” and “energetic 
defender[s] of the rights of [their] fellow citizens.301 
The pressure that Iglesias and his colleagues applied to Unionistas had its 
intended effect. Already in 1912, Iglesias had secured a Bureau of Labor for the island. In 
1913,Iglesias told island and mainland workers that “representative members of the 
insular political parties and legislators came to realize that it was no longer possible to 
ignore the just demands of organized labor.” He detailed a raft of legislation supported by 
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the Federación that delegates had introduced and stated that six hundred new schools 
opened their doors to 30,000 children that year.302 
 
Citizenship Reborn: From Protection to Claims Making, 1913-17 
The U.S. political landscape shifted on March 4, 1913, when for only the second 
time since the Civil War an elected Democrat became U.S. President. The American 
Federation of Labor welcomed Woodrow Wilson’s new administration, and quickly won 
from it key clauses in the Clayton Act, including one that declared that “the labor of a 
human being is not a commodity” and a second that the Federation hoped would curb 
anti-labor injunctions by recalcitrant mainland judges. For Iglesias, these legislative 
victories mattered less than Wilson’s appointment of Arthur Yager as Governor of Puerto 
Rico and Lindley Garrison as Secretary of War, for in Puerto Rico it was administrators 
more than judges and legislatures who exercised autonomy, capacity, and authority. 
Iglesias, who now had to build new relationships with new leaders, faced potential losses 
of influence and friends in Washington following the change in administration. 
Unionistas, by contrast, welcomed and sought to exploit Democratic ascendance, which 
they had long predicted would bring greater self-government to their island. As in years 
past, administrators and congressmen also tried to formulate new policy for Puerto Rico. 
Puerto Ricans and U.S. officials often claimed that a U.S. citizenship that had come 
unmoored from rights and democracy mattered most as an omen of the ultimate status of 
the island, though few agreed as to what exact status it portended. Island representatives 
thus faced the challenge of formulating positions on a U.S. citizenship with a meaning 
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that depended on what U.S. congressmen intended by proposing to extend it.303 
 In 1914, the legislative fate of Puerto Rico in the House of Representatives lay in 
the hands of the Committee on Insular Affairs, especially those of its recently elevated 
chair, William Jones of Virginia. A veteran of the Confederate Army, Jones joined many 
congressional Democrats in interweaving romanticization of actions by U.S. southern 
whites during and after the Civil War with fierce criticism of what he called “the 
imperialistic and commercial policy of the Republican party.” In a 1900 floor speech, he 
had both savaged the Foraker Bill for withholding U.S. citizenship from a people “seven-
tenths of [whom] belong to the Caucasian race” and argued that “no such dangerous and 
absolute power as this [proposed in the Foraker Bill] was ever before lodged in an 
irresponsible carpetbag government.” By 1914, the gap between Democrats and 
Republicans on Puerto Rican policy had narrowed, with many members in each camp 
agreeing that Puerto Rico would remain permanently part of the United States and should 
have a more liberal government. On February 24, 1914, consistent with this shift, Jones 
introduced a bill similar to the compromise that Puerto Rico Governor George Colton, a 
Taft appointee, had advanced in 1910. In it he proposed to naturalize Puerto Ricans 
collectively as U.S. citizens, create an almost wholly elected island senate, give the 
governor an absolute veto, establish a Puerto Rican Department of Agriculture and Labor, 
and impose literacy and property requirements on new voters. Later that month Jones’s 
Committee opened hearings. As in 1910, naturalization was a flashpoint. Arguments of 
witnesses and congressmen revealed that a decade and a half of judicial and political 
evasion concerning U.S. citizenship had simultaneously drained its content, generated 
confusion over its meaning, and failed to reduce interest in whether and how it should be 
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distributed.304 
 Appearing before the Committee on Insular Affairs and before a Senate 
Committee hearing testimony on a similar bill on February 25-26, Governor Arthur 
Yager promoted U.S. citizenship as key to a permanent U.S. rule in Puerto Rico that 
would demonstrate U.S. good intentions to Latin America. Puerto Rico was “the only 
Latin-American country over which the United States has had an entire control for any 
considerable length of time,” Yager contended, so success there would “greatly improve 
the relations of the United States to the whole of Latin America.” He disfavored 
modeling U.S. rule on Latin American republics—“[N]o Latin-American people . . . 
seems satisfied with their government”—or what he portrayed as oppressive Spanish 
colonialism. Instead he favored British colonial models, which, he claimed, “governed 
many peoples successfully” “to the satisfaction of the people governed.” To that end he 
advanced a proposal backed by Secretary of War Lindley Garrison that Yager predicted 
would be popular among Puerto Ricans: streamlined, individual naturalizations. This 
voluntary approach, he argued, would foreclose independence and thereby end the 
impression among some Puerto Ricans “that the United States has not determined the 
future political status of the Porto Ricans.” Yet because it was not a collective 
naturalization it would not determine “whether [Puerto Rico] should ever become a State 
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or remain as a somewhat autonomous country.”305 
Unionista leader Luis Muñoz, now also Resident Commissioner, opposed 
collective naturalization as well. He and his party characterized the policy as bringing 
Puerto Ricans no new rights, guaranteeing no eventual statehood for Puerto Rico, 
precluding Unionista aspirations for independence, and thus subjecting islanders to 
permanent colonial rule. The year before, in a unanimous memorial, the House of 
Delegates had told Congress that U.S. citizenship promised Puerto Ricans few rights at 
home or abroad. Muñoz now added that proponents of U.S. citizenship like former 
President Taft, former Secretary of War Henry Stimson, and Senator Miles Poindexter 
had “state[d] clearly that American citizenship for Porto Ricans does not suggest the most 
remote intention on the part of the United States to ever grant statehood to my people.” 
Agreeing with Yager that U.S. citizenship would foreclose Puerto Rican independence, 
Muñoz argued that collective naturalization would make islanders “citizens of an inferior 
class” and Puerto Rico “perpetually a colony, a dependency.” Yager elaborated the 
argument for the committee. Were U.S. citizenship not to preclude it, Unionistas 
anticipated “that Congress will inevitably be forced by its own Constitution and its own 
ideas to grant them some sort of independence.”306 
 Congressmen perceived the feedback loop—witnesses based recommendations to 
Congress on perceptions of likely congressional actions—and tried to break it: 
The Chairman. Well, if the Congress decides upon statehood, there would 
be no reason, would there, why we should not make the Porto Ricans 
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citizens of the United States now? . . . 
Mr. [Muñoz]. [agrees] 
The Chairman. [T]here is no sentiment in the United States in favor of 
granting independence to the Porto Ricans? 
. . .  
Mr. [Muñoz]. There is no sentiment in favor of statehood for Porto Rico. 
The opinion is not definitely formed about the question. . . . 
. . .  
Mr. Brumbaugh. [W]ould you prefer, statehood [or] independence[?] 
Mr. [Muñoz]. As a political body, we look toward national independence. 
. . . 
Mr. Call[a]way. We had national independence in Texas, but we thought it 
was better [to] become one of the States . . . [though] this Government will 
not grant statehood to Porto Rico within the next 100 years . . . . 
Mr. Towner. [I]t is my judgment that . . . it will be granted statehood . . . . 
Mr. [Muñoz]. [I]f you tender statehood now, I, . . . accept statehood.307 
The exchange reveals contingency on both sides. Representatives’ disagreement about 
the likelihood of Puerto Rico becoming a state caught Muñoz between the possibility that 
Unionistas were wrong to consider statehood unachievable and the likelihood that 
embracing potential statehood would merely legitimize U.S. colonialism. He hedged, 
reiterating a platform ratified prior to this discussion, accepting immediate statehood, and 
withholding comment on eventual statehood. 
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 For U.S. officials, the question of the relationship between the status of people 
and the status of place was hard to resolve in part because it involved the legacy of the 
Civil War. In Scott v. Sandford (1857), the Supreme Court had rejected a claim to 
freedom by the enslaved Dred Scott on two grounds. First, the Court had held that it had 
no jurisdiction to hear the claim because Scott was not a U.S. citizen. Chief Justice Roger 
Taney had reasoned that U.S. citizenship was a status rich in rights. Positing an early U.S. 
Republic in which blacks did not vote or exercise other rights that he associated with 
citizenship, Taney had concluded that the Constitution presumed that free blacks were 
not U.S. citizens. Second, the Court struck a federal bar on some territorial slavery, 
thereby nullifying Scott’s claim that he was free because he had resided in a free territory. 
Taney had explained that Congress had no power to hold U.S. territories as perpetual 
colonies, then determined that the Constitution barred Congress from certain 
interferences with property rights, including rights over slaves, in U.S. territories. When 
the Civil War and 14th Amendment affirmed the principle of non-secession and partly 
overturned Dred Scott by declaring that “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States,” it had 
become possible to argue that all peoples in places that the United States annexed would 
become immediate U.S. citizens in eventual U.S. states. Some Democrats opposed to 
prior Republican imperial policies embraced this tradition, as when Representative Jacob 
Baker of New Jersey opined: “By the Constitution of the United States everybody under 
the flag is a citizen of the Republic,” and “the Government should recognize and 
establish State government” in every “qualified” “territory.”308  
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But with Democrats now administering colonial Puerto Rico and Downes v. 
Bidwell (1901) and Gonzales v. Williams (1904) having weakened claims like Baker’s, 
others in the party took more flexible lines. Secretary Garrison, for example, described 
Puerto Ricans as U.S. “denizens,” “people not citizens of the United States.” For many 
Republicans, whose party had led both the fight to preserve the Union and the effort to 
annex Puerto Rico permanently to the United States, the Civil War taught a different 
lesson. Thus Representative Horace Towner of Iowa contended, “we have never allowed 
any part of our territory to get away from us, and the probabilities are that we never 
will.”309 
 On March 11, new Bureau of Insular Affairs law officer Felix Frankfurter aimed 
to clarify matters with a legal memo to Congress reviewing recent federal decisions and 
laws involving status of people and places. In Neely v. Henkel (1901), the Court let the 
United States hold Cuba in temporary trust. Hawaii v. Mankichi (1903) allowed Congress 
to create what “was practically a territorial form of government, and yet not incorporat[e] 
systems of procedure deemed fundamental by our Bill of Rights.” A “unique form of 
executive government” in the Panama Canal Zone survived review in Wilson v. Shaw 
(1906), while Dorr v. United States (1904) and United States v. Heinszen (1907) affirmed 
delegation of Filipino legislative functions to agencies. Recent statutes had created a 
customs receivership in the Dominican Republic and given the United States influence 
over debt policy and a limited right of military intervention in Cuba. These precedents, 
Frankfurter argued, established that U.S. relations with dependent locales were “matters 
solely for congressional competence,” so Congress could “grant citizenship without 
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incorporation.”310 
On April 14, Santiago Iglesias wrote Samuel Gompers to offer to “go to 
Washington myself . . . to present a statement” in support of collective naturalization. 
Drawing an analogy between Puerto Rico and U.S. states with sizeable populations of 
American Indians and Mexican-Americans, Iglesias recalled that U.S. citizens in “New 
Mexico, Arizona, Oklahoma . . . wait[ed] . . . generations before they were taken in as 
States.” The question of the status of Puerto Rico as a place, he wrote, was “very 
premature.” He worried, though, that Unionistas would win individualized naturalization, 
exploit “the great ignorance of countrymen” into “not adopting” it , and thereby advance 
their “secret . . .policy of” achieving an “independence” like that in “Santo Domingo or 
Venezuela” in which local elites could tyrannize workers without fear of U.S. limitations. 
Instead, the Washington Star soon reported, Unionista objections to “legislation for the 
island . . . to a very large measure caused Congress to delay any definite action.” So, as it 
had for a dozen years, Congress passed no bill.311 
While Congress held hearings in 1914, strikes broke out in Puerto Rico that lasted 
four months and involved more than half of all workers employed in the manufacture of 
tobacco. As during prior strikes, police, mayors, and judges tied to Unionistas and subject 
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to oversight by presidential appointees in the island government barred labor 
demonstrations, disbanded Federación Libre meetings, and attacked and imprisoned 
strikers. When the governor and his cabinet did not rein in these local officials, Iglesias 
adapted his claims for protection to adversaries beyond the House of Delegates and to 
conflicts involving more than island legislation and electoral campaigns.312 
Unlike in 1912, when Iglesias enjoyed longstanding alliances with the Governor 
of Puerto Rico and the Secretary of War, he now had to build relationships with new 
appointees to these posts while seeking their support for laborers engaged in industrial 
conflicts. And unlike in 1909-1910, when Iglesias had first jointly pursued U.S. 
citizenship with then-Governor George Colton and Colton’s War Department allies, 
Iglesias now seemed unlikely to convince Governor Arthur Yager or his colleague 
Secretary of War Lindley Garrison to share either his position on U.S. citizenship or his 
main enemies. Before and during congressional hearings on Puerto Rico bills in 1914, 
Yager and Garrison had actively opposed Iglesias on collective U.S. citizenship. The 
employers and the investors from whom Iglesias’s Federación sought concessions also 
differed from the House of Delegates against whom Iglesias and previous U.S. officials 
had aligned. Governors and secretaries of war measured progress on the island by gross 
economic output, which they associated with mainland investment. Employers and 
property owners in Puerto Rico—especially those from the mainland—resembled high-
ranking federal officials in being well connected on the mainland and familiar with how 
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to advance their agendas within existing rules and norms. Police, mayors, and judges 
were similarly unlikely targets of U.S. ire. Police were executive-branch employees, 
hired by a governor-appointed commission and answering to a chief who reported 
directly to the governor. Mayors and local judges in Puerto were elected at the municipal 
level, hence technically independent from U.S. officials. Yet, the governor and attorney 
general had broad powers of oversight and removal over them. Abuse by police, judges, 
or mayors would mean active wrongdoing or failures to supervise on the part of U.S. 
officials.313 
In protesting official repression Iglesias drew on lessons learned during prior 
strikes, especially those in the years just before 1907. Then, Federación leaders had 
observed U.S. officials offer blanket denials to complaints of official misconduct, a 
strategy that strikers had facilitated by failing to create a formal, detailed, investigable 
record. In 1914 Iglesias made specific charges in more than thirty telegrams, judicial 
filings, and “complaints and protests in the form of filed statements duly sworn to.” 
Yager responded hostilely, describing Iglesias to the Bureau of Insular Affairs as a 
troublemaker and ordering an investigation that concluded that all actions taken by 
accused officials had been justified. Iglesias, for his part, told the Bureau and the 
American Federation of Labor that Yager was anti-labor and that because he condoned 
state actors’ well-documented “transgressions of the law,” “the rigor of the law was not 
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Unable to resolve their differences with Yager, Iglesias and the Federación sought 
to turn distant arms of the state against him and his associates through legal arguments in 
legal domains. Given “enormous” “gubernatorial and judicial corruption,” Iglesias told 
Gompers, “the only recourse that we have is to be constantly vigilant, to advise our 
lawyers, taking all the records and collecting all the proofs until seeing if in the end we 
can find some court where . . . justice for the workers in their fights will be recognized.” 
By courts, Iglesias appeared to mean official bodies providing procedural guarantees. He 
told Yager that he would accept an adjudicative entity that furnished witnesses 
opportunities to testify; provided a neutral forum in which to press constitutional and 
other legal claims; empowered parties to cause testimonial and other proofs to be 
produced; created a record; and made recommendations. Unlike the “terrorizing,” 
“almost inquisitorial” investigations Yager conducted in response to complaints, Iglesias 
claimed, his imagined adjudicator would be neither private nor staffed by individuals 
biased in favor of the accused.315 
In an October 5 letter to Iglesias, Yager also put a legal frame on their disputes. 
The government, he wrote, had a duty to enforce laws equally and presume the regularity 
of judicial activities. The Federación was in a weak position to claim protection from the 
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state, he added, because judges had criminally convicted its members. Instead, Yager 
directed Iglesias to First Amendment claims, recognizing that “the foundation of a 
democracy rests on freedom of speech” and promising to protect it. That freedom, 
however, had a narrow, predominantly political compass for Yager: “the right of citizens 
to liberally discuss and criticize the form in which government functionaries carry out 
their official duties.” It ended where governmental obligations to preserve order and 
protect property began.316 
The men’s rival legal strategies came to a head after non-unionized laborers in 
Bayamón left the sugar fields and demanded higher wages in January 1915. Strikes 
quickly spread throughout the island, drawing in more than 20,000 workers before they 
ended in late February and March 1915. Workers sought a share of the profits that 
materialized as World War I shortages drove up sugar prices. Stepping forward to 
provide advice and encouragement, Federación leaders also seized the opportunity to 
found a Socialist Party to participate in island politics and to try and organize sugar 
laborers permanently.317 
As promised, Yager acted to protect worker speech rights, though in ways that 
tended to defeat the strike. He instructed police to allow “peaceful and orderly” meetings 
“so long as the speakers” orate “within the limits of the law,” but to bar “[n]oisy and 
threatening parades of large bodies of workmen.” These ostensibly neutral rules worked 
to the detriment of strikers, who sought to alter economic relations, a disruptive endeavor. 
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Unlike large employers, they had little property for the police to protect. And while 
Yager recognized people’s property interest in their labor, he understood it to be 
individual. Each laborer, Yager claimed, could work or not work as he saw fit. The role 
of the police was not to protect the emotional appeals, peer pressure, and consciousness-
raising discussions that might lead workers to take unified action, but to insulate workers 
who chose to work from those who did not. In a subsequent letter to President Wilson, 
Governor Yager acknowledged ordering the “[t]he police . . . to preserve order and 
protect property,” but insisted that although this policy brought the strike to a prompt end, 
“No constitutional or legal rights of laborers or of others have been contravened.” 318 
In the meantime, Iglesias pursued a two-pronged strategy: create a record, then go 
to court. He had few alternatives. Unarmed, miserably poor, unaccustomed to 
demonstrating or organizing, and opposed by local industry and government officials, 
striking agricultural workers had little hope of meeting quasi- or extra-legal coercion and 
violence with successful arguments or in kind. So as anti-labor violence mounted, 
Iglesias requested that the Commission on Industrial Relations—a congressionally 
created body charged with examining U.S. labor conditions, relations, and disputes—
investigate. A month later the Federación instructed Iglesias also to ask Yager to create 
an independent, neutral commission to investigate events of the strike. Next Iglesias 
solicited American Federation of Labor support for securing a congressional investigation 
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and similar action by President Wilson.319  
Were Iglesias to win any of the hearings he sought, his success would depend 
upon having created an extensive, detailed record of purported official abuses from the 
outset. To that end, telegrams from strikers and their supporters poured in throughout 
February, creating independently verifiable, written records that particular charges had 
been made at specific times and places. Strikers supplemented these telegrams with 
sworn, notarized affidavits in which they detailed which state officials had committed 
what acts in which times and places. A government official reported getting “dozens of 
complaints every day,” several from Iglesias. At a hearing in Washington, Iglesias 
offered to produce “[m]ore than 100 telegrams” and “perhaps . . . nearly 100 affidavits” 
from a broad swathe of workers and Federación leaders. In one town, Iglesias related, 
“More than 1,000 country workers . . . filed complaints.”320  
As Iglesias and his colleagues built this record, they joined the American 
Federation of Labor in articulating broad speech rights. On the mainland, Federation 
members often criticized judicial injunctions as being illegitimate restrictions on laborers’ 
First Amendment rights to speak, walk and parade on public highways, peaceably 
persuade, hold meetings, publish, and picket. Iglesias advanced this more aggressive 
interpretation by reprinting in his labor newspaper Unión Obrera Gompers’s injunction 
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that “the working people of the island” be advised “that every constitutional, statutory 
and inherent right should be exercised in the effort to associate, assemble, and meet and 
express their thoughts and views.” Unlike constitutional or statutory rights, inherent 
rights were not necessarily recognized by courts or present in official texts. Gompers and 
Iglesias thus appeared to argue, as had many organizers before them, that some rights 
existed even in the absence of positive state authority.321 
As marshaled by Iglesias, the complaints described police using violence and 
threats against “pacific,” “peaceful,” and “orderly” strikers exercising First Amendment 
rights. Alberto Fernandez, a theater patron whose movie let out as police broke up a labor 
meeting, swore before a notary that he  
saw a policeman beating a man with a stick [and that] the poor victim 
begged the policeman to stop beating him (the victim), saying these 
words, “Don’t hit me more,” and then the policeman shot him, and the 
poor man said to said policeman, “Please don’t kill me, that I am going 
out,” and then the policeman shot again the second time, killing him.322 
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Focusing on expressive rights, workers charged that police repeatedly forbade and 
“disbanded, violently and illegally,” parades, public meetings, small gatherings, and acts 
of symbolic speech. They pulled speakers off platforms based on what they said, and in 
one case Chief of Insular Police George R. Shanton and the island District Attorney told 
volunteer-organizer Esteban Padilla that “meetings in the rural zone were prohibited as 
well as any manifestations or group of more than ten persons.” 323 
Claims involving U.S. flags made the point particularly strongly. Concerned 
about striker violence, insular officials treated flagpoles as weapons. Yager told police 
that “parades of laborers, armed with . . . clubs . . . must be strictly prohibited,” and 
Esteban Padilla reported Chief of Police Shanton telling him “it was also prohibited to 
carry flags.” Insular officials thus tried to maintain order and protect workers’ rights by 
refusing them access to what one labor leader called expression via “symbols, . . . flags of 
the idea they represented.” The Federación responded by placing U.S. flags into the 
hands of strikers and then reporting, for instance, how “an American flag was torn from 
the hands of an aged country striker, and he himself was hit by the policeman’s billy.” 
This strategy aligned Federación claims to expressive rights with defense and 
proclamation of general U.S. liberties, while forcing insular officials to choose between 
commitments to either property and order or to the patriotism that the U.S. flag 
represented. By electing the former, officers attacked a U.S. symbol and denied strikers 
rights for which, the Federación purported, the United States stood.324 
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On April 15, after the above record was largely complete, Gompers told Iglesias 
that he had won him an appearance before the congressional Commission on Industrial 
Relations. Five days later, Commission Chairman Frank Walsh invited Secretary Lindley 
Garrison to send representatives to address Iglesias’s “General Allegations.” The 
commission apparently envisioned an adjudicative “hearing,” later describing the event 
as a “full and fair presentation” by both sides. On May 26, Iglesias claimed rights and 
protection, telling the commission that biased officials deprived strikers of liberties and 
that the U.S. nation had a duty to improve living conditions of island laborers. The 
presidential appointees serving in Puerto Rico who testified contested the first point and 
concurred in the second.325 
When the Commission transmitted its final report to Congress on August 23, 
1915, testimony and exhibits concerning Puerto Rico filled nearly 200 pages. A plurality 
of commissioners took positions favorable to the Federación, noting that all witnesses 
had agreed that island laborers suffered severe deprivations. In language that harkened to 
Iglesias’s 1910-12 demands for protection, the Commission described how a 
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“responsibility rests upon the American Nation for the conditions of the people in our 
colonial possession who occupy the position morally and legally of wards of the Nation.” 
The Commission also apologized for workers who “may have been guilty of excesses” 
after having been “provoked by the agents of the employers or by the police.” It found 
“no excuse,” however, for the actions of “the rural police and local magistrates,” which 
“violated the personal rights of the strikers” and “treated them . . . with wanton 
brutality.”326 
Iglesias’s legal-administrative strategy had produced political returns. By 
appearing before the commission, Iglesias raised his standing among officials and 
workers in Puerto Rico and on the mainland. The hearing and report increased mainland 
awareness of Puerto Rican laborers’ poverty under U.S. stewardship. By forcing them to 
acknowledge, justify, and document their decisions, the hearing made the words and acts 
of insular officials visible. Doing so showed workers, local officials, and employers that 
violators of workers’ rights could be investigated and condemned, albeit not yet 
punished, by a federal entity. Laborers also won standing at the hearings, the official 
record of which showcased documents authored by island workers and responses of U.S. 
officials to them. Given the myriad obstacles facing the Federación, these were large 
gains.327 
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Santiago Iglesias, U.S. officials, and Unionistas returned their attention to federal 
legislation for Puerto Rico during the 1915-17 congressional term. Taking what the 
Washington Star called “[t]he most important single step” toward passing a new organic 
law for Puerto Rico, Unionistas in 1915 moderated their calls for independence, stressing 
that home rule was their immediate goal. Governor of Puerto Rico Arthur Yager worked 
concurrently to build political support for a bill like that which had failed in 1914, and by 
the end of the year had “got it included in the Message of the President to Congress.” In 
late December Yager traveled to Washington to work with Congressmen to formulate 
proposed legislation, and on January 25, 1916, Chairman of the House Committee on 
Insular Affairs William Jones introduced a bill that Yager supported. Its provisions were 
familiar. It proposed to collectively naturalize all Puerto Ricans who did not take 
affirmative steps to retain their “present political status” and to create a department of 
agriculture and labor. In lieu of the absolute gubernatorial veto previously proposed, the 
governor would get a qualified veto backed up, in cases of legislative override, by an 
absolute presidential veto. The island legislature was to be wholly elective and literacy 
and taxpaying requirements would apply to all voters. As in years past, all sides focused 
on the citizenship provision of the bill and compared U.S.-Puerto Rican relations to 
events during the U.S. Revolution, Spanish imperialism, and Reconstruction. But, in light 
of the recent island-wide strikes, shifting understandings of the relationships between the 
status of people and place in the U.S. constitutional system, and World War I, the parties 
altered their arguments and in some cases their stands.328 
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In January 1916 the Senate Committee on the Philippine Islands and Porto Rico 
and the House Committee on Insular Affairs opened hearings on similar versions of 
Jones’s bill. In testimony to the committees, Yager supported an elected island legislature 
to be tempered with what he elsewhere termed “certain reasonable restrictions on the 
ballot.” In a nod to growing separatist sentiment among Puerto Ricans, Yager described 
them as “a homogenous race, with a civilization running back . . . to the Middle Ages,” 
and with distinct linguistic, literary, intellectual, and religious traditions. “[W]hen we 
attempt to apply to it an American background,” he contended, “we make a mistake.” 
Yager also now sought collective naturalization of Puerto Ricans as a means to shore up 
U.S. colonial rule. In line with Frankfurter’s 1914 memo, Yager depicted a U.S. 
citizenship that bore no necessary legal relationship to political rights or any particular 
status of place. It did “not imply suffrage or statehood” and would not block Congress 
from giving Puerto Rico “independence.” But it would, Yager contended, mean “that we 
have determined practically that the American flag will never be lowered in Porto Rico.” 
Doing so was also good public relations, he argued, because “the masses of the Porto 
Rican people[] would cheerfully accept citizenship” so long as “some increased 
participation in their own government” followed. Moreover, he claimed, it was a matter 
of U.S. principles. Puerto Ricans merited “citizenship as . . . not a privilege, but a right” 
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both because they “permanently” “owe[d] allegiance . . . and [we]re open to all the pains 
and penalties imposed for their disobedience” and because “[w]e have no place in our 
Constitution for subjects.”329 
When Muñoz and his co-partisan Cayetano Coll y Cuchi appeared before 
Congress on behalf of Unionistas in early 1916, they also supported Jones’s bill as a 
whole, but asked legislators to remove the disfranchisement clause and not impose 
collective citizenship without eventual statehood. Explaining that “[we] “have been a 
colony for 400 years, and we do not want to be a colony,” the men observed that two 
forms of self-government—“statehood or independence”—“appear[ed] at the present 
time to be very remote measures.” As a result, they did “not take any systematic stand 
either against or for American citizenship.” “[I]f we are going to stay forever within the 
union,” “now is the time to grant American citizenship,” they explained, but if Congress 
may grant independence, naturalization now could later “confront[ Congress] with the 
very serious problem of unmaking 1,500,000 citizens of the United States.” Moreover, 
Puerto Ricans, who “have their dignity and self-respect to maintain,” they contended, 
“will preserve their conception of honor,” and “refuse to accept a citizenship of . . . the 
second class, which does not permit them to dispose of their own resources . . . nor to 
send to this Capitol their proportional representation.”330 
Weaving arguments concerning the place of Puerto Rico in the Spanish-speaking 
Americas with those about U.S. ideals and standing, Muñoz and Coll y Cuchi depicted 
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U.S. denials of autonomy to Puerto Rico as a regrettable re-enactment of Reconstruction. 
All Spanish colonies in the Americans, they argued, had eventually gained a “free 
political life.” Most had come to “figure in the family of nations”; Puerto Rico won a 
“complete form of self-government” from Spain. Asserting that Cuba and the Philippines, 
to whom the United States had respectively given and promised independence, were “not 
more civilized or wealthier in proportion to their respective areas” than Puerto Rico, the 
men reminded Congress of what they called “the democratic principles upon which the 
Republic of the United States has been founded.” Those principles, they contended, had 
been reaffirmed in response to World War I, with U.S. leaders “from Washington to 
Wilson” advocating “the ability of small countries to lead an independent life.” Now the 
men offered Congress imperial-American exceptionalism, the chance to “stand before 
humanity as the greatest of the great; that which neither Greece nor Rome nor England 
ever were, a great creator of new nationalities.” U.S. foreign relations were also at stake, 
they claimed. U.S. actions in Puerto Rico influenced Caribbean nations’ choices between 
“the influence of the American Government” and “London, Paris, or Berlin.” Yet self-
government had not arrived. As the Congressional Record reported, they appealed to 
Democratic legislators by arguing that this was for “the same sad reason of war and 
conquest which let loose over the South after the fall of Richmond thousands and 
thousands of office seekers, hungry for power and authority, and determined to report to 
their superiors that the rebels of the South were unprepared for self-government. 
[Laughter.]” The men potentially overreached, however, when they concluded that Puerto 
Ricans “are the southerners of the twentieth century,” a remark that the Record did not 
record occasioning applause or amusement.331 
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The fragility of the analogy that Unionistas asked Democrats to draw was evident 
in the remarks of the notoriously white-supremacist Senator from Mississippi, James 
Vardaman, and Texas representative James Davis. In a floor speech supporting Jones’s 
bill, Vardaman described the “misfortune” of bringing “into the body politic” a people he 
claimed would “never, no, not in a thousand years, understand the genius of our 
government.” This was especially so, he elaborated, because “I think we have enough of 
that element in the body politic already to menace the nation with mongrelization.” But 
given that it was likely “the Porto Ricans are going to be held against their will,” he 
explained, he was more concerned about federal tyranny: “I am from the South, where for 
years we had a carpetbag government, and I know from experience how intensely 
disagreeable that is.” Representative Davis found the competing interpretations harder to 
reconcile. During committee hearings, he suggested that Puerto Ricans were like “the Tea 
Party that threw the British tea overboard,” denounced by an empire as “an irresponsible 
rabble,” but really “the foundation of the greatest republic on earth.” Yager instead 
compared them to Reconstruction-era blacks, and Davis initially took the hint: 
Mr. Davis. . . . We have had that situation with the negroes. I have seen 
500 negroes standing in a cabin, all waiting for their sack of flour. . . . 
Mr. Yager. Don’t you think it was a mistake to give them the ballot? 
Mr. Davis. I do. 
Mr. Miller. [You have] answered the whole argument [with] that reference 
to the history of the last 50 years. 
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But then during a House floor debate, Davis again reversed course, opposing federal 
disfranchisement of Puerto Ricans because he saw harm from federal intrusion into local 
affairs outweighing benefits of disfranchisement: 
[Davis]. Every man in Texas has the same right to vote I have. 
[Miller of Minnesota]. But do they vote? 
[Davis]. Black and white, thank God, if they want to. I have to pay $1.50 
poll tax before I vote, and that goes into the school fund and helps educate 
the negro children . . . . 
[Miller]. Does not the gentleman think some such property qualification 
would be proper for Porto Rico or— 
[Davis]. We are acting for ourselves down there in Texas, and these 
people are not acting for themselves. When they treat themselves that way 
I have no objection, not a bit of it. [Applause.]”332 
In communications to the American Federation of Labor, its President Samuel 
Gompers, Congress, and others, labor leader Santiago Iglesias reconceptualized U.S. 
citizenship and refused to support a bill that included disfranchisement. Unlike seven 
years earlier, when Iglesias had advocated U.S. citizenship as a way for dependent 
workers to secure the protection of an ostensibly benevolent administrative state, 
organized labor now lacked state support in its efforts to secure higher wages and faced 
official violence, censorship, and delegitimation. In 1916 Yager told the House 
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Committee on Insular Affairs that “Federation of Labor . . . leaders . . . seem to be rather 
neglectful of the real interests of the laborers and inclined to look to their personal 
interests,” while Iglesias charged that a new set of “conspiracies of the corporation, 
politicians and local governmental officials” had led to five deaths and violations of 
expressive rights. Absent the administrative support Iglesias has envisioned, workers had 
gone on strike, made claims, and joined his organization, the Federación Libre, acting 
less as wards than as self-assertive political agents. In response, Iglesias now sought to 
win protection for workers in two ways: by winning elections on behalf of candidates for 
the Socialist Party that he had recently helped form and by turning distant arms of the 
state against those on the island. The latter required matching a friendly forum to a 
legible claim, and he identified Congress or a congressionally created island Department 
of Agriculture and Labor as leading candidates.333 
U.S. citizenship could advance both aims, and Iglesias evaluated the section of the 
Jones Bill “granting American citizenship to the Porto Ricans (collectively)” to be its 
“greatest and most important part.” Most immediately, it would preserve congressional 
jurisdiction by ensuring continued U.S. sovereignty. As Iglesias had written Gompers in 
1914, proponents of independence described U.S. citizenship as “a chain which will tie 
[Puerto Rico] forever” to the United States, precisely the result that Iglesias sought. 
Additionally, Iglesias had told the Commission on Industrial Relations, U.S. citizenship 
                                                 
333 Report of Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth Annual Convention of the American Federation of Labor Held 
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suffered a form of “semioutlawry”). 
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could mean U.S. membership and U.S. laws, including those federal labor protections 
that Puerto Ricans did not yet enjoy: 
Chairman Walsh. You want the same laws applied to the working people 
of Porto Rico as apply to the people of the United States? 
Mr. Iglesias. Yes, sir. That is the best way to make true American 
citizens.”334 
 U.S. citizenship was also potentially valuable to Iglesias for claims making. 
Iglesias utilized a similar strategy based on sovereignty, governance, and American 
exceptionalism. Asserting that “America stands for an ideal,” he complained that “nearly 
two decades [after] the American flag [was] raised in Porto Rico,” islanders enjoyed only 
“a few of the outward forms of American rights and liberty.” Perhaps because some 
congressmen saw the ostensibly minimal content of U.S. citizenship as an argument in 
favor of extending it to Puerto Ricans, Iglesias generally did not claim that islanders 
would exercise new rights as U.S. citizens. He made an exception, however, to oppose 
disfranchisement, which he no longer accepted in exchange for naturalization. 
“[R]ecommending granting American citizenship disfranchisement,” he thus asserted, 
“g[ave] no credit to [the] American nation.” Federation President Samuel Gompers 
provided a model for more expansive claims based on citizenship when, in a letter 
concerning strikes in Puerto Rico, he complained to President Wilson that “the action of 
government agents . . . denied the workers the fundamental rights of free citizens”335 
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With Unionistas, Governor Arthur Yager, Representative William Jones, and 
President Wilson all behind Jones’s Bill, and with Iglesias primarily objecting to the 
disfranchisement clause he had previously accepted, the bill’s backers were hopeful. The 
danger, Yager told Unionista newspaper La Democracia, was apathy and delay. Initially 
the bill made steady progress. Jones’s committee unanimously recommended it to the 
House, which then passed it on May 23, 1916. The Senate Committee on the Pacific 
Islands and Puerto Rico unanimously recommended an amended version to the Senate, 
and in September both house jointly called for Puerto Rico to delay its scheduled 1916 
elections in anticipation of enactment of its new government. On December 5 President 
Wilson called on Congress to send him the bill. But then, with the final session of the 
Congress winding down in February 1917, senators like progressive leading light Robert 
La Follette of Wisconsin objected to the disfranchisement clause in the bill and prevented 
a vote. Possible U.S. entry into the Great War made passage more urgent. Though the 
United States could and would draft non-U.S.-citizen Puerto Ricans for the war effort, 
newly appointed Secretary of War Newton Baker nonetheless told the bill’s main handler 
in the Senate that “[t]he importance of this bill cannot be overstated. The whole moral 
dominance of the . . . United States in the American Mediterranean is involved in our 
treatment of the people of Porto Rico, and these unfortunate delays give . . . illustration 
for argument as to our neglect of . . . peoples associated with us.” Backers of the bill then 
jettisoned the disfranchisement clause, securing a positive Senate vote on February 20. 
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That change survived the conference between the chambers, with Jones later telling the 
House, “in my judgment, this bill could not have been passed by this Congress if the 
House conferees had held out for either a property or an education qualification.” 
Otherwise the bill remained much as Jones had introduced it. Both houses passed the 
reconciled bill, and Wilson signed it into law on March 2.336
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By 1917, the constitutional crisis that had been latent since the occupation of 
Puerto Rico was, if not solved, contained. Two decades earlier, many in the United States 
had argued that the U.S. occupations and potential annexations of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and 
the Philippines had brought the nation to a crossroads between adherence to U.S. 
constitutional norms and emergence as a global imperial power. President William 
McKinley’s allies had battled self-styled Anti-Imperialists over the merits of a U.S. 
empire and the scope of the U.S. Constitution. In the two decades that followed, however, 
many U.S. officials sought to reconcile a constitutional tradition of individual rights, self-
government, and legal equality to an imperialism that the prominent attorney Frederic 
Coudert called, “the domination over men of one order or kind of civilization, by men of 
a different and higher civilization.” To do so, they divided big, hard issues into smaller, 
hopefully more manageable ones. And when some questions remained intractable, they 
deployed strategic vagueness to delay giving answers.  
 U.S. constitutional practice and doctrine did not emerge from the endeavor 
unscathed. Prior to 1898, U.S. citizenship had been intertwined with the legacy of Dred 
Scott (1857) and its subsequent repudiation by the Reconstruction-era Amendments to the 
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U.S. Constitution. In that case, writing in the shadow of decades of judicial ambiguity 
concerning the content and distribution of U.S. citizenship, Chief Justice Roger Taney 
had implied that U.S. citizenship was rich in rights. The Founders could not have 
intended free blacks to be U.S. citizens, he had argued, because states had long denied 
them civil and political rights associated with citizenship. Eleven years and a civil war 
later, the 14th Amendment had made the contrary interpretation explicit, holding that “All 
persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, 
are citizens of the United States.” Throughout the late 19th century, the U.S. Supreme 
Court had construed the 14th Amendment to mandate U.S. citizenship for all people 
subject to U.S. jurisdiction and born in lands under U.S. sovereignty. As to the substance 
of U.S. citizenship, the Court had spoken with two voices. In a series of cases involving 
specific rights, it had construed the “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States” quite narrowly. In Downes v. Bidwell (1901), however, justices treated U.S. 
citizenship as a sufficiently robust status that the threat of its extension to peoples in the 
newly acquired territories would impede U.S. expansion. U.S. governance of Puerto Rico 
and the Philippines after 1917 capped the process of constitutional narrowing, pushing 
back against what remained of unitary and substantive visions of U.S. citizenship, both 
by thinning out the content of the U.S. citizenship granted to Puerto Ricans, and by 
denying U.S. citizenship altogether to Filipinos. In cases like Rabang v. Boyd (1957), the 
Supreme Court eventually read the U.S. Constitution to permit the United States to hold 
millions of Filipinos as U.S. subjects or what Coudert would have called U.S. non-citizen 
“nationals.” Following Filipino independence, they thus could be and were deemed aliens 
and deported.337 
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 Gonzales v. Williams (1904) marked a turning point in this narrowing of the 
potential of the 14th Amendment as a basis for claims involving U.S. citizenship. Before 
Gonzales, and notwithstanding the congressional decision to withhold recognition of 
Puerto Ricans as U.S. citizens in the Foraker Act (1900), it was plausible to expect that 
the Supreme Court would continue to find all peoples born in U.S. lands under U.S. 
sovereignty to be U.S. citizens. While justices had expressed concerns about recognizing 
recently annexed peoples as U.S. citizens in Downes v. Bidwell (1901), those concerns 
both struck some prominent mainland and island lawyers as answerable and indicated 
that a Supreme Court decision on Puerto Rican citizenship remained to be made. By 
contrast, many legal experts read Gonzales to implicitly endorse the view that colonized 
peoples like Puerto Ricans and Filipinos were nationals but not citizens of the United 
States. After that decision, Resident Commissioner Federico Degetau y González’s view 
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that courts could be convinced to recognize Puerto Ricans—or Filipinos—as U.S. 
citizens came to appear increasingly quixotic. Secure in the new conventional wisdom 
that the Supreme Court would not recognize Filipinos as U.S. citizens absent 
congressional action, federal lawmakers extended Puerto Ricans but not Filipinos U.S. 
citizenship in the Jones Act (1917).338 
 Gonzales is in some ways an unlikely legal landmark, a short opinion and narrow 
holding that the Supreme Court has cited only occasionally. That the case nonetheless 
played a key role in the history of U.S. citizenship illuminates how that history sprawled 
beyond U.S. courtrooms and formal doctrine. It included claims and decisions by federal 
administrators, elected U.S. officials, and Puerto Rican leaders and litigants, all of whom 
characteristically drew creatively upon and thereby transformed prevalent ideologies and 
metaphors concerning race and empire.  
Focusing on these dynamics reveals how Gonzales emerged out of and then 
shaped struggles in the United States around citizenship, empire, and the constitution. 
The case began when Isabel Gonzalez, a Puerto Rican seeking to relocate to New York, 
asserted that she was a U.S. citizen and thereby challenged immigration officials’ 
authority to deny her entry into the United States. By the time her claim reached the 
Supreme Court, the top administrator at the Ellis Island immigration station and leading 
lawyers from the private New York Bar, the federal government, and the Puerto Rican 
political class had joined the fight. These advocates related the question of Puerto Ricans’ 
citizenship to the status and treatment of men, women, children, colonized and 
indigenous peoples, and ethnic minorities within the U.S., Spanish, French, and British 
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empires. In 1904, the Supreme Court resolved Gonzalez’s claim, finding Puerto Ricans 
not to be alien to the United States and declining to clarify their U.S. citizenship status. 
Partly as a result, a new Puerto Rican political coalition secured durable majority status. 
It deemphasized test cases and focused instead on confronting federal authorities while 
seeking liberalization of congressional policy toward Puerto Rico. Within the U.S. state, 
Gonzales marked the transformation of the U.S. citizenship status of Puerto Ricans from 
a judicial matter to a legislative one. By decoupling Puerto Ricans’ fate from that of 
Filipinos, whom many in the U.S. state perceived to be truly degraded, the decision also 
altered the relationship of Puerto Ricans’ U.S. citizenship status to ideologies of race and 
empire, to perceived exigencies of imperial governance, and to U.S. constitutional norms. 
 Though Gonzales and other Insular Cases accorded U.S. officials enormous 
discretion in governing U.S. nationals in unincorporated territories like Puerto Rico and 
the Philippines, it was the Cuban model that came to dominate U.S. foreign policy. 
Rather than place Cuba within and beyond the U.S. nation, as it had Puerto Rico and the 
Philippines, the United States eventually came to position its interactions with Cuba in 
the realm of foreign relations, but foreign relations reflecting “ties of singular intimacy.” 
The United States insisted that it was as a sovereign nation that Cuba had acceded to the 
Platt Amendment and to the prospect of U.S. intervention. Vis-à-vis the United States, 
Cubans thus did not have the same access to U.S. courts, officials, or constitutional 
arguments as Puerto Ricans. Militarily and economically subordinated to the United 
States, however, Cuba was also not in a position to use its sovereignty to assert itself 
forcefully in state-to-state dealings with the United States. Through force, threats, 
economic pressures, political interference, and negotiations, the United States similarly 
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expanded its sphere of influence in the Americas and elsewhere, ensuring that many 
neighbors there also became second-class sovereigns.339 
U.S. citizenship after 1917 provided Puerto Ricans no guarantee that the U.S. 
government would refrain from colonial rule. It turned out not to be a pathway to 
territorial incorporation, a guarantee of constitutional rights, or a harbinger of self-
government. Ubaldino Ramírez Quiñones learned that it was also not a prerequisite to 
compulsory U.S. military service. In 1917, he awaited receipt in Puerto Rico of a copy of 
his dentistry diploma. Without it, he could not qualify to participate in World War I as an 
officer in the U.S. Dental Reserves Corps. Instead, like all “male citizens, or male 
persons not alien enemies who have declared their intention to become citizens” in the 
United States, Ramírez could be drafted into the general ranks. Hoping to avoid the draft 
long enough to receive his diploma, Ramírez declined U.S. citizenship. When his 
diploma subsequently arrived, military superiors announced that he could not join the 
Dental Reserve Corps as a non-citizen. The Bureau of Insular Affairs added that he could 
not rescind his declination of U.S. citizenship.340 
Concerned that other islanders might also refuse U.S. citizenship, Governor 
Arthur Yager asked the War Department to construe the selective-service law to apply 
equally to Puerto Ricans who became U.S. citizens under the Jones Act and islanders like 
Ramírez who retained their pre-Jones Act status. Initially, the War Department had 
contemplated exempting all Puerto Ricans from the draft. But because the army planned 
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to shift to a wholly conscripted army, the Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs had 
objected that the plan would lead the island to “lose the great economic advantage which 
would come to it” “and to the young men in Porto Rico” “by the putting in the military 
service, for a period, of some thousands of its citizens.” Instead, the Judge Advocate 
General of the Army had ruled that Puerto Ricans who declined U.S. citizenship would 
not thereby become exempt from the draft. Soon afterward, Yager reported that only 288 
islanders ultimately had turned down U.S. citizenship.341 
 José Balzac, a pro-labor journalist, found embracing U.S. citizenship to be equally 
unavailing. After Balzac criticized Governor of Puerto Rico Arthur Yager in print as a 
“diabolical incarnation of despotism” in 1918, the Prosecuting Attorney for the District of 
Arecibo charged Balzac with libel and the District Court of Arecibo—after denying his 
request to be tried by a jury—convicted him. Claiming a 6th Amendment right to a jury 
trial, Balzac appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. He had reason to be hopeful. In 1901, a 
plurality of the Court had cited congressional failure to recognize Puerto Ricans explicitly 
as U.S. citizens as a key consideration when it classified Puerto Rico as an 
unincorporated territory where residents enjoyed only fundamental constitutional rights. 
By implication, the recognition of citizenship that had come with the Jones Act should 
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bring full constitutional protections.342 
Instead, recognition of Puerto Ricans as U.S. citizens had not occasioned Puerto 
Rican incorporation but rather acknowledgement of ongoing island non-incorporation. In 
a unanimous rejection of Balzac’s appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court held that despite being 
U.S. citizens, residents of Puerto Rico had no constitutional right to trial by jury. Puerto 
Rico remained unincorporated territory entitled only to “fundamental” constitutional 
rights, Chief Justice William Taft wrote on behalf of the Court, and those rights did not 
include trial by jury. Taft thus rejected the claim that congressional extension of U.S. 
citizenship to Puerto Ricans had occasioned incorporation of Puerto Rico. He 
acknowledged that prior Court opinions had looked to the citizenship status of territorial 
residents in determining whether Congress had incorporated their territories. But those 
cases, he explained, had examined congressional actions that had taken place at a time 
when “the distinction between acquisition and incorporation was not regarded as 
important.” Now that the Insular Cases had changed the constitutional order, he 
reasoned, only an “express declaration” of incorporation by Congress—and not mere 
collective naturalization of territorial residents—would suffice to incorporate territory. In 
reaching its conclusion in this way, the Court for the first time definitively embraced the 
doctrine of territorial non-incorporation that Justice Edward White had introduced in his 
plurality opinion in Downes v. Bidwell in 1901.343 
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 In the most glaring ommission, U.S. citizenship also left residents of Puerto Rico 
without a vote in the U.S. Congress to whose laws they were subject or for the U.S. 
President who appointed their governor. Consequently, even as the Jones Act opened 
positions within the Puerto Rican state to some politically connected men of Puerto Rican 
heritage, it blocked the kinds of elections that might have given voice to anti-colonial 
sentiments, and kept the appointment power closely tied to Washington. Domingo 
Collazo encountered this dynamic when he sought appointment as Treasurer of Puerto 
Rico in 1917. Drawing on his prior partisan service—which included criticizing 
Republican imperialism and organizing voters behind Democratic candidates—he won 
backing for the job from Democratic Senator Kenneth McKellar and Democratic 
National Committee member Hugh Wallace. His vocal anti-colonial politics, however, 
were out of step with the U.S. colonial rule in Puerto Rico as Democratic President 
Woodrow Wilson envisioned it. Unsurprisingly, then, Governor Yager, also a Democrat, 
did not make Collazo his Treasurer. Afterward, Collazo criticized Yager and sought a 
more modest post in the island government, an initiative that Yager moved to scuttle.344 
Collazo’s niece, Isabel Gonzalez, continued to criticize U.S. governance of Puerto 
Rico, even twenty-three years after participating as a litigant in the citizenship case of 
Gonzales v. Williams (1904). Writing to the New York Times in 1927, Gonzalez attacked 
the system that the Jones Act had wrought. Drawing on progressive tropes, she 
characterized Puerto Rican politics in terms of apathetic voters electing corrupt 
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legislators, an ineffective and politically appointed governor, and a lack of expert 
governance. Though she had worked in a factory at least during her early years in the 
United States, Gonzalez now aligned herself with landowners and investors. Those “who 
took the trouble to go to the polls,” she wrote, had elected “politicians intoxicated with 
their own verbosity” who implemented policies of over-borrowing, over-spending, and 
over-taxing. Claiming that these politicians’ actions “cannot but lead to final disaster, 
though to their personal profit,” Gonzalez also criticized presidentially appointed 
Governor Horace Towner as “either too weak or too condescending with the politicians 
to tell them that unscientific running of Government undermines credit and frightens 
capital.” Because Towner “is utterly unable to stem the tide of radicalism which is now 
holding Porto Rico under its irresponsible sway” and became “anarchy is there which 
[Towner] cannot control,” she added, “a war of classes” was imminent. Under the 
existing system, she implied, only presidential intervention would “bring back conditions 
to their original standing under the flag of the United States.”345 
Senator Elihu Root, who had opposed the substantive citizenship for Puerto 
Ricans that Gonzalez had sought, now joined her in disparaging the results of the Jones 
Act, which had extended to islanders a formal U.S. citizenship without concomitant self-
government. He wrote: 
Citizenship in a democracy means something more than a decorative title. 
It means the right to share in government. What Porto Rico needs and 
really wants is not to take part in the government of the United States, but 
to be protected in governing herself. . . . Her people cannot really be 
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citizens of the United States, and, calling them so only delays the real 
liberty Porto Rico should have.346 
Yet in defending a robust vision of citizenship as political participation and of 
Puerto Ricans as wholly excluded from U.S. governance, Root overstated his case. U.S. 
citizenship brought voting rights to many otherwise qualified Puerto Ricans resident on 
the mainland. It also ensured their freedom of movement within U.S. borders. Though 
Gonzales v. Williams (1904) held that U.S. immigration officials could not prevent Puerto 
Ricans’ migration to the mainland by labeling them aliens, it did not address 
congressional power to exclude people who were neither aliens nor U.S. citizens. In 
1934, Congress enacted the Philippine Independence Act, which both promised that 
archipelago eventual sovereignty and capped immigration from there by “citizens of the 
Philippine Islands who are not citizens of the United States” at fifty persons per year. As 
U.S. citizens, Puerto Ricans remained exempt from such immigration rules, and in the 
years after World War II they migrated by the hundreds of thousands to the U.S. 
mainland. Today, more than four million U.S. citizens resident on the mainland self-
identify as Puerto Rican.347 
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 Other legacies of the formalization of colonial disabilities persist. Puerto Rico 
remains an unincorporated territory with no clear indication of an end in sight to that odd 
status. The Insular Cases are still largely binding precedents, albeit vague and widely 
criticized ones. More than a century after introducing the principle that only 
“fundamental” constitutional rights apply to unincorporated U.S. territories, the Court has 
provided just piecemeal guidance concerning which rights qualify as “fundamental,” and 
on what grounds. And as in 1898, many in Puerto Rico draw on competing conceptions 
of citizenship to struggle over the meanings of self-determination. The troubled legacies 
of 1898, whether in San Juan, Havana, Washington, or Guantánamo, remain with us.348
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